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ABSTRACT 
PATTERNS IN THE LEGISLATIVE RATINGS AND 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF BUSINESS AND LABOR PACS 
(February 1985) 
Cornelius N Hetzner III, A.B., Indiana University 
M.S., University of Massachusetts 
Ph.D. University of Massachusetts 
Directed by Dr. Arthur Elkins 
The ability of interest groups in the United 
States to affect the political process has drawn 
interest and concern since before this nation's 
founding. During the last ten years, the role of 
interest groups in electoral politics has drawn even 
more heightened attention. The cause of the attention 
has been the substantial force political action 
committees (PACs) have played in campaign funding. 
The number of PACs and the proportion of their 
contributions to campaign financing have grown rapidly. 
Journalists and scholars have begun efforts to 
describe, analyze and evaluate the importance of PAC 
growth. Most of these efforts are founded on 
comparisons of the relative growth among the Federal 
Election Commission's (FEC) PAC categories, 
particularly the corporate and labor categories. 
The relevance of making FEC or business/labor 
categorical comparisons hinges on two issues dealing 
• • • 
vm 
with cohesion. One issue of concern is the behavioral 
cohesion within a particular category. If 
organizations within a category act dissimilarly, that 
tendency will weaken the usefulness of the category as 
a unit of analysis. To date, PAC researchers have 
assumed behavioral cohesion among categorical elements. 
The findings of this study indicate that this 
assumption is not based in fact. Using organizations' 
ratings of members of Congress as a measure of 
behavior, discrepancies are found between PAC origin 
(categorical membership) and behavior (legislative 
ratings). Inferences about what a PAC seeks cannot be 
made from knowledge of its categorical membership. 
The second issue dealing with cohesion is concerned 
with the correspondence between what instrumental goals 
a PAC wishes and its ability to pursue those goals 
through financial contributions. The PAC's 
instrumental goals are defined by their ratings; the 
pursuit of these goals is measured by their 
contributions to members of Congress. This study's 
findings shew that there is less than perfect cohesion 
between approval when measured by ratings and approval 
when measured by contributions. However, unlike the 
case with ratines, the financial contribution patterns 
of PACs cause the sample of organizations to split into 
ix 
well-defined business and labor categories. 
The results found within this study indicate that 
the importance and complexity of this issue of 
categorical cohesion demand intensified research 
efforts. 
x 
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CHAPTER I 
THE GROWTH OF PACS 
Introduction 
In The Federalist Papers, James Madison writes, 
"Among the numerous advantages promised by a well 
constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately 
developed than its tendency to break and control the 
violence of faction."^ While the Constitution has been 
successful in the control of factions in the sense that 
the United States is neither a monarchy nor a 
totalitarian state, the balance of forces has been 
precarious enough that factions have drawn piercing and 
critical observation since the country's founding. 
It is the question of balance among factions that 
has been the impetus for the present study. Passage of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the data 
recording and disseminating activities of the Federal 
Election Commission since 1976 have allowed political 
activity to be investigated with heretofore unknown 
depth and rigor. In the years since 1976 much 
attention has been paid to the amount of money being 
contributed to Congressional campaigns by the political 
action committees (PACs) of various factions. To a 
1 
2 
great extent, the importance of those dollar flows 
hinges upon the cohesion of the givers. If campaign 
contributions of a particular size come from a set of 
sources that are like-minded in terms of legislative 
goals that money is apt to be more influential than the 
same amount of money coming from a number of 
contributors having very disparate legislative goals. 
Thus, the legislative cohesion of the givers enhances 
or mitigates the influencing capacity of the 
contributions. 
On the surface, as evidenced by PAC contributions, 
the relative power of the business faction of the U.S. 
has grown while that of labor has shrunk. This 
conclusion hinges on certain assumptions about the 
cohesion within and the separation between the business 
and labor factions. This project looks at the strength 
of the cohesiveness assumptions. Before exploring 
these assumptions, modern attempts to preserve 
factional balance and the PAC growth of the last ten 
years, which has triggered the present concern over 
imbalance, will be described. 
Modern Electoral Reform 
In the 20th century, the United States has 
undergone three major periods of reform aimed at 
3 
restoring a balance among factions. In 1907, in 
reaction to the perceived political influence of 
businessmen in the election of Theodore Roosevelt to 
the Presidency, Congress passed the Tillman Act 
[Alexander (1976, 1980)]. The Tillman Act prohibited 
corporations from making political contributions of 
federal candidates. Three years later Congress passed 
a campaign funding disclosure law that required 
candidates to publicly disclose the source of the funds 
expended on their campaigns. 
In the 1940s, Congress passed three pieces of 
legislation that sought to diminish labor's role in the 
electoral process. The Hatch Act of 1940 set a $5,000 
limit on an individual's contribution to a single 
federal candidate. The Smith-Connally Act forbade 
union political contributions to Federal elections for 
the duration of the war. With the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, unions were restricted from 
making expenditures or contribution from their 
treasuries to Federal political conventions, primaries, 
or general elections. 
FECA and PACs 
After a decade of false starts during the 1960s, 
Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1971 and the Federal 
4 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. Congress' intent 
for the Revenue Act was to curb the potential for undue 
influence of wealthy donors by providing for publicly 
financed presidential elections. 
The FECA was intended to be a modernized, reformed 
version of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. 
Most electoral experts agree that the FECA, through the 
Federal Election Commission, has been successful in 
recording and making public the electoral financing of 
federal candidates [U.S. Congress, House. Campaign 
Finance Study Group (1979)]. Great dissension exists 
over the success of FECA in terms of controlling the 
influence of special interest groups over the electoral 
processes of federal candidates [Epstein (1982)]. 
The FECA, its 1974, 1976 and 1979 amendments, the 
FEC's SUN-PAC Advisory Opinion, and the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Buckley v. Valeo have contributed to a 3300% 
increase in the number of political action committees 
and a 900% increase in PAC receipts in the 1972-1982 
period [FEC Record (Mar., 1984)]. The large increase 
in PAC receipts does not necessarily indicate a growing 
participation by interest groups in the electoral 
process. Prior to the 1970s it was almost impossible 
to accurately estimate interest group contributions. 
Much financing was done through purposefully deceptive 
5 
means. It may be that the proportion of campaign 
contributions funded by interest groups has remained 
relatively constant, that it is only the channels of 
funding that have changed. 
The rapid growth in the numbers, receipts, 
expenditures, and contributions of PACs serves as a 
strong justification for their study. In addition, 
that growth has not been distributed evenly over what 
are perceived to be the major interest group blocks in 
this country [FEC Record (Mar., 1984)]. As research 
results in the next section will indicate, it appears 
that the electoral influence of business has grown 
while that of labor has waned. 
If one accepts the Madisonian notion that the 
prevention of tyranny by either majority or minority 
needs constant vigilance in a democracy, then a change 
in the relative strength of interests such as business 
or labor calls for research into the implications of 
those changes. 
From a different perspective, interest groups that 
engage in electoral politicking have a need for research 
that can explain, predict others', or enhance their own 
participation in the electoral process. For businesses 
susceptible to turbulent environments [Fahey and King 
(1977)], Bower and Doz (1979), Mintzberg (1979)], astute 
6 
political activity may become as important a factor for 
their survival as more traditional managerial skills. 
For business, increasing foreign competition, expanding 
government regulation, rising costs of funds, and 
changing tax policy may be more conducive to solution 
through the political process than through operational 
changes in the organization itself. For organized 
labor, foreign imports, high unemployment, and a 
diminished membership may cause it to seek redress in 
Congress rather than at the negotiating table. 
The rapid growth of PACs, a growing segment of 
single issue PACs, and a perceived demise of party 
influence [Polsby (1981)] have caused PACs to become 
one of the most important political changes of the last 
ten years. To date, the research efforts directed at 
this great change in campaign financing have been 
relatively straightforward descriptive analyses of PAC 
growth and composition. 
Descriptive PAC Research 
Since passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971, political action committees have grown in 
numbers from 113 in 1972 to 3700 (approx.) at the end 
of 1984. The receipts of PACs during the same period 
have growth from $19.2 million to an estimated $200 
million total for the 1982 two year election cycle 
[Epstein (1980), FEC Record (Mar., 1984)]. 
In fulfilling the mission given to it by Congress, 
the Federal Election Commission has issued summary 
statistics of PAC and other Federal electoral process 
activities since the 1976 elections. 
Under the present FEC design, PACs are aggregated 
into six categories. The FEC defines PACs as "all 
political committees not authorized by a federal 
candidate and not established by a political party" 
[FEC Record (Mar., 1982)]. The FEC categorizes these 
political entities as: 1. Corporate; 2. Trade/ 
Membership/Health; 3. Non-connected; 4. Labor; 
5. Cooperative; and 6. Corporations without stock. 
The financial activity of PACs is portrayed using 
three financial categories—receipts, expenditures, and 
contributions. In addition, within certain parameters, 
the FEC collects and disseminates the names of 
contributors, their economic affiliations, the size of 
the contributions, and the names of the recipients of 
the contributions [Cantor (1982)]. 
The efforts of the FEC have provided political 
researchers with a wealth of accurate detail that 
8 
previously was only estimable or, too often, unknown. 
Due to the way the FEC data is developed and arranged 
and to its accessibility on computer tape, researchers 
may analyze PACs using party, individual candidate, 
candidate status (incumbent, challenger, open), PAC 
category, individual PAC, and Senate or House of 
Representatives as categorical variables. 
The following section is a summary of what 
descriptive studies have ascertained about the growth 
in- numbers and receipts and the contribution behavior 
of political action committees. 
PAC Growth 
PACs have greatly increased in number since 1974. 
Table 1 records the growth in the number of registered 
PACs from 1974 through June of 1982. While all PACs 
have grown five fold in the eight year period, that 
growth has been uneven. PACs affiliated with 
corporations have increased from 89'in 1974 to 1,555 in 
December 1982, an increase of over 1700%. During the 
same period labor PACs have growth from 201 to 415, an 
increase of 206%. In other words, for every new labor 
political action committee, there have been seven new 
business PACs formed. This disproportion is magnified 
if one accepts Epstein's contention (in Malbin, 1980), 
9 
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that, at a conservative estimate, one half of the PACs 
included in FEC categories other than business and 
labor should be viewed as promoting a pro-business 
philosophy. Under that assumption, in 1982, 
business-oriented PACs outnumbered labor PACS 2,107 to 
350. 
Table 2 shows that in the period from 1976 to 1982 
corporate PACs nearly doubled their proportion of 
receipts, disbursements, and contributions. Labor's 
share fell from 36% to 24% of all nonparty PAC 
contributions. Labor's receipts dropped even more 
precipitously as a percentage of all nonparty receipts; 
however adjusted receipts for all PACs grew by 260% in 
a period of five years. 
Table 3 decomposes the contributions of PACs by 
year, category, amount, party, and status. By party, 
business PACs are more balanced in their giving than 
of labor. While labor has given less than 10% of its 
money to Republicans, business gives one third of its 
money to Democrats. Business and labor both distribute 
the majority of their funds to incumbents. 
The above representations of PAC growth are 
descriptive in nature. The patterns they reveal may be 
summarized as follows: 
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1. PACs have increased at a great rate in their 
numbers and in their ability to raise and 
distribute funds. 
2. PACs, on average, contribute over one-fourth 
of a Representative's and one-fifth of a 
Senator's campaign funds. 
3. Although PACs still favor Democratic 
candidates as recipients, the Democratic edge 
seems to be shrinking. 
4. Over 60% of PAC contributions continue to be 
made to incumbents. 
5. Labor PACs have shrunk from one-third of all 
PACs in 1972 to one-ninth in 1982. Labor's 
contributions, which constituted 50% of all 
donations in 1972, were down to 25% in 1980. 
6. Corporate PACs have grown to become one-half 
of all PACs. From 1976 to 1980, business 
PACs increased their expenditures from 10% to 
25% of ail PAC expenditures. In the two year 
period of 1978-1980, corporate PACs increased 
their contributions from one sixth to 
one-third of all PAC contributions. 
It is results such as these that have caused 
concern over factional imbalances and the perverting of 
political processes through interest group influence 
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based on contributions. 
Theoretical Research 
As the number of PACs and their contributions have 
grown, more attention has been given to developing 
frameworks to discover the implications of that growth. 
Research is beginning to move from description to 
explanation and interpretation. What follows are the 
results of two studies that go beyond descriptive 
analysis. 
Environments and PAC Growth 
In November of 1982, Edwin Epstein presented a 
paper to the Conference on the Impact of the Modern 
Corporation that may have surprised these who have 
followed Epstein’s voluminous writing or. PA.Cs over the 
last dozen years. Epstein writes, 
"In a more personal vein, I have argued for over a 
decade, that absent the legal right of 
corporations and labor unions to contribute 
directly to political campaigns, the PAC mechanism 
served as a useful and appropriate vehicle for 
their limited involvement in electoral politics. 
The almost exponential increase in PAC 
activity—particularly among corporate and ether 
business-related committees—over the past several 
years has raised serious doubts in my mind as to 
whether PAC contributors do not already exceed 
their "fair share" of Congressional candidates' 
campaign receipts" [Epstein (1982 p. 118)]. 
Epstein's conclusion derives from his studies of 
the potential for future corporate PAC development. 
Only 35% of the 1,000 largest industrial corporations 
have PACs. The formation of PACs for those 1,000 
corporations increased by nearly 50% between 1978 and 
1980. 
Epstein concludes that beyond the size variable, 
corporate PAC formation is influenced by both 
regulatory and economic dependence on the Department of 
Defense (DOD). Highly regulated industries and those 
corporations holding DOD contracts have a greater PAC 
formation rate than those not exhibiting those two 
characteristics. 
Ideology vs. Pragmatism 
In 1982 Edward Handler and John Mulkern published 
study of the behavior of a sample of 71 corporate PACs. 
Using FEC data, corporate PAC bylaws, interviews with 
an officer from each PAC, and other information the 
authors attempted to discern if there were differences 
in the electoral philosophy and behavior of corporate 
PACs. Their results suggest that there are at least 
two styles of corporate PAC behavior--pragmatic and 
ideologic. 
PACs in the pragmatic mode tend toward greater 
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support of incumbents. For a pragmatic corporate PAC: 
"the priority is to accommodate, in what it 
regards as a realistic way, the existing 
composition of Congress, and to secure and 
maintain a high degree of access to incumbent 
elected officials, with some, but not heavy, 
emphasis on party affiliation" [Handler and 
Mulkern (1982, p. 14)]. 
When evaluating candidates for the possibility of 
contributing to them, pragmatic PACs focus on a relatively 
small set of issues that are of direct concern to the 
particular corporation. Ideological corporate PACs 
are: 
"seeking to alter the political composition of 
Congress,to help produce a conservative or 
Republican majority in both houses, or failing that, 
to induce a movement in a more conservative and 
pro-business direction--in any case to move the center 
of gravity of the Congress to the Right" [Handler and 
Mulkern (1982), p. 14)]. 
Ideological corporate PACs evaluate potential recipients on a 
range of issues that they believe will improve the general 
business environment. 
Handler and Mulkern classified their sample into a 
four part typology—ideological, ideological leaning, 
pragmatic leaning and pragmatic. Membership in a 
particular category was determined by using seven 
ratios that measured incumbency. Republican party and 
liberal Democrat support. 
The authors found that ideological business PACs 
made greater contributions to and supported Republicans 
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much more strongly than did pragmatic PACs. The 
authors classified 56.4% of their sample as ideological 
or ideological leaning. 
Handler and Mulkern conclude that "corporate PACs 
express differences in priorities and perceived 
interests in a continuum of contribution strategies" 
[Handler and Mulkern (1982, p. 33)]. The authors argue 
that the business community shows more political 
diversity than that of labor, although not so little 
that it could be claimed that no community of business 
interests exists. 
The question of cohesiveness and diversity among 
corporate, as well as other, PAC categories is an 
important one. 
It is the degree of cohesiveness of the behavior 
of interest groups that underpins all questions about 
the relative power of those groups. If it can be shown 
that the cohesiveness of the business community differs 
greatly from that of the labor community, then 
conclusions of factional imbalance based on straight 
forward comparisons of the numbers of PACs and the size 
of their contributions of these two factions becomes 
subject to doubt. Handler and Mulkern find diversity 
in PACs from the business community; however they 
provide no reference point that would allow the 
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determination of the meaningfulness of that diversity. 
Without a comparison point such as labor, it is 
difficult to draw inferences about the impact of 
corporate PAC behavior upon the relative power of 
business in the political process. 
In the following chapter five hypotheses are 
developed to investigate the degree of cohesion within 
a set of politically active organizations composed of 
business, labor, liberal, conservative, agricultural, 
and other interests. The cohesion of these various 
factions is investigated from two perspectives. 
Similarity of approval toward members of Congress and 
similarity of campaign contribution patterns are used 
to determine the degree of cohesion within particular 
interest groups. 
The choice of legislator approval and campaign 
contributions as the operational variables of the 
cohesion construct have not been chosen haphazardly. 
Their selection derives from theories of interest group 
behavior. The following sections discuss the relation¬ 
ship of interest group theory to group cohesion. 
Introduction to Interest Group Theory 
In the 19th century, the politics of America were 
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studied using the individual as the unit of inquiry. 
That focus changed in 1908 when Arthur F. Bentley's The 
Process of Government was published. Bentley argued 
that to understand American political behavior 
political scientists should study groups rather than 
individuals. In the following seventy-five years 
numerous theories about how interest groups form, 
adapt, and achieve their goals have been formulated 
[Bentley (1945), Schattscheider (1942), Truman (1951), 
Olson (1970), Salisbury (1970)]. 
During the last ten years, the study of interest 
groups has meant primarily the study of PACs. However, 
the body of interest group theory has not played a 
significant role in the investigations of PAC behavior. 
9 
In. large part, the small number of theory driven, 
% * • • 
analytical PAC studies, when compared to descriptive 
studies, is due to the relatively short time that PAC 
statistics have been available. 
Proliferation Theory 
Proliferation interest group theorists, such as 
Bentley, propose that the formation of interest groups 
is tied to the complexity of a society. As the social 
and economic relationships of a society become more 
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diverse, a need arises among people to form groups 
specifically directed to protecting their specialized 
interests. The more complex the society, the greater 
the number of interests, and the greater the number of 
groups needed to represent those interests. 
There is little argument that the 1970s were a 
decade of rapid change in the U.S. Long term 
inflation, the embargo and price rise of oil, the 
influx of women into the job market, and conservation 
and consumerist legislation are but a few indicators 
of that change. The six fold increase in the number of 
PACs during the same period may reflect the attempt of 
groups of people with newly similar interests to deal 
with that change. 
If societal complexity has increased and diversity 
of interests grown along with it, as the 
proliferationists would argue, that change is not 
reflected in PAC research. In almost all instances, 
academic researchers have used the six FEC categories 
as the units of analysis. Analysis is drawn from 
aggregating 3,700 PACs into six groups of origin. In 
non academic settings, journalists have used the 
behavior of single PACs to try to convey the impact of 
P/vC growth and influence [Perry, 198 2] . 
In each type of investigation, little note is made 
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of either increased diversity or the implications of 
that growing diversity. Instead, the common assumption 
is that corporations and business associations tend to 
act in a singular, cohesive fashion. Labor, too, is 
assumed to have congruent political goals. Handler and 
Mulkern's study is the most noticeable attempt to 
address the question of degree of cohesion in interest 
group PACs. 
Homeostatis Theory 
Homeostatis group genesis theory, of which David 
Truman's work. The Governmental Process, is 
representative, posits the formation rate of groups 
upon dislocations in the society at large. In 
Salisbury's words: 
"A putative equilibrium among social groups is 
disturbed as a consequence of such socially 
disruptive factors as technological innovation, 
war, transportation or communication changes and 
such macro-social processes as major population 
movements, business cycle fluctuations and 
industrialization. The disequilibrium will 
evoke a response from the disadvantaged sectors 
as they seek to restore a viable balance" 
[Salisbury, (1970), pp. 35-36]. 
In the business literature much attention has been 
paid during the last twenty years to the increasingly 
turbulent environments in which business must act 
[Ansoff (1965), Bower and Doz (1979), Lawrence and 
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Lcrsch (1967)]. As environments destabilize, the 
ability of business organizations to control their 
fates through business functional skills becomes less. 
Strong operational control diminishes to a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to maintain a successful 
business. Extra-organizational solutions developed 
through the political process become necessary. 
The last ten years were witness to a number of 
business "haves" becoming "have nots." The steel and 
auto industry were devastated by imports. The savings 
and loan industry became stuck between low interest 
bearing mortgages and the high cost of new funds. 
Attempted passthroughs of the increased cost of 
petroleum and the fear of nuclear power caused the 
utility industry to fall from economic and social 
grace. 
In each of these examples, the industry affected 
made a concerted effort to wrest a public policy 
solution to the problems caused by environmental 
instability. 
With the exception of Epstein's work on formation 
rates among Department of Defense contract holders, 
almost no one has investigated PACs using a homeostatic 
perspective [Epstein (1982)]. There has been no 
investigation of whether formation rates or size of 
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contributions are affectec by relative loss of eccr.cric 
position. Almost without exception, in the study of 
FACs the unit cf analysis has been the FEC category. 
Sub Rosa Theory" in Current Research 
While in a formal sense there have been few 
explicit links between theory and PAC research, in 
another sense much cf the analysis cf PAC behavior has 
been made while implicitly subscribing to some theory 
or theoretical fragment. The very way data is 
aggregated and the comparisons deemed relevant imply 
seme cognitive structuring by the researcher. This 
section attempts me elucidate the assumptions 
underlying the order that researchers have placed cn 
their data. 
To a great extent the analyses of PAC behavior 
have concentrated on a comparison of the growth and 
contribution patterns of labor PACs to these cf 
business. To choose this comparison as a focal point 
implies seme conflict between the electoral, and hence 
political and economic, aspirations of business and 
these of labor. In its essence, the making cf this 
comparison is a Marxian based analysis. That is, it is 
assumed that the goals of a particular group, owners 
and managers, are inimical to those of workers. 
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While there is strong historical evidence of the 
usefulness of this type of comparison, it is arguable 
whether this diametricality is as clear cut in the 
1970s and 1980s as it was during earlier periods. 
In anecdotal fashion, it is possible to list 
numerous occasions during the past few years when 
portions of labor formed coalitions with various 
industries. The UAW and the domestic car manufacturers 
have fought together to curtail automobile imports. 
The USW and the largest steel producers have formed a 
partnership to try to limit imports of foreign steel. 
In 1980 and again in 1984, a great number of blue 
collar workers aligned themselves with large and small 
business owners to elect President Reagan with his 
program for reducing inflation, entitlements, and 
taxes. 
Group Cohesion Assumptions 
With the few exceptions such as Handler and Mulkern 
(1982) and Epstein (1982), PAC researchers have assumed 
the cohesiveness of the political goals held by the 
members of a particular FEC category, particularly with 
the corporate and labor categories. 
Unions' recent declining membership, the relatively 
small proportion of U.S. workers that belong to unions in 
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comparison to European nations, the historical conflict 
between the often exclusionary policies of craft unions 
versus more inclusionary general unions, are but a few of 
the points that indicate a lack of cohesion within the 
labor community. 
In the 1984 presidential elections, the leadership 
of the AFL-CIO made an early commitment to Walter 
Mondale's campaign. Large numbers of the AFL-CIO's 
members ignored that commitment in order to vote for 
President Reagan. This and other incidents offer 
evidence that interest group analyses based on 
assumptions of organized labor cohesiveness, either 
with respect to itself or with all workers, may be of 
suspect validity. 
If the representativeness and cohesiveness of labor 
is suspect that of business is more so. Epstein (1982), 
and Handler and Mulkern (1982) have offered research 
findings that argue against the notion that businesses 
act as a cohesive economic interest group, or electoral 
force. 
While it seems apparent that nearly all businesses 
and associations must hold some goals in common, what 
is less apparent is the degree of goal congruency among 
them. Economic interest group theory suggests that the 
fact that National Association of Manufacturers, the 
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Chamber of Commerce, the National Federation of 
Independent Business, the National Restaurant 
Association, and the National Realtors Association are 
able to maintain large memberships over many years 
means that they must be fulfilling some needs 
particular to their respective constituencies [Olson 
(1970), Salisbury (1970)]. To date, no attempt has 
been made to determine the congruency and disparity of 
goals among the numerous groups subsumed under the 
business category. 
Rather than cohesion, micro economic principles 
suggest that the closer a business organization 
resembles another the greater the degree of competition 
(conflict) between them. While each unit in ah, 
industry may hold general goals in common, it is-.. A 
assumed that each unit also will attempt to influence 
events in such a way as to provide itself with a 
comparative advantage. In the same vein, different 
industries compete with one another over everything 
from national trade policies, to tax benefits, to 
access to the labor pool. Common situs picketing, 
transportation deregulation, minimum wage legislation, 
the deficits and interest rates, and revision of the 
Clear Air Amendments are recent examples where 
industries failed to act in concert with one another. 
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If corporations hold few goals in common and if the 
same is true for unions, then making judgments about 
PAC activity from the aggregated FEC category data is 
subject to questions of validity. 
This project tests the relative cohesiveness of 
two groups - one composed of labor unions and a second 
composed of business associations. In addition, it 
investigates the criterion of mutual exclusivity of the 
FEC PAC categorical scheme. In the following chapter 
the author develops a paradigm to investigate interest 
group cohesion through cluster analyzing the 
legislative ratings and campaign contributions of 
interest group members. The strengths and weaknesses 
of using contributions and ratings as a means to 
measure cohesion are discussed. It is concluded that 
the analysis of interest group cohesion may be advanced 
through the use of these two variables. A series of 
interrelated hypotheses directed toward measuring 
cohesion through the linkage of these two variables 
concludes the chapter. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The 
Federalist Papers, (New York: Pocket Books, 1964), p. 
16. 
The data contained in Tables 1, 2, and 3 are 
compiled from FEC Record summary reports, Epstein's 
"PACs and the Modern Political Process" paper of 
1982, and mhe 1979 Campaign Finance Study Group report 
ro uhe Committee on House Administration. 
2. 
CHAPTER II 
AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUP COHESION 
"All the real knowledge which we possess, 
depends on methods by which we distinguish 
the similar from the dissimilar.... 
For we must not join in the same genus 
the horse and the swine, tho' both species 
had been one hoof'd nor separate in different 
genera the goat, the reindeer and the elk, 
tho' they differ in the form of their horns. 
We ought therefore by attentive and diligent 
observation to determine the limits of the 
general, since they cannot be determined a 
priori. This is the great work, the important 
labour, for should the general be confused, 
all would be confusion." 
- Linnaeus, in 
Genera Plantarum 
Categorizing PACs 
The previous chapter indicated that much of the 
analysis of PACs has been confined to combinations 
and permutations of FEC-defined variables. 
The section dealing with the theory of interest 
group behavior suggested that a modern industrial 
society is composed of numerous groups each having its 
own particular and, to some extent, unique set of 
concerns. 
The manner in which the FEC categories PACs and 
their behavior causes much of the uniqueness of 
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interest group concerns to be submerged. 
The FEC aggregates 3700 PACs into six categories. 
The FEC categorizes PACs by the PAC's parent body, 
i.e., by origin. This is an obvious way to separate 
one PAC from another; however, this scheme is not the 
only one available. The FEC could choose to divide 
PACs into two groups—liberal and conservative. Or, 
like Epstein, the FEC could divide the category of 
corporate PACs into subcategories of industrial and 
non-industrial, defense contract holding and 
non-holding, or highly and minimally regulated 
corporations. 
The choice of categorizing scheme will obviously 
influence the results of any analysis. As analytical 
results influence the conclusions and implications to 
be drawn and, subsequently, public policy, it may be 
said that the choice of categorical scheme influences 
public policy. How the political interests of various 
groups in the United States are evaluated, and 
encouraged or curtailed as a result, depends in part 
upon the grouping variables used in the preliminary 
data aggregation. 
Presently there exists an anomaly between the 
categorical variables used in research and the interpre¬ 
tations of the research results of those categories. 
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The primary research categorical variables are those of 
the FEC. The six FEC categories are essentially 
categories of PAC origin. The category into which an 
individual PAC is placed is determined by its parent 
organization. However, the interpretation of the 
results, including conclusions, implications, and 
suggestions for public policy, treat the origin 
variable as though it were a variable of purpose. 
Where the PAC comes from (origin) is used to indicate 
what political goals (purpose) the PAC is seeking. 
Whether stated or not, the underlying assumption of 
much PAC research is that the members of a particular 
FEC category tend to act in concert with, and seek the 
same goals as, other members of the same category. 
Whether this assumption is true has not been thoroughly 
tested. 
Epstein (1982) and Handler and Mulkern (1982) both 
touch on the behavioral dissimilarities of members of 
the FEC corporate category. Each concludes that there 
are subsets within the corporate category that display 
different behavior. 
If the members of a particular category behave in 
different ways or seek different goals, then it may be 
presumed that the prinia facie power of that group is 
greater than its real power. That is, a group in which 
33 
members fail to work in concert, or work at cross 
purposes to other members, may be expected to wield 
less power than a group, comparable in size and other 
relevant attributes, in which goal or behavioral 
cohesiveness is more pronounced. 
In the previous chapter it was noted that economic 
and interest group theories suggest that a modern 
industrialized nation would be expected to have a large 
number and a great diversity of groups. That theoretical 
expectation has not been translated into research premises. 
Rather, in most cases, a small number of categories and an 
ersatz Marxian labor/business orientation have been the 
predominant research approaches. 
The use of legislative ratings is proposed as an 
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alternative way to analyze PACs without depending upon the 
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common research assumptions. The logic of tying ratings to 
FEC data hinges on the notion that it is group political 
purpose, where purpose means both political goals and 
purposeful behavior to achieve those goals, rather than 
group origin, that should be the focal point of research. 
Ratings 
Over seventy groups issue ratings of members of 
Congress. These ratings portray to what extent an 
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organization considers a member of the House or Senate 
to be supportive of its political goals. 
In most cases, the rating components are made up 
of a number of votes on legislation deemed important by 
the issuing organization. After the legislative sample 
has been selected, the percentage of "correct" votes by 
individual legislators is tallied. Those lawmakers 
approaching 100% on the ratings may be judged to be 
more supportive of an organization's goals than those 
who score near zero. 
In a few cases, as with Environmental Action 
Inc.'s Dirty Dozen, only a subset of Congress' members 
is evaluated. In most cases, all members of Congress 
are rated. 
Different organizations make different use of the 
ratings. Some seek the widest possible dissemination 
of their ratings; others are more restrictive in 
circulating their evaluations. 
If one accepts the assumption that an organization 
is the best judge of its own self-interest, then one 
may be led to accept organizationally constructed 
ratings as a strong surrogate for organizational 
self-interest. Admittedly, the optimal research 
situation would be to have all politically active 
groups evaluate all the legislation to come before 
Congress. In this hypothetical situation, it would be 
possible to determine the absolute cohesiveness of 
FEC-defined groups. Comparisons within and across 
groups could be made. More importantly, it would be 
possible to determine the efficacy of the FEC 
categories. For example, if one were to find that the 
legislator evaluations of a subgroup of corporate PACs, 
e.g., smokestack industries, were closely matched by a 
segment of labor groups, e.g., industrial unions, then 
the usefulness of the FEC categories and those 
categories' linkages to electoral contributions could 
be questioned. Unfortunately, the above situation is 
not matched in reality. 
Not all PACs rate; not all PACs that rate make 
campaign contributions. Perhaps the largest drawback 
is the lack of any individual corporations that issue 
ratings. However, the sample used in this research 
includes almost fifty organizations representing 
numerous interest groups. 
For this study the emphasis is on the cohesion of 
approval toward the legislators not the legislation 
itself. It cannot be argued that the fact that several 
organizations rate a single legislator equally implies 
that those organizations hold goals in common. But, if 
several organizations tend to display the same pattern 
of ratings across all members of one or both houses of 
Congress, then it does seem highly probable that the 
similar patterns derive from some commonality of 
purpose, if only electoral goals, rather than from 
chance. 
By applying similarity techniques such as cluster 
analysis to ratings, it is possible to construct 
groupings of organizations that are similar in terms of 
their behavior rather than their origin. The degree of 
difference between the membership of the origin group 
and that of the purpose group can be tested. In 
addition, the rating consistency of, for example, a 
group of business associations can be compared to the 
consistency of a group of labor organizations. 
The use of ratings also allows for a greater 
understanding of the use and effect of PAC money in 
campaigns. The ratings profile of an organization or 
group can be compared to the contribution profile of 
the same entity to determine whether legislative 
behavior is necessarily rewarded financially. In 
addition, the contributions of dissimilar organizations 
to the same candidate can be investigated to determine 
the degree of contribution neutralization. The next 
section discusses the use of money as a variable in the 
study of interest group politics. 
Money as Power 
The study of PACs is the study of political 
influence. Those who have analyzed PACs have tended to 
operationalize the construct of influence in terms of 
dollars [Adamany (1980), Alexander (1976 , 197.9 , 1980)]. 
It is assumed that groups that are more successful at 
raising and contributing funds have an increased 
ability to influence both elections and legislation. 
On its surface this argument is both methodologically 
and logically pleasing. 
In a methodological sense, the choice of money as 
a surrogate for influence eases the task of the 
researcher greatly. Financial data is easy to obtain. 
It lends itself to ready and comprehensible comparison. 
It allows the investigator to circumvent both the 
herculean task of.attempting to define the goals of an 
organization tracing and the organization's ability to 
achieve those goals through the labyrinthine processes 
of Congress. 
Unfortunately, money is not a perfect surrogate 
for political influence. Alexander (1980) has noted 
the difficulty in comparing the financial contributions 
of business to those of labor. Organized labor has a 
long history of augmenting its financial support of 
candidates with extensive volunteer activities such as 
voter registration, get-out-of-the-vote efforts, 
leafletting and the manning of telephones. To look 
only at labor's financial resources would be to 
underestimate labor's political clout. 
In an effort to improve the precision of money as 
a surrogate of influence, Jacobson (1980) attempted to 
trace the changing utility of contribution dollars. He 
found that money contributed early in a campaign, 
especially to an unknown challenger, has a greater 
utility to the candidate than later contributions. The 
viability of a campaign frequently hinges on voter 
recognition, and recognition, in most cases, must be 
purchased through the media. 
An additional problem with using contribution 
dollars as a straight forward surrogate for influence 
is related to the interrelations among cohesiveness, 
conflicting interests, and the constrained recipient 
pool. Consider that while the number of PAC 
organizations has grown from 600 to 3700 and the amount 
of money these PACs contribute has risen from $19 
million to $200 million over the last ten years, the 
number of recipients beyond the primaries has remained 
constant. More organizations and more money are trying 
to influence the same number of candidates. Each 
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contributor is further constrained in his ability to 
influence by the contribution limits imposed on PACs by 
the FEC. As the average cost of campaigns increase, 
the absolute percentage of support able to be provided 
to a single candidate by a single PAC declines. In a 
$100,000 campaign, composed of primary and general 
election, a single PAC has the potential of providing, 
at most, 10% of a candidate's funds; in a $500,000 
campaign that potential diminishes to 2% because of the 
$10,000 contribution limit. 
The only way for an individual PAC to get around 
this declining influence is by acting in concert with 
other like-minded PACs. The researcher interested in 
this area is led back to trying to determine what 
groups tend to exhibit similar behavior or hold 
congruent goals. 
If the researcher is able to surmount the problem 
of determining congruency among groups, another problem 
remains. This is the notion of neutralization. It was 
noted above that, while PAC numbers and receipts have 
grown astronomically, the candidate pool has remained 
constant. Given this trend and the earlier mentioned 
trend toward diminishing party discipline, it would 
appear that there is a high probability for two or more 
PACs, with some interests in conflict, to be making 
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contributions to the same candidate. While it seems 
apparent that, in some sense, the opposing dollars must 
neutralize each other, it remains to be researched what 
the outcome of this type of situation is. 
A final issue that confuses the dollar/power 
surrogate again revolves around the limited candidate 
pool. Because of their limited choices, PACs may be 
forced to support candidates that offer small potential 
for supporting the organizations' goals for the sole 
reason that the candidate represents the lesser of two 
evils. That is, financial support of a candidate may 
not necessarily indicate more than a greater 
disapproval of that candidate's opposition by the PAC. 
To this point the discussion has focussed on 
contemporary PAC research, the assumptions of categor- . .. \ 
ical cohesiveness upon which that research is founded, 
and the suspect nature of those assumptions. The next 
sections develop a set of hypotheses that investigates 
the legislator approval and campaign contribution 
cohesivensss of a diverse set of organizations. 
Cohesion hypotheses 
Introduction 
This research project combines a new line of 
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reasoning about the behavior of political action 
committees with some rather involved methodological 
steps used to carry out that reasoning. To avoid the 
pitfalls of attempting to explain two involved 
processes in parallel, the author has chosen to focus 
only on the reasoning toward, and delineation of, the 
hypotheses in the present chapter. The following 
chapter details the methodology. Thus, for example, 
while each of five hypotheses is tested on both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate individually, 
no mention, beyond this present instance, is made in 
this chapter of using these two separate populations. 
Categorical Cohesion 
In a previous section, an argument was made that 
there is a potential discrepancy between how PACs are 
categorized by the FEC and how researchers make 
interpretations from those categories. The FEC uses 
PAC origin as a categorizing variable. If one is 
interested solely in what sectors of the society are 
initiating PACs, the FEC categories will serve that 
purpose well. However, if one is interested in 
determining the goals or influence of various 
collections of PACs, then using the origin variable to 
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portray influence or goals is subject to questions of 
validity. The fact that the category of corporate PACs 
gives more money to candidates than the labor PAC 
category may carry less weight if business' purposes 
are found to be significantly less cohesive than those 
of labor. 
One way to test the validity of using PAC origin 
to indicate behavior is to compare the FEC category 
membership of a set of organizations to the membership 
of groups formed by a cluster analysis on the ratings 
of the same set of organizations. If there is no 
significant difference in membership between the origin 
categories and rating clusters, confidence in the use 
of the FEC categories as a categorical variable useful 
in the study of goal cohesiveness would rise. When 
judgments derived from FEC categorical data are made as 
to the growing strength of business or labor's decline, 
confidence in the judgment would be greater. 
The means used to discern the degree to which 
organizations are similar in their goals are the 
legislative ratings. A distinction needs to be made 
about what goals are being studied. The political end 
goal of an organization is to insure that legislation 
favorable to its interest is passed and that 
unfavorable legislation is defeated. These end goals 
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will be called legislation goals. For favorable 
legislation to be passed or unfavorable legislation 
defeated, legislators must be found who are in 
support of the organization's legislation goals. 
Encouraging the election or reelection of supportive 
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legislators and defeating those opposed to the 
organizations' interests may be termed the legislator 
goals of the organization. Legislator goals are 
instrumental goals used to achieve the legislation 
goals of the organization. This distinction is an 
important one. The great complexity of U.S. society 
and the finite number of federal legislators may cause 
two organizations to have widely divergent, even 
conflicting legislation goals, yet hold the same set of 
instrumental or legislator goals in common. 
As it is the electoral behavior of organizations 
that is of interest, it is the homogeneity of their 
legislator goals that is investigated. Ratings are the 
means used to discover the cohesiveness in legislator 
goals among organizations. The technique used to 
determine cohesiveness, or similarity, is cluster 
analysis. 
The first hypothesis tests the validity of using 
FEC categorizations as surrogates for goal 
cohesiveness. It investigates w7hether differences 
44 
exist in the membership of a set of raters categorized 
by the FEC scheme with the same set when categorized by 
the similarity of their ratings. 
HI: There will be a significant difference in the 
membership of three groups formed from FEC defined 
categories of Labor, Unconnected, and Trade/ 
Membership/Health organizations and three clusters 
formed from the same set of organizations 
using a similarity of ratings criterion. 
In a sense the first hypothesis is a strawman. 
The Unconnected and Trade/Membership/Health (T/M/H) 
categories are obviously hodgepodge categories. The 
corporate category can not be tested directly because 
no corporations make ratings available to the public. 
However, Hi does provide the opportunity to determine 
the cohesion of the FEC Labor group. 
The tables in Chapter I and Handler and 
Mulkern's research indicate that labor acts in a more 
cohesive manner than business. If labor undergoes 
significant membership differences under HI then it 
can be reasoned that that tendency would tend to be 
even more prounounced in a group of corporate raters if 
it were to exist. 
The second hypothesis is a direct investigation of 
the cohesiveness of business and labor groups. H2 
tests the difference in a group of business-related and 
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labor PACs to two groups formed by cluster analysis on 
the same organizations' ratings. The business-related 
group was culled from the sample of raters using either 
self-descriptions by the organization or descriptions 
contained within The PAC Directory. The labor PACs 
were designated such by the FEC. 
H2: There will be a significant difference in 
the membership of two groups, one composed of 
business and the other of labor organizations and 
two groups formed from the same set of 
organizations using a similarity of ratings 
criterion. 
If H2 is supported, that confirmation would 
indicate that conclusions drawn from simple 
business/labor comparisons may be too simplistic. 
Conclusions based upon assumptions of internal goal or 
behavioral cohesiveness within each group could prove 
to be inappropriate. 
Cluster Dispersion 
The third hypothesis uses the cluster results from 
the second hypothesis to analyze the degree of 
dispersion within the resultant clusters. Handler and 
Mulkern's results indicate that the behavior of 
corporate PACs varies along a pragmatic/ideologic 
continuum. FEC financial data indicates that labor 
PACs give a higher proportion of their contributions to 
a single party (Democrats) and a single status 
(incumbency) than the PACs of business. Those findings 
indicate that one might expect the ratings of 
legislators among the labor group to contain less 
dispersion than that of the business group. That is, 
labor raters will show a higher degree of similarity in 
their approval or disapproval of legislators than 
business PACs. 
The third hypothesis is meant to compare the 
dispersion of the labor and business clusters. 
H3: There is a significant difference in the dis¬ 
persion of ratings between the cluster generated 
business group and the cluster generated labor 
group. 
If H3 is supported, it would enhance the argument 
against making simple business/labor PAC comparisons. 
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The greater the dispersion of members within a cluster, 
the less those members resemble one another on the 
cluster formation variable. 
Spokesperson Representativeness 
Proliferation and homeostatic interest group 
theories emphasize the diversity of interests within a 
society as complex as the United States. A human 
being's capacity to deal with complexity and diversity 
is strictly limited. One means of dealing with 
complexity is to select an object to represent a group 
of seemingly similar objects. President Reagan is 
represented as a spokesperson for Republicans; during 
the last four years. Speaker of the House O'Neill often 
has been represented as the spokesperson for Democratic 
party interests. 
At times there is consternation over who or what 
represents the interests of a specific group. In the 
spring of 1984, the media and politicians, both black 
and white, argued over whether or not Jessie Jackson 
was the spokesperson for blacks. 
A common choice as spokesperson for labor's 
interests is the AFL-CIO; a commonly accepted 
spokesperson for business interests is the Chamber of 
Commerce. Through ratings, it is possible to test 
the representativeness of the AFL-CIO and Chamber of 
Commerce as spokespersons for labor and business 
interests. 
The fourth hypothesis is set up to test the 
appropriateness of the Chamber of Commerce and the 
AFL-CIO as representative spokespersons for the 
interests of business and labor respectively. 
H4: There will be a significant difference in the 
membership of the business and labor affiliated 
groups and two groups formed by cluster analysis 
using the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO 
ratings as the cluster seeds. 
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If those clusters which form around the AFL-CIO 
and Chamber of Commerce are mixtures of business and 
labor organizations, legislators who wish to be 
business or labor partisans may need to rethink the 
advisability of using either of those two 
organizations' recommendations as guides to legislative 
action. 
Ratings-Contributions Cohesiveness 
The final aspect of the proposed research is a 
preliminary attempt to describe the relationship 
between approval of legislative behavior as measured 
by ratings and approval as measured by campaign 
contributions. 
It would seem reasonable to presume that the 
better a legislator represented the interests of an 
organization, as measured by his rating, the greater 
the campaign support he would receive from that 
organization. This statement is not meant to imply a 
causal relationship between legislative performance and 
campaign contributions. That question is saved for 
some future time series based analysis. Instead, it is 
the congruency between approval patterns and 
contribution patterns that is of interest. 
It was noted, in an earlier section, that the use 
of money as a surrogate for influence may not be a 
straight forward substitution. There are numerous 
conditions arising from contribution limits and the 
limited pool of candidates that could weaken the 
correspondence between contribution size and degree of 
influence. The same logic may hold true for the 
relationship between legislator approval and that 
approval as made manifest by financial contributions. 
Big financial contributions need not follow high 
ratings. There are few, if any, constraints on an 
organization's ability to rate. But, there may be 
numerous constraints on an organization's ability to 
provide financial contributions commensurate with a 
legislator's ratings. Size of a PAC's kitty, or the 
special circumstances of a particular race, may cause 
discrepancies between rating score and contribution 
size. (A senator with moderate ratings may receive 
$10,000 because if he or she were to be defeated a 
second senator with a lower rating may take over as 
chairperson of a specific committee. A highly rated 
senator may receive a modest contribution because his 
or her reeiection is not in doubt). Thus, receipt of a 
large contribution from a particular organization may 
mean little in regard to how well the legislator serves 
that organization's purposes. 
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A prime example of the potential for discrepancy 
between ratings approval and campaign contributions 
occurred during the 1984 reelection campaign of Rep. 
Joseph Addabbo. Addabbo received more money from the 
PACs of America's ten largest defense contractors than 
any other member of the House. Simultaneously, Rep. 7 
Addabbo was receiving the highest level of ratings from 
major arms-control groups. While Rep. Addabbo's 
legislative record should have nullified defense 
contractor contributions, his role as chairman of the 
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense acted as a 
magnet for defense contractor PAC money. [Mapes 
(1984) ] . 
The fifth hypothesis compares the membership of 
clusters generated from legislative ratings to clusters 
formed from the same set of organizations using 
campaign contributions as the clustering criterion. 
H5: There will be a significant difference in the 
membership of business and labor groups con¬ 
structed from ratings and two clusters generated 
from the same set of organizations by their simi¬ 
larity of campaign contributions. 
A significant difference in membership between 
the ratings and contribution clusters would indicate 
that rewards in terms of campaign contributions are not 
directly related to the degree of partisanship seen in 
legislators' voting records. 
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The financial cluster outcomes indicate to what 
extent so-called business or labor money is cohesive 
in terms of recipients. If the financial results 
reveal members from both business and labor in the same 
cluster then that result adds fuel to the earlier 
contention that straightforward labor to business PAC 
contribution comparisons are inappropriate. Aggregate 
financial totals derived either from FEC categories or 
variations of Epstein's business-related categories may 
be too imprecise to be used to make judgments of, or 
policy decisions on, PAC electoral behavior. 
Summary 
The five hypotheses constitute only a limited part 
of this research project. The manipulation of ratings, 
the linking of ratings and organizational orientation, 
rating seeds, and contribution and rating parallelism 
are all new approaches to the study of political 
behavior. Because of their nascent qualities, they act 
more as guideposts to thinking than they do as research 
end goals. 
In the following chapter, "Methods," and the 
penultimate chapter "Results," greater detail is given 
to the thinking and techniques that led to the testing 
of the hypotheses. In these two chapters and their 
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appendices, detail is provided on the outcome of 
intermediate steps as well as ancillary analyses. As 
noted in the introduction to this chapter, description 
of technique was deferred to allow the reader to 
concentrate on the reasonableness of the hypotheses. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Introduction 
The hypotheses of this project focus on the 
similarities in rating and campaign contributions among 
a diverse sample of organizations. The degree of 
similarity is determined through cluster analysis 
techniques. 
Sample 
The sample is a collection of 47 organizations 
that issued ratings for members of the House of 
Representatives and Senate during the 96th Congress, 
1979-1980. [Appendix A contains a description of the 
members of the sample]. Keller has estimated that, for 
the 1979-80 period, approximately 75 organizations 
constructed ratings. The sample used in this research 
constitutes approximately two thirds of the population 
of raters. It is not, however, a simple random sample. 
It is the result of trying to collect the ratings from 
the population. 
Being non-random, the sample is, of course, 
subject to questions of representativeness. In this 
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case, the representativeness is a dual issue. Does the 
sample of raters mirror the population of raters? Does 
the sample of raters mirror the population of political 
action committees? The answers to these questions 
depend upon the perspective of the questioner. 
If the questioner is concerned with rigorous 
methodological purity, it cannot be argued that this 
sample and the results obtained from it are 
generalizable. If the assumptions underlying 
statistical sampling techniques are transgressed, then, 
logically, the results are suspect. 
If the questioner is concerned with the usefulness 
or aptness of this sample within the context of which 
it is used, the present sample has much to recommend 
it. It contains nearly two-thirds of the organizations 
that construct ratings. Its elements represent a wide 
diversity of interest groups. It contains a large 
number of the most politically active interest groups 
in the United States. The following paragraphs 
describe the diversity of the sample membership. 
Sample Elements 
Labor. The largest grouping within the sample 
is composed of labor organizations. America’s largest 
unions are represented. The AFL-CIO, teamsters. 
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autoworkers, mine workers, and teachers are sample 
members. 
The professional service sector of labor is 
represented by two teachers' unions, the National 
Education Association and the American Federation of 
Teachers, as well as the National Association of Social 
Workers. 
The industrial sector is composed of the United 
Autoworkers, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers, the Communication Workers of America, the 
International Food and Commercial Workers, and the 
AFL-CIO. 
The labor group is rounded out with the government 
workers of the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Workers, the craft members of the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters, and the eclectic membership 
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
This portion of the sample contains 12 of the 
15 labor raters compiled by Keller. The American 
Federation of Government Employees, the International 
Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, and the 
International Association of Machinists did not respond to 
requests for their ratings. 
With industrial, craft, professional and non¬ 
professional service unions as members, the labor 
grouping is representative of the breadth of the 
American labor movement. 
Business. The portion of the sample judged to 
represent the interests of business is composed of 11 
members. All of the members are umbrella groups; none 
is a corporation. The representativeness of the 
business subsample is not so clear cut as that of 
labor. 
A large association of the country's largest 
manufacturers is represented.^ The Chamber of Commerce, 
with its diverse membership of big and small, 
industrial and non-industrial members, is a sample 
element. The Council for a Competitive Economy is a 
recently formed group of businesses and business 
persons concerned with espousing the benefits of a free 
market economy. The National Federation of Independent 
Business is organized to represent the specific 
interests of small business. 
The sample contains five industry specific 
organizations. The insurance industry is represented 
by the National Association of Life Underwriters; the 
petroleum industry by the Independent Petroleum 
Association of America; and the construction industry 
by the Associated General Contractions. Two 
agricultural groups, the National Farmers Organization 
and the National Farmers Union, were included in the 
business subsample. The capital intensive nature of 
farming and its dependence upon credit, foreign trade, 
and tax policies are justifications for the inclusion 
of the two agricultural organizations in the business 
grouping. Another judgment call was categorizing the 
National Society of Professional Engineers as a 
business group. The large number of managers within 
this group and an inspection of the legislation chosen 
to construct the NSPE's ratings were the determining 
factors in making the judgment. 
Of the business raters that Keller lists, the 
National Mass Retailers Association, the National 
Newspaper Publishers, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, the Credit Union National Association, and 
the Business Industrial Political Action Committee 
(dropped due to missing values) are the organizations 
missing from this study. Numerous sectors of the 
American economy, such as banking, defense, automotive, 
information processing, health care, are not repre¬ 
sented by specific organizations; however, the generic 
concerns of American business, large and small, would 
seem to be well represented. 
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Other. The remaining 50% or 23 members of the 
sample contain a great diversity of political 
interests. Women, consumer, peace, defense, Christian, 
liberal, conservative, senior citizens, conservation, 
civil liberty, children, and taxpayer issues are 
represented by one or more sample members. 
In summary, in the author's judgment, the sample used 
in this study has no noticeable gaps in its breadth of 
representation of the major interest group issues of the 
late 1970s. It is not, however, a proportionally precise 
microcosm of America's interest groups in the 1979-1980 
biennium. 
Data Collection 
The members of the sample came from two sources. 
Twenty-four of the raters were from the 26 rating 
organizations that Greevy and Weinberger included in 
the first edition of the PAC Directory. The two 
organizations dropped from the Greevy and Weinberger 
set, the Business Industrial Political Action Committee 
and the Christian Voters Victory Fund, were done so 
because of missing values. 
The ratings for 23 other members of the sample 
were collected in response to a mail solicitation of 40 
organizations that were extant, discoverable, listed by 
Keller, and but not contained in The PAC Directory. 
See Appendix B for a copy of the rating request letter. 
Of the 17 organizations not used in the study, 5 were 
non-respondents, 3 were not located and the remaining 
9 either did not rate during 1979-80, or did not have 
copies of their 1979-80 ratings in their files. 
Plating Content 
Organizations that use ratings construct those 
evaluations from legislator behavior toward particular 
legislation. In this study the organizations used 
as few as 5 and as many as 22 votes in their ratings. 
The norm for the number of votes used in an 
organization's ratings is in the 8-12 range. The votes 
used are almost exclusively votes from the floor. 
Committee and sub-committee behavior do not play a part 
in legislative ratings. 
In regard to the selection of legislation to be 
used in the construction of the index, it is assumed 
that each organization selects those votes on 
legislation which it considers to be most important to 
its own interests. A typical example is the set of 14 
pieces of legislation used to evaluate members of the 
House by the small business oriented National 
Federation of Independent Business. Subject matter for 
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this index included budget resolutions, trucking 
deregulation, restricting on site OSHA inspections, 
product liability insurance, Davis-Bacon Act 
requirements, restrictions on the Small Business 
Administration and welfare reform. 
There is great diversity in how organizations 
publish voting information. Some construct a numerical 
index that ranges from 0 to 100. Others choose to 
publish the votes without constructing a numerical 
index. Of those that issue a numerical index, some 
construct the index by dividing "right" by "right" plus 
"wrong" votes. Others chose more complex formulas. 
Absences, present but not voting, paired absences, and 
declared but not voting with paired absences are 
handled in different ways. 
Regardless of how an organization chooses to 
determine its ratings, the relative meaning of the 
ratings of that organization is constant. The ratings 
range from 0 to 100. Zero means that a legislator 
failed to vote in the direction of the organization's 
wishes for all the legislative issues that the 
organization chose to include in its index. A score of 
100 means the opposite. Each vote of the legislator 
was in the direction that the organization sought. In 
an upcoming section, dealing with scale issues, the 
relative meaning of a particular score across 
organizations will be discussed. 
In those instances where organizations recorded 
votes but did not construct numerical scores, the 
author constructed scores in the simplest possible 
manner. A legislator's score was determined by the 
fraction of "right" divided by "right" plus "wrong," 
multiplied by 100. Rounding was to the closest whole 
number. 
In cases where at least one "right" or "wrong" was 
recorded, absences were ignored. Rarely, a legislator 
was absent for all votes on the legislation making up a 
particular organization's rating. In that situation, a 
rating of 50% was assigned. Many of these cases were 
cases where resignations or deaths had occurred during 
the term. They, of course, were deleted. 
Appendix C lists those legislators dropped from 
the analysis due to four or more missing values. 
Appendix D lists the nine occurrences where an 
organization's rating mean was substituted for a single 
missing value. Insertion of the mean allowed retention 
of the case. 
Similarity 
The central issue of this project is one of trying 
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to distinguish what similarities exist within a set of 
organizations which have chosen to be politically 
active at the federal level. 
The methodological means of determining similarity 
among the sample of organizations is based upon 
empirical techniques rather than theoretical or 
philosophical structures. Rather than assuming that 
the Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of 
Independent Business desire the same political goals, 
or that the United Mineworkers and United Autoworkers 
are more similar one to the other than each is to the 
Associated General Contractors, the relationships among 
these organizations are empirically determined. The 
empirical technique used to determine the degree of 
similarity among the organizations is cluster analysis. 
In its simplest form the problem may be conceived 
as determining the degree to which n organizations are 
similar in their evaluation of x members of Congress. 
The organizations are the objects being clustered and 
the Congresspersons are the variables used to do the 
clustering. In this setting the appropriate type of 
of clustering is observation clustering or O-clustering 
[Tryon & Bailey (1970)]. Those organizations which are 
most similar in the way that they rate across all the 
legislators would fall together in the same cluster. 
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In the present situation there is a problem in doing 
observation clustering. The problem arises from the 
number of legislators in the Senate and particularly 
the House of Representatives. The cross product House 
matrix, 420 by 420, can not be factored because it is 
less than full rank. The variables outnumber the 
observations. 
Two solutions are available to get around the rank 
problem. One approach is to pull random subsets of 
variables from the set of all variables such that the 
number of variables is less than the number of 
observations. The second approach involves 
transposing the matrix so that the legislators act as 
"observations" and the organizations represent 
o 
"variables." In the case of the House of 
*> * * • 
Representatives this causes the variable list to 
decrease by a factor of 10 while the number of 
observations increases by the same proportion, 
alleviating the rank problem. The clustering program 
switches from 0-clustering to Variable or Q-clustering. 
This allows the raw data set to be successfully 
clustered with no loss of variables. This second 
solution, of clustering by variable with the rating 
organizations being the variables, was chosen. 
The matrix has the legislators as observations and 
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the organization as variables. The clustering is done 
on the variables. Figure 1 represents the structure of 
the raw data matrix. 
The observation list begins with Alaska's first 
(and only) representative Don Young. Observation 425 
is Wyoming's representative Richard Cheney. 
Observation 426 is Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens and the 
last observation, 521, is Wyoming Senator Malcolm 
Wallop. 
Organizations vary in how they issue ratings. 
Some record votes only from the first session of a 
Congress; others record only from the second session; 
some issue a set of ratings for each session; some 
issue a single rating based on legislation from both 
sessions of the two year congressional cycle. To 
include as many organizations as possible within the 
analysis, the arithmetic mean was computed for those 
organizations that issued separate ratings for both the 
first and second session of the 96th Congress. 
The data set was composed of 25 organizations for 
which the arithmetic mean of two sessions had been 
computed, 16 organizations which issued a single rating 
for both sessions, and 6 organizations which rated from 
only one session. 
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Scale of Values 
Scaling is an especially important issue in this 
study. This section traces the author's reasons for 
using the interval based ratings, rather than rankings, 
in the analysis. It can be argued that the similarity 
analysis should be performed using rankings rather than 
ratings. The reasoning behind converting to rankings 
is to correct for anomalies among the first and second 
moments of the distributions of ratings of different 
organizations. For example, it is possible for two 
organizations (A and B) to issue ratings much different 
in absolute terms yet exactly the same in the relative 
terms of rankings. Organization A might have a range 
of 0 to 81 with a mean of 36. Organization B might 
have a range of 0 to 100 with a mean of 52. Yet, in 
ranking the legislators from low to high, the two 
organizations could have exactly the same ordering of 
the legislators. 
Under SAS VARCLUS, the cluster program used in 
this study, input, whether ranks or raw scores, may be 
converted to standard scores/ Thus, the input into 
the cluster analysis is mean and variance corrected. 
Using ratings that have been standardized will preserve 
both the order and magnitude of the scores. When using 
rankings, order is preserved, but magnitude is lost. 
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For example, consider organization A which uses ten 
pieces of legislation to construct its ratings index. 
Possible scores include 0%, 10%, 20% etc. Rankings 
have the potential to wash out the ten point 
differences in scores. If Senator A scores 100 and 
Senator B scores 90, the magnitude of that difference 
is preserved using the standardized scores of the 
ratings; however, under rankings that distance between 
the two can be lost. If Senator A is ranked first and 
Senator B second, the cluster program will treat the 
ordinal difference of 1 as an interval difference of. 1, 
instead of 10 as it should be. That loss is preserved 
when the program converts the ranks into standard 
scores (somewhat of a misnomer) in order to generate 
the correlation matrix used for the cluster algorithm. 
A second distortion can occur because of tied 
scores. If the top 40 legislators were tied at 100, 
they all would be given the mean rank, 20, if only one 
legislator had a score of 99, he would be ranked 41st, 
a difference of 21. As the cluster algorithm assumes 
that the data is interval scaled, the program would 
treat the actual 1 point ratings difference as a 21 
point difference if the input used were the ordinal 
ranks. 
A third problem exists with the mean of the 
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organization's ratings. In the House data sets, with 
their 421 observations, the mean of each and every 
variable will always equal 211, (n+l)/2, when ranks 
are used; the mean of the raw ratings will shift 
depending upon how the scores are distributed for each 
particular variable. The distortions that accompany 
the use of rankings as input into the cluster program 
dictates the use of the ratings themselves. The 
results that follow are based upon using the 
standardized interval scaled ratings as input. 
Cluster Analysis 
In this project, the analytical technique used to 
discover the empirical similarity of organization is 
cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is a technique that 
is often used in the preliminary stages of an 
investigation to discover the structure of the data. 
In many cases, cluster techniques are used prior to the 
development of theory or hypothesis. Cluster analysis 
is used to gain enough understanding of the structure 
of a phenomenon to be able to generate theory and 
hypotheses [Andenberg (1973)]. 
The objective of cluster analysis is a simple one. 
One attempts to take a number of entities, either 
observations or variables, and arrange them into groups 
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in such a way that within-group distance is minimized 
with respect to the cluster centroids and between 
cluster distance is maximized. In other words, the 
object is to order the data so that the elements within 
a cluster are as homogeneous as possible while the 
clusters, in relationship to each other, are as 
heterogeneous as possible. 
The process by which this goal is accomplished is 
by partitioning the data under a particular criterion. 
Usually the criterion is concerned with the maximization 
of intercluster centroid distances or minimizing 
intracluster element distances from the cluster 
centroid. 
The cluster program used in this study is the SAS 
VARCLUS routine.^ 
In the present setting clustering techniques are 
used to test a limited number of hypotheses. 
Many of the sticky issues of cluster analysis, 
such as how many clusters to generate and what the 
clusters mean, are avoided in this project. In a 
sense, rather than investigating data structure, here 
cluster analysis is being used as a treatment - 
confirmatory cluster analysis. The FEC, or 
business/labor, categories are known; these categories 
are "treated" with cluster analysis; and the membership 
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of the resulting groups are compared to the original. 
If it is assumed that the prior groups are homogeneous 
in terms of instrumental goals, then one would predict 
that the cluster "treatment" will have no effect. The 
membership of the clusters should duplicate that of the 
categories. 
Financial Profiles 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) investigates the degree 
of congruency between a set of clusters formed by 
ratings similarity and a second set formed by 
similarity in contributions to congressional 
candidates. 
i 
With the contribution clusters there is a question 
as to whether to compare the organizations' 
contributions to all candidates or only to those 
candidates who are already in office, i.e., the same 
observations that are contained in the ratings data 
set. If the ratings set match is used, there is the 
potential for losing a large portion of an 
organization's campaign contribution behavior, but the 
information that is retained contains measures on 
exactly the same set of observations as the ratings. 
If all contributions are retained, no information is 
lost, but the set of observations is larger, as it 
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includes those who failed to be elected to the 96th 
Congress. H5 was tested using the rating set as the 
standard so as to be consistent with the other 
hypotheses. 
The set of contribution profiles was developed 
from the FEC's 1979-1980 Master Committee tape and Non 
4 
Party Political Committee (NPC) tape. 
Using the procedures described in the above 
footnote, a data set was constructed that contained the 
total dollar contributions of 421 members of the House 
and 96 Senators by 25 organizations. Of the 25 
organizations, eighteen could be categorized as either 
business or labor. 
Cluster analysis was performed on the contribution 
and rating similarities of these eighteen 
organizations. The cluster membership solutions 
derived from contribution similarities were compared to 
the solutions generated from rating similarities. 
Summary 
This chapter has described the general procedures 
used to organize the ratings and contribution data 
sets. The following chapter, "RESULTS," contains more 
specific detail on how analyses for specific hypotheses 
were made. 
72 
FOOTNOTES 
1. This organization chose to remain anonymous. 
2. SAS is a registered trademark of the SAS Institute 
Inc. VARCLUS is a cluster analysis program 
available in the SAS statistical package. 
3. VARCLUS, an iterative algorithm is a divisive 
cluster program; it begins with all variables in a 
single cluster. If allowed to run to completion, 
the procedure ends when each cluster contains a 
single element. 
To construct a cluster a seed or nucleus is needed 
upon which the cluster can be built. SAS VARCLUS 
offers three options for seeding or initializing a 
cluster. The first variable of the data set to be 
clustered can be used. In a second method a 
cluster is seeded with a variable specified by the 
researcher. This method is used in Hypothesis 4 
to investigate the representativeness of the 
AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce. Under the 
third method, the cluster is initialized with a 
variable picked randomly from the set to be 
clustered. After initialization, the algorithm 
proceeds to a search phase. 
This tests to determine whether, after assigning 
each variable to that component with which it has 
the highest squared correlation, variation 
explained can be improved through variable 
reassignment. The search phase ofthe VARCLUS 
algorithm was set to ten iterations. This 
exercise, while costly in CPU time, helps to 
insure against solutions hanging up on local 
optima. 
A trial of the data for the House population was 
run three times using random initialization, 
MAXSEARCH = 10 iterations. In all three runs the 
solutions generated were equal. 
For all hypotheses, the analyses were made using 
the correlation matrix of the standardized scores 
as input to the VARCLUS routine. 
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4. The Master Committee (MC) tape contains 7904 
records of party and non party political 
committees active at the federal campaign level 
during the 1979-1980 Congressional cycle. Each 
record contains the committee's identification 
number, name, address, designation, type, interest 
group category, connected organization's name, and 
several other categorical variables. Twenty-nine 
of the 46 organizations contained in the ratings 
set were found on the MC tape. Twenty-five of the 
29 had made direct campaign contributions. These 
25 organizations had sponsored a total of 145 
separate PACs. 
The group of 145 PACs was used to pull contribution 
figures from a detail file of the NPC tape. This 
file is composed of 70,000 plus records. Each 
record contains the total amount of direct and in 
kind contributions to a single candidate by a 
single PAC. 
The committee identification numbers of the 145 PACs 
from the MC tape were used to generate a list of all 
candidates who were given contributions by those 
PACs. That set of 5058 records was sorted by 
INDENT. 
In those situations where no contributions were 
made to a candidate contained in the ratings data 
set, a dummy record was created for that candidate 
in the contribution data set. This situation 
occurred more frequently for those Senators who 
were not up for reelection in 1980. 
At this point the file contains 5058 records of 
contributions to individual candidates by 
individual PACs plus dummy records of those rated 
candidates who received no moneyfrom any of the 
145 PACs. 
In the next step the contributions of the 145 PACs 
were aggregated by the 25 sponsors. This results 
in a set of 25 contribution profiles for 807 
candidates for the House and 194 Senatorial 
candidates. The profiles have, of course, 
numerous missing values. The missing values occur 
because a candidate did not receive a contribution 
from an organization. No contribution is, 
however, the equivalent of a $0 contribution. 
When the missing values are converted to zeroes 
the resultant data set contains a dollar 
contribution value for each candidate for Congres 
for each of the 25 organizations that both issued 
ratings and made direct congressional 
contributions through their 145 PACs. This data 
set is reduced to the same set of observations in 
the rating set by merging on the INDENT variable. 
This data set contains the total dollar 
contribution for 421 members of the House and 96 
Senators by the 25 sponsors. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the results of the 
analysis. When necessary, it includes additional 
methodological descriptions beyond those contained in 
Chapter III. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Before portraying the results of the hypotheses, 
some descriptive statistics of the data set are given. 
The full set is to be found in Appendix E. 
In the House of Representatives, the mean rating 
over all organizations was 50.35. The two farm 
organizations, NFO and NFU, gave the highest average 
ratings, 71.47 and 66.34 respectively. The AFL-CIO's 
average score is near the mean, 51.49; the Chambers 
of Commerce had the fifth highest average rating with a 
60.66. It is notable that four of the five highest 
raters, (NFO, NFU, Chamber and NFIB) are from business. 
This is during a period when the House, Senate, and 
Presidency were controlled by Democrats. This positive 
approval is not matched by the Council for a 
Competitive Economy, a free market business 
organization, which, with a 40.12, gave the second 
lowest average rating. The lowest rating, 36.05, was 
from the National Taxpayers Union. 
In the Senate, where the overall mean is 50.04, 
several organizations join the NTU with scores under 
40. The Christian Voice, National Christian Action 
Coalition, Consumer Federation of America, the Liberty 
Lobby, and the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military 
Policy all have an average rating under 40. The 
Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO are more closely 
aligned in their approval of the Senate than the House. 
The nine point House difference shrinks to three points 
in the Senate for these two organizations. The highest 
Senate ratings are given by the two farm organizations 
and the Woman's Activist. 
% • • • 
The mean scores of organizations are a very rough 
indicator of the central tendencies of organizational 
scores. In general, the distributions tend to be 
bimoaal with a large proportion of the scores residing 
in the tails. The relatively high standard deviations 
give evidence of the bimodality of the distributions. 
The common case seems to be one in which the 
legislation chosen by a particular organization divides 
the Congressional body into two groups - those "for" 
and those "against" with a smaller group of neutrals. 
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Table 15, in Appendix E, represents interquartile 
points of the organizations in the data set. It shows 
the heavy concentration of observations that fall in 
the tails of the distribution of scores of many 
organizations. 
Hypothesis 1: FEC Categories 
The first hypothesis: 
HI: There will be a significant difference in 
the membership of three groups formed using FEC 
defined categories of Labor, Unconnected, and 
Trade/Membership/ Health organizations and three 
groups formed from the same set of organizations 
using a similarity of ratings criterion. 
is a test of the validity of making inferences or 
drawing conclusions of aggregate group goals, purposes, 
or behavior from FEC categorical data. 
The FEC categories of organizations were taken 
from the FEC's 1979-1980 Report on Financial Activity 
tapes. Of the 47 organizations included in the data 
set, 27 of those members were contained on the FEC 
tape. Those 27 organizations and their category 
membership are listed in Appendix F. A restrictive 
test of the Hi was made using only those 27 
organizations categorized by the FEC. The test was 
performed on each body of the Congress individually. 
The 27 organizations were divided into three 
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groups by their FEC category. Cluster analysis was run 
using the ratings as input. The resultant clusters 
were designated Labor, Unconnected, or Trade/Member- 
ship/Health by determining the proportion of each FEC 
category represented in a particular cluster. That 
cluster with the highest proportion of FEC labor 
category members was designated the Labor group, and so 
on. 
The results are portrayed in three ways. In the 
setting specified by the particular hypothesis, a 
graphical figure of the movement of members from 
category to cluster precedes a table of the numerical 
results. The cluster memberships that are obtained 
when the cluster algorithm is allowed to proceed beyond 
the number of clusters specified in the hypothesis are 
presented in Appendix G. 
Using the FEC categories, the 27 organizations 
were broken down into 11 Labor, 7 Unconnected, and 9 
Trade/Membership/Health (T/M/H) members. In the tables 
of results, the FEC category to which an organization 
belongs is indicated by the last letter of its name. 
Labor is represented by L, Unconnected by U, and 
Trade/Membership/Health by T. With the cluster program 
truncated at three iterations, the three clusters have 
23, 3, and 1 members. 
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FIGURE 2 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
COHESIVENESS OF FEC CATEGORIES 
USING RATINGS OF THE HOUSE 
FEC Category Membership 
T = Trade/Membership/Health 
L = Labor 
U = Unconnected 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING 
GENERATED SOLUTIONS FOR FEC—CATEGORITED 
FAC SUESAMPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONEHT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 3 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTION SECOND 
CLUSTER MEMBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 3 3.000000 2-586271 0.8628 0.266124 
2 23 23.000000 19.815422 0. 86 15 0.746908 
3 1 1. 000000 1.000000 1.0000 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 23.40369 PBOPCRTION - 0.866803 
B-SQUABED HITH 
OWN NEXT B++2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST BATIO 
CLUSTER 1 _ -- ------ 
NSPE T 0.8623 0. 6446 0.7475 
LCVX~T 0.9144 0.7034 0.7692 
GNCOTJX T 0.8115 0. 4117 0.5074 
CLUSTER 2--- 
NALU T 0.6947 0.5262 0.7574 
CHVC”U 0.8129 0.5434 0.6684 
NCACTU 0.7687 0.5652 0.7352 
NFIB~U 0.8697 0.5744 0.6605 
H PC TJ 0.7071 0.5189 0.6592 
IMSTfi L 0.7493 0.3630 0.4844 
AFT L” 0.8789 0.6555 0-7457 
CARP L 0.7551 0.3254 0.4309 
NEA X 0„81 15 0.5091 0.6274 
AC AX U 0.9212 0.5305 0.5759 
ACUX"T 0. 9322 0.6026 0.6464 
ADAX”U 0.9057 0.8009 0.8843 
AFLCXX L 0.956 1 0.601 1 0.6287 
AFSCHX“L 0.7782 0.5294 0.6803 
CFAX T“ 0.9000 0.7443 0.8269 
COCUXX T 0.9190 0.7170 0.7803 
CSFCX TJ 0.9305 0.5648 0.6070 
CHAX X 0.9534 0.6252 0.6558 
IFCHT l 0.9506 0-6225 0.6548 
sochkx t 0.9184 0.6139 0.6684 
UAHX 1” 0.9743 0.6708 0.6685 
UMHX”L 0.8879 0.7366 0.8296 
ACTW7X L 0.7598 0. 4979 0.6553 
NFCX_T 1.0000 0.2819 C-2819 
CLUSTER 
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House of Representatives. Figure 2 and Table 4 
portray the memberships of the FEC categories and the 
cluster membership at three clusters. All of the 
Unconnected and a majority of the T/M/H organizations 
end up in a cluster containing all the Labor 
organizations. 
Under the null of HI, the number of expected 
members in each cluster is expected to equal the number 
of members in each of the original categories. Great 
shifts, however, occur. In fact, at three iterations 
the Unconnected category disappears. All seven 
Unconnected members shift into the Labor cluster. Of 
the nine T/M/H organizations five shift to Labor, three 
remain in a cluster by themselves, and the ninth, the 
National Farmers Organization forms a cluster unto 
itself. 
When a fourth cluster is constructed [Table 16, 
Appendix G], cluster membership is much closer to the 
FEC scheme. Ten of eleven Labor organizations are 
members of Cluster 2, C2. Six of the seven Unconnected 
organizations are members of C3. Three of the nine 
T/M/H category members constitute C4. 
In the three cluster solution, the National 
Farmers' Organization forms a cluster unto itself. 
Given its high mean, higher median, and relatively 
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small standard deviation, its tendency to be pulled 
away from the other sample elements is not unexpected. 
With this outlier removed, the large cluster, C2, 
splits in two, C2 and C4, in the next interation. The 
configuration at this level may be reasonably compared 
to the FEC memberships. Cl has only Trade elements; 
however only three of the nine trade organizations are 
contained within that cluster. While all but one of 
the Labor unions are members of C2, four other members, 
29%, are from different FEC categories. Three of the 
four outsiders, the Chamber, NFIB, and Underwriters, 
are business organizations. In C4, the cluster 
dominated by Unconnected members, 33% of the membership 
is from other FEC categories. 
Under the House of Representatives condition, 
using similarity of ratings as the cluster criterion, 
the FEC categorization scheme does not result in 
categories of mutual exclusion. Those members which 
are categorized together by the similarity in which 
they rate members of the House are not the same 
members who are categorized together by their origin. 
Origin and purpose are not synonymous. The first 
hypothesis is supported. 
Senate. The results in the Senate are even more 
supportive of Hi. With three clusters, [Figure 3 and 
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FIGURE 3 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
COHESIVENESS OF FEC CATEGORIES 
USING RATINGS OF THE SENATE 
FEC Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
T = Trade/Membership/Health 
L = Labor 
U = Unconnected 
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"
 (N
O
 
TABLE 5 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENEBATED CLDSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FOB FEC-CATEGORIZED FAC SUBSAHPLE 
CBLIQDE PBINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALISIS 
CLUSTER SUMHABI FOB 3 CXUSTEBS 
CLUSTER HEHBEBS 
8 
17 
2 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
8.000000 
17.000000 
2.CO0000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
6.775538 
13.838558 
1.822428 
0.S46* 
0.8140 
0.9112 
SECCSC 
EIGENVALUE 
0.600149 
0.703200 
0. 177572 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 22.43652 PROPOBTIOM = C.830962 
CLDSTEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
R—SQUARED fcXIH 
OWN NEXT fi**2 
1- 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
1" 
CH VC 0 0.9536 0.7932 0.8316 
ncacTu 0.8972 0-7572 0.8440 
HPC 13 0.8455 0.6881 0.8138 
NEA"L 0.5585 0.3703 0.6630 
ACAl a 0.9136 0.8881 0.9721 
ACUX"T 0.9476 0.8863 0.9351 
CSFCl U 0.9625 0.9158 0.9514 
•5 
NFOX T 0.6969 0.5527 0.7931 
NALU T 0.6144 O.4773 0.7769 
NFIB”U 0.8239 0.6936 0.8419 
TMSTT L 0.7886 0.6719 0.8520 
AFT L“ 0.6646 0.50T5 0.7545 
CART L 0. 5068 0.4145 0.8179 
ADA X”U 0.8779 0.8258 0.9407 
AFLCTX L 0.9760 0.8548 0.8758 
AFSCHX*” L 0.7031 0.6085 0.8654 
CFAX T“ 0- 8 45 8 0.7414 0-8766 
C0CU3X T 0.9114 0.8537 0.9367 
CHAX L” 0.9603 0.8361 0-8707 
GNCOTX T 0.8096 0.6837 0.8446 
IFCHX X 0.9246 0. 8 19 1 0.8859 
SOCNKX T 0.8807 0.8348 0.9479 
DAHX L“ 0.9739 0.8908 0.9146 
UHHX“L 0.7358 0.5274 0.7168 
T 
ACTNTX L 0.8412 0.6993 0.8313 
NSPE T 0.91 12 0.4498 0.4937 
LCVX"" T 0.9112 0.3949 0.4334 
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Table 5] the Unconnected cluster Cl contains three, or 
37%, outside members. The Labor cluster C2 contains 10 
of the 11 the labor unions—the National Education 
Assocoiation is again missing. However, 7 of 17, or 
41%, of the cluster membership is composed of non FEC 
Labor category organizations. As in the House setting, 
the Chamber of Commerce and the small business oriented 
NFIB are comembers with the unions. The third cluster 
contains 2 of the 7 Trade categorized organizations. 
The solutions at four and five clusters fail to cause a 
clean split in C2 [Tables 18 and 19 in Appendix G]. 
Discussion. Using either the Senate or House 
populations, cluster analyzing the ratings of 27 
organizations results in clusters whose membership is 
not composed of organizations from a single FEC PAC 
category. 
The results of HI indicate that the instrumental 
goals of organizations do not match to the origin of 
organizations. In addition, with this subset of organ¬ 
izations, and relatively few clusters, the instrumental 
goals do not clearly differentiate between groups of or¬ 
ganizations. While single or dyadic member clusters may, 
2 
as indicated by low R ratios, form relatively tight 
2 
clusters, the high R ratios within the larger clusters 
indicate that the clusters are relatively amorphous. 
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Although the data set contains 47 organizations, 
only 27 were used in the Hi analysis. The remaining 20 
were dropped as they did not make electoral 
contributions, hence, were uncategorized by the FEC. 
An analysis was made of the full set. Results and 
discussion of cluster analyzing all 47 organizations 
through ten iterations is to be found in Appendix H. 
Hypothesis 2: Business and Labor Categories 
It was noted earlier that the first hypothesis is 
weak. Its vulnerability stems from the FEC categories 
that are used. Few would expect the Unconnected and 
Trade/Membership/Health categories to remain inviolate 
to boundary jumping when ratings are used. It is 
apparent that the FEC meant Unconnected and Trade 
categories to imply no more than PAC origin. To show 
that the origin of PACs contained within these catego¬ 
ries differs from their purpose is to show the obvious. 
If individual corporations issued ratings and if 
the HI data set had included sets of corporate ratings, 
in some minds HI would no longer be a straw man. That 
the FEC did not mean for its categories to imply more 
than cohesion of origin for the Trade and Unconnected 
organizations does not, for some, hold for the business 
and labor groupings. For these two categories, origin 
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does imply cohesion of purpose. The bisected logic 
that allows two origin categories to imply purpose and 
the remaining four to not is circumstantially subjected 
to investigation in the second hypothesis. The means 
for doing so is by comparing the ratings of a set of 
business organizations to those of a set of labor 
unions. 
Hypothesis 2 states: 
There will be a significant change in the 
membership of two groups, one composed of business 
and the other of labor organizations, and two groups 
formed from the same set of organizations using a 
similarity of ratings criterion. 
The group composed of labor organizations is a 
duplicate of those used in the labor category of HI 
with the exception of the addition of the National 
Association of Social Workers. The twelve labor 
organizations represented are: 
1. American Federation of Labor - Congress of 
Industrial Organizations 
2. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
3. American Federation of Teachers 
4. National Association of Social Workers 
5. American Education Association 
6. American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees 
7. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
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8. United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
9. United Auto Workers 
10. United Mine Workers 
11. Communication Workers of America 
12. International Food and Commercial Workers 
The business category contains 11 members: 
1. Independent Petroleum Association of America 
2. National Associated Businessmen 
3. National Association of Life Underwriters 
4. National Society of Professional Engineers 
5. A Major Manufacturing Association 
6. National Federation of Independent Business 
7. Council for a Competitive Economy 
8. Chamber of Commerce for the U.S. 
9. Associated General Contractors 
10. National Farmers Organization 
11. National Farmers Union 
House of Representatives. In the House population 
when the cluster program is truncated after two 
iterations [Figure 4 and Table 6], ten of twelve of the 
labor and eight of the eleven business organizations 
reside in one cluster. The two farm organizations and 
the Council for a Competitive Economy, a conservative 
business group, compose the second cluster with the 
Teamsters' and Carpenters' unions. 
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FIGURE 4 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
COHESIVENESS OF BUSINESS AND 
LABOR CATEGORIES USING HOUSE RATINGS 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
B = Business 
L = Labor 
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TABLE 6 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENEBATED CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE BUSINESS/LABOB SUBSAMP1E 
RANDOM INITIALIZATION 
CLUSTEB SUMMARY FOB 2 CLUS1EBS 
CLUSTEB MEMBERS 
1 18 
2 5 
CLUSTEB 
VARIATION 
18.000000 
5.CG 0000 
VARIATION PBOPOBTIOM 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
15-089 137 0.8383 
3.872882 0.7746 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.696901 
0.704797 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18.96202 PBOPOBIION = 0.82-4436 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE 
IPAA63 
NAB63 
NALU 63 
NSPE63 
NFIB63 
AFT63 
NEA63 
AFLCI03X 
AFSCM63X 
C0CUS63X 
CMA63X 
GNCON63X 
IFCH63X 
BUSORG 63 
SOCWK63X 
UAM63X 
UHH63X 
ACTBV63X 
1MSTB63 
CABP63 
CCE63X 
NFC63X 
NFU63X 
fi-SOU ABED HITH 
CUN NEXT B**2 
CLUSTEB HIGHEST RATIO 
0.8146 0.6075 0.7457 
0.8838 0.6995 0.7915 
0.6992 0.4574 0.6542 
0.7133 0.3524 0.4941 
0.8845 0.6067 0.6860 
0.9017 0.5681 0.6301 
0.7 844 0.6764 0.8623 
0.9495 0.7649 0.8056 
0.8086 0-5926 0.7329 
0.9439 0.6359 U.b737 
0.9559 0.7326 0.7664 
0.4642 0.2155 0.4643 
0-9412 0.7393 0.7855 
0-7829 0-5516 0.7046 
0. 8998 0., 6691 0.7436 
0.9702 0.7284 0.7508 
0. 9111 0.6237 0-6845 
0.7803 0.5309 0.6803 
0.7844 0.7071 0.9015 
0.787C 0.7072 0-8986 
0.9095 0.6533 0.7183 
0-5814 0.2559 0.4401 
0.8106 0.4670 0.5760 
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There is no clean business/labor split at two 
clusters. More importantly, that split never comes. 
As was seen with HI, it is very possible that outliers 
will dominate the cluster algorithm at the beginning. 
That is, those organizations which are most unlike any 
other organizations will be split off in ones and twos. 
If there is cohesiveness within the labor and business 
communities, then once the most anomalous members of 
the sample are off in small clusters, the main body of 
the sample should split into two clusters with several 
members. That split never occurs under the second 
hypothesis. 
Tables 20 to 27 in Appendix G portray the 
progression of the H2 analysis from three to ten 
clusters. At each increment, the cluster generated 
has only one or two members. 
As more clusters are formed, the farmers form an 
2 
isolated dyad as indicated by their relatively low R 
ratio. At the six cluster level [Table 23], with the 
variation explained proportion surpassing the .90 
level. Cl, the largest cluster, contains most of the 
labor organizations and most of the generic business 
organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce. With ten 
clusters [Table 27], the Chamber of Commerce and the 
AFL-CIO occupy the same cluster. Even when 10 clusters 
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are generated 25% of Cl's membership is from the 
business organizations. 
In the House, when using ratings as the clustering 
criterion, there is no clear demarcation between those 
organizations whose origins are in the business 
community and those organizations from the labor 
community. In relative terms, the results indicate 
that the business community is much more divided in its 
evaluation of the members of the House than is the 
labor community. 
Senate. At two clusters [Figure 5 and Table 7], 
the results from Senate ratings are, with the exception 
of the addition of the anonymous business association, 
BUS0RG63, the same as for the House. The teamsters and 
carpenters are members of Cl with five of the 11 
business organizations. The other six business 
category members are in C2 with most of the labor 
groups. 
Again, as with the House ratings, the sample tends 
to divide one or two members at a time [Tables 28 to 35 
in Appendix G]. At the tenth iteration, three of C2's 
nine members, including the Chamber of Commerce, are 
business organizations. Cl has one labor and two busi¬ 
ness members; C7 has one of each. Only C8 has all busi¬ 
ness members, of which two are the farm organizations. 
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FIGURE 5 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR 
CATEGORIES USING RATINGS OF THE SENATE 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
B = Business 
L = Labor 
TABLE 7 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE EATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
POE THE BUSINESS/LABOB SUBSAMPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLOSTEfi ANALYSIS 
RANDOM INITIALIZATION 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 2 CLUSIEES 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 7 
2 16 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
7-000000 
16.C00000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
5-766864 0.6238 
12-579239 0.7862 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18.3461 PROPORTION 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.40S421 
0.707593 
= 0.797657 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
B-SQUARED MITB 
QUH NEXT R**2 
1 VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0-7958 0.6661 0-8371 
TMSTR63 0.8239 0.7388 0.8966 
CARP63 0.6776 0.4434 0.6543 
CCE63X 0.9303 0.8128 0.8736 
BUSCBG63 0-9144 0.8033 0.8784 
NF063X 0.7509 0.5398 0.7 190 
NFU63X 0-8738 0.7166 0-8201 
NAB63 0-8386 0.7368 0.8785 
NALU63 0.6141 0.4689 0.7636 
NSPE63 0.5066 0.29 14 0.5753 
NFIB63 C. 810-4 0.7285 0.8989 
AFT63 0.6638 0-4842 0-7294 
NEA63 0.424 C 0-2938 0.6929 
AELCI03X 0.9688 0.8263 0-8529 
AFSCM63X 0.7125 0.5833 0.8188 
C0CUS63X 0.9043 0.8759 0.9686 
CHA63X 0.9538 0.8362 0.8767 
GNCON63X 0.8107 0.6312 0-7786 
IFCW63X 0.9313 0.7411 0.7958 
SOCWK63X 0.9131 0.6 544 0.7166 
UAM63X 0.9714 0.8532 0.8783 
UMH63X 0.7362 0-5522 0.7500 
ACTRV63X 0.8195 0.7464 0-9107 
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The results from clustering the Senate ratings of 
23 business and labor organizations are duplicates of 
the House clusters. The organizations fail to cluster 
according to their origins. The business community 
organizations are less cohesive than the labor 
organizations. 
Discussion. The solutions generated by the 
cluster program suggest that the specific interests of 
organizations from the business community outweigh 
their general needs. This pattern is reversed for 
labor. The fact that in the House nine of the twelve 
labor unions remain together in a cluster even at the 
tenth iteration [Table 27] indicates that the general 
outweigh specific goals. It should be noted that of 
the three business organizations that are co-members of 
the labor cluster. Cl, two, the Chamber and NFIB, are 
among the more generic of the business organizations in 
the sample. 
From a political perspective, this contrast 
between labor community cohesion and business community 
disintegration seems to imply that, if one pleases one 
union one is apt to please all; however if one's vote 
pleases one business interest one is much less apt to 
please all. Hypothetically a vote for industry 
specific legislation that is perceived to be 
unfavorable to labor's general interest could also 
cause segments of the business community to perceive 
that vote as unfavorable to its own interests too. 
There are apt to be numerous situations where issues of 
specific interest to a particular industry are not 
perceived to be in conflict with the general interests 
of labor. That is, one may help an industry without 
hurting labor - a non-zero sum game setting. This does 
not mean that other interests such as consumers, 
education or minorities may not be harmed. It does 
mean that judicious voting can lead to simultaneously 
pleasing segments of the business community, while not 
offending the labor community. 
The business/labor contrast in degree of 
cohesiveness may be seen from another perspective. The 
dispersion of the business community may result from 
business' recognition of the turbulent complexity of 
its environment. General conditions are not enough to 
insure the well being of a specific industry. Labor's 
cohesion may result from a slowness to recognize a 
changed world. If declining memberships, union apathy 
among younger workers, difficulty in organizing new 
industries, and large numbers of union workers voting 
for Republicans are caused by something, that something 
may in part be a too high priority placed on labor 
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solidarity by labor's leadership. It may be that in a 
post industrial economic world, "Divided we stand; 
united we fall," is the new order of the day. If this 
is true the findings suggest that while many businesses 
have come to see this; labor has not done so. 
Hypothesis 3: Business/Labor Dispersion 
The third hypothesis, H3, states: 
"There is a significant difference in the 
dispersion of ratings between the cluster 
generated business group and the cluster 
generated labor group." 
Given the poor discrimination between the business 
and labor organizations at the two cluster level as 
presented in the previous section, this issue is 
somewhat moot. However, if the poor discrimination is 
disregarded, in the House at two clusters [Table 6], 
o 
the average of the business cluster members, .77, is 
somewhat lower than the .84 average of the labor 
2 
cluster members. The average R ratio of each cluster 
is .70. Indirectly, the tendency of the business 
community toward disintegration (clusters of one or two 
members) lends evidence to the argument that it is less 
cohesive than the labor community. That tendency, 
however, is reversed in the Senate clusters. There, 
2 
with two clusters [Table 7], the average R of the 
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business cluster. Cl, is .82; the C2 labor cluster 
2 . 2 
average R is .79. Again, the average R ratios are 
equal, at .81. A comparison of how the business and 
labor communities divide in the Senate shows a strong 
resemblance to the outcome in the House setting. The 
labor community has a greater tendency to hold 
together. Six of the 13 labor organizations are 
cluster comembers in C2 at the stage of ten clusters 
[Table 35 in Appendix G]. 
Hypothesis 4: Spokesperson Representativeness 
The fourth hypothesis states: 
There will be a significant change in the 
membership of the business and labor affiliated 
groups and two clusters formed using the Chamber of 
Commerce and the AFL-CIO ratings as cluster seeds. 
To test H4, the same set Of organizations that was 
used in H2 is used again. The only difference is that, 
rather than having the cluster algorithm be initialized 
randomly, the first two clusters are formed using the 
Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO as seeds for the 
initial formation of the two clusters. 
House of Representatives. In the House, when the 
cluster program is truncated at two clusters [Figure 6 
and Table 8], eight of the eleven business and ten of 
the labor unions reside in one cluster. More 
FIGURE 6 
HYPOTHESIS 4 
SPOKESPERSON REPRESENTATIVENESS OF 
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND 
AFL-CIO USING HOUSE RATINGS 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
B =Business 
L =Labor 
COC=Chamber of Commerce 
AFL=AFL-CIO 
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TABLE 8 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING GENERATED 
CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS FOR BUSINESS/LAEOR SUESAMPLE 
WHEN SEEDED WITH SPOKESPERSON GROUPS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COHPONERT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER 
1 
2 
MEMBERS 
18 
5 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
18.COCOUO 
5.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
15.089337 
3-872882 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8383 
0-7746 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18-962C2 PROPORTION 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.696901 
0-704797 
= 0-824436 
B-SgUABED WITH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
1 CLUSTER 
IPAA63 
NAB63 
NALU63 
NSPE63 
NFIB63 
AFI63 
NEA63 
AFLCI03X 
AFSCH63X 
COCUS63X 
CWA63X 
GNCON63X 
IICW63X 
BUSORG63 
SOCWK63X 
UA863X 
UMW63X 
ACTS V63X 
CLUSTER 
0. 8146 0.6075 0.7457 
0.8838 0.6995 0.7915 
0.6992 0.4574 0.6542 
0.7333 0.3524 0.4941 
0.8845 0.6067 0.6860 
0.9017 0.5681 0.6301 
0.7844 0.6764 0.8623 
0.9495 0.7649 0.8056 
0.8086 0.5926 0.7329 
0.9439 0.6359 0-6737 
0.9559 0.7326 0.7664 
0.4642 0.2155 0.4643 
0.9412 0.7393 0.7855 
0.7829 0. 5536 0.7046 
0.8998 0.6691 0.7436 
0.9702 0.7284 0.7508 
0-9111 0.6237 0.6845 
0.7803 0.5309 0.6803 
IMSTR63 
CARP63 
CCE63X 
NF063X 
NFU63X 
0.7844 
0-7870 
0-9095 
0.5814 
0.8106 
0-7071 
0.7072 
0.6533 
0.2559 
0.4670 
0.9015 
0.8986 
0.7183 
0.4401 
0.5760 
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importantly, the Chamber, though used to initialize the 
business cluster, does not remain a member. It, too, 
joins the labor cluster. It is not distinct enough 
from the AFL-CIO to sustain a cluster of its own. 
2 
Inspection of the R values in Cl shows that both the 
Chamber and AFL-CIO have high and nearly equal values 
of .9439 and .9495 respectively. 
The Chamber is not an outlier in the cluster; it 
is as integral a member of the cluster as the AFL-CIO. 
If the AFL-CIO were to be dropped from the sample, 
there would be almost no change in Cl's composition. 
Forcing the clustering algorithm to begin building 
the two clusters around the AFL-CIO and Chamber of 
Commerce changes nothing. By the completion of the 
process, the two organizations are both members near 
the center of the same cluster. 
Senate. In the Senate, at two clusters [Figure 7 
and Table 9], the Chamber again fails to build a 
cluster around itself. It becomes a co-member with the 
AFL-CIO in a cluster with ten of the twelve labor 
organizations and five of the eleven business 
organizations. The two cluster seeded results are the 
same as those in the unseeded condition. 
Discussion. In neither the House nor Senate do a 
majority of the business organizations reside in a 
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FIGURE 7 
HYPOTHESIS 4 
SPOKESPERSON REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND AFL-CIO USING SENATE RATINGS 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
C2 
B = Business 
L = Labor 
COC = Chamber of Commerce 
AFL = AFL-CIO 
TABLE 9 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED 
CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR BUSINESS/LABOR 
SUBSAMPLE WHEN SEEDED WITH 
SPOKESPERSON GROUPS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY -CR 2 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 7 
2 16 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
7.000000 
16.000000 
VARIAT 1 UN 
EXPLAINED 
5.766864 
12.579239 
PRGPORTICN 
EXPLAINED 
0.8238 
0.7862 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18.3461 PROPORTION 
SECOND _ 
EIGENVALUE 
0.409421 
0.707593 
- 0.797657 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
R-SQUAREO KITH 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
OWN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIC 
IPAA63 0.7958 0.6661 0.8371 
TMSTR63 0.8239 0.7388 0.8966 
CARP 6 3 0.6776 0.4434 0.6543 
CCE63X 0.9303 0.8128 0.8736 
8USCPG63 0.9144 0.8033 0.8784 
NFQ63X 0.7509 0.5398 C.7190 
N-U63X 0.8738 0.7166 0.8201 
NAB63 0.8386 0.7363 0.8785 
NALU63 0.6141 0.4689 0.7636 
NSPE63 0.5066 0.2914 0.5753 
NFIB63 0.8104 0.7285 0.8989 
AFT63 0.6638 0.4842 0.7294 
N6A63 0.4240 0.2938 0.6929 
AFLCIU3X 0.9688 0.8263 0.8529 
AFSCM63X 0.7125 0.5833 0.8188 
C0CUS63X 0.9043 0.8759 0.9686 
CWA63X 0.9538 0.8362 0.8767 
GNCUN63X C.8107 0.6312 0.7786 
IFC 1*6 3X 0.9313 0.7411 0.7958 
S0CWK63X 0.9131 0.6544 0.7166 
UAM63X 0.9714 0.8532 C.8783 
UMW63X 0.7362 0.5522 0.7500 
/CTWV63X 0.8195 0.7464 0.9107 
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cluster in which they hold a majority of the cluster 
membership. In both settings, most of the business 
organizations are cluster co-members with most of the 
labor groups. Given these results, it is not possible 
to say that the Chamber is not a spokesperson for 
business, but the meaning of "spokesperson" must change 
in light of these results. 
The results of H2 showed an alignment of 
most of the labor unions and the Chamber. The H4 
results show that the Chamber's cluster membership is 
not an artifact of the cluster program. Additionally, 
it reinforces the earlier discussion of business 
cohesion. The business community is so disparate that 
its commonly accepted spokesperson, the Chamber, may be 
seen as a better spokesperson for labor than business. 
Its role as a generic organization, in a world needing 
industry and even corporate specific solutions (such as 
the Chrysler and Continental Illinois rescues) may have 
caused the Chamber to be distanced from its 
constituency. Analogous to the exploding universe, as 
the violent economic forces of the last 25 years pushed 
industries away from the center to seek solutions to 
their individual environments, the Chamber, by choosing 
to remain at the center, becomes an isolate. Part of 
the Chamber's isolation is due to its decision to 
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represent the interests of both big and small business. 
Proliferation theorists might point to the danger 
inherent in trying to serve two masters, or more, well 
in an increasingly complex world. 
Hypothesis 5: Contributions and Ratings 
The focal point of the fifth hypothesis is a 
comparison of the cluster memberships that result from 
rating pattern similarity to that of contribution 
pattern similarity. 
H5: There will be a significant difference in 
the membership of business and labor groups 
constructed from ratings and two clusters 
generated by the campaign contributions of the 
same set of organizations. 
The comparison for H5 was constructed by using all 
those organizations contained on the FEC financial 
tapes, that made contributions to members of the 96th 
Congress, and could be classified as being from the 
business or labor community. 
These were clustered on their contribution 
patterns. The results were compared to the clusters 
generated using the ratings of the same set of 
organizatins. 
House of Representatives. When the algorithm was 
truncated at two clusters [Figure 8 and Table 10], the 
contribution clusters form a near perfect split along 
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FIGURE 8 
HYPOTHESIS 5 
COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS 
AND LABOR CATEGORIES USING CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
Cl 
B = Business 
L = Labor 
C2 
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T? .0 
HOUSE OF 
CLUSTER 
REPBES ENTATIVES CONTRIBUTION 
SOLUTIOMS FOR BUSI RESS/LABOR 
GENERATED 
SUBSAMPLE 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 5 
2 13 
TOTAL VARIATION 
CLUSTER 
RANDOM INITIALIZATION 
CLUSTER SUHMARI FOR 2 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
5.000000 
13.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
2.145746 
5.581356 
PSOPORTICN 
EXPLAINED 
0.4291 
0.4293 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
1. 042346 
1.241438 
EXPLAINED = 7.727102 PROPORTION = 0.429283 
VARIABLE 
R-SQUIRED WITH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
NFIB63 
COCUS63X 
GNCON63X 
NSPE63 
NALU63 
0.5920 
0.1738 
0.5512 
0.1464 
0.6823 
0.0529 
0.0016 
0.0143 
0.0023 
0.0215 
0.0893 
0.0094 
0.0260 
0.0155 
0.0315 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER 2-— 
AFLCI03X 0.7446 0.0301 0.0404 
UAW63X 0.6063 0.0338 0.0557 
CARP63 0.5453 0.0359 0.0659 
ACTWV63X 0.3115 0.0180 0.0579 
CMA63X 0. 4844 0.0044 0.0090 
NEA63 0.3778 0.004 1 0.0 109 
AFSCM63X 0.5893 0.0371 0.0630 
IFCN63X 0.7790 0.0349 0.0448 
UMH63X 0.0146 0.0026 0. 1771 
AFT63 0.2756 0.0115 0.0416 
TMSTR6J 0.2858 0.0010 0.0035 
NF063X 0.0276 0.0017 0.0614 
SOCWK63X 0.5396 0.0207 0.0384 
108 
the business/labor dimension. Twelve of the thirteen 
members of Cl are from labor; five of the six business 
organizations are co-members of Cl. 
When ratings are used [Figure 9 and Table 11], the 
resulting clusters bear little resemblance to the 
contribution clusters. With ratings. Cl contains a 
single member, the NFO. The other seventeen 
organizations are contained in C2. 
The proportion of variation explained by the cluster is 
almost twice as high with ratings, .8388, as it is with 
2 
contributions, .4293. In like manner, the R between an 
organization and its cluster is noticeably higher with the 
2 
ratings. Yet, the separation, as denoted by the R ratio 
between one cluster and the other cluster, is much 
cleaner in the contribution cluster results. 
Senate. The membership split in the Senate is 
close to that of the House. With contributions [Figure 
10 and Table 12], four of the five business 
organizations are in Cl while C2 contains all of the 
labor groups and the NFO. The Chamber of Commerce is 
dropped for this comparison as it did not give to any 
Senatorial candidates. In the rating clusters [Figure 
11 and Table 13], the carpenters and farmers are 
members of C2; all of the other organizations are in 
Cl. 
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FIGURE 9 
HYPOTHESIS 5 
COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR 
CATEGORIES USING RATINGS OF THE HOUSE 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
B = Business 
L = Labor 
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TABLE 11 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTAT IVES LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED 
CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS PCB HYPOTHESIS 5 
BUSINESS/LABOB SUBSAHPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUMMARY FOB 2 CLOSTEBS 
CLUSTEB MEMBERS 
1 1 
2 17 
CLUSTEB 
VARIATION 
1.000000 
17.000000 
VARIATION PBOPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
1.000000 1.0000 
14.098745 0.8293 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.840917 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 15.09874 PROPORTION - 0.6388 19 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
OWN NEXT R*+2 
VARIABLE CLUSTEB HIGHEST RATIO 
NF063X 1.0000 0.2545 0.2545 
NALU63 0.6973 0. 1654 0.2372 
NSPE63 0.6874 O.1469 0-2136 
NFIB63 0.8865 0.1649 0.1860 
TMSTR63 0.7573 0.2257 0.2981 
AFT63 0.8980 0.1744 0. 1942 
CARP63 0.. 7 53-4 0.2330 0.3093 
NEA63 0-7966 0.2690 0.3377 
AFLCI03X 0- 9596 0.2572 0.2680 
AFSCM63X 0.8224 0. 1644 0.1999 
COCUS63X 0.9332 0.2171 0.2326 
CUA63X 0.9556 0.2612 0.2734 
GNCON63X 0.4446 0. 1621 0.3647 
IFC163X 0.9484 0.2595 0.2736 
SOCWK63X 0.8986 0.2649 0.2948 
UAU63X 0.9719 0.2562 0.2636 
UMN63X 0.9139 0.2209 0-2418 
ACTHV63X 0.7741 0.1736 0.2243 
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FIGURE 10 
HYPOTHESIS 5 
COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR 
CATEGORIES USING CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
Cl 
B = Business 
L = Labor 
TABLE 12 
SENATE CONTRIBUTION GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOB BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAHPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
RANDOM INITIALIZATION 
CLUSTER SUUNARY FOB 2 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEHEERS 
1 4 
2 13 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
4*000000 
13.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
2.573917 0.6435 
8.389955 0.6454 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.638682 
1.059196 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 10.96387 PROPORTION = 0.609104 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
R-SQUARED WITH 
OBN NEXT B**2 
V ARIABLE 
1 —it , 
CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
NFIB63 0.719 8 0.0060 0.0083 
GNCON63X 0.6213 0.0058 0.0093 
NSPE63 0.7432 0.0003 0.0004 
NALU63 0.4897 0.0765 0.1563 
AFLCI03X 0.8668 0.0001 0.0002 
UAH63X 0.7968 0.0000 0.0000 
CARP63 0.7641 0.0079 0.0103 
ACTBV63X 0. 7 71 5 0.0001 0.0001 
CBA63X 0.8673 0.0003 0.0003 
NEA63 0.499 1 0.0186 0.0373 
AFSCH63X 0.7843 0.0056 0.0072 
IFCB63X 0-8648 0-0005 0.0006 
UHN63X 0.2805 0.0002 0.0008 
AFT63 0.4471 0.0024 0.0054 
1NSTR63 0.4946 0.0007 0.0013 
NF063X 0. 1726 0.0448 0.2598 
S0CBK63X 0.7805 0.0013 0.0016 
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FIGURE 11 
HYPOTHESIS 5 
COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR 
CATEGORIES USING RATINGS OF THE SENATE 
Category Membership 
Cluster Membership 
B = Business 
L = Labor 
TABLE 13 
SENATE CLUS WITH VARS THAT EQUAL BOS LAB BUCKCLUS FOB H5 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 2 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER 
1 
2 
MEMBERS 
16 
2 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
16.000000 
2.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
12.503225 
1.669275 
0. 
0. 
7815 
8346 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.740980 
0.330725 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 14.1725 PROPORTION * 0.787361 
R-SOUARED WITH 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CRN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
NALU63 0.6067 0.3968 0.6540 
NSPE63 0.4998 0.1117 0.2235 
NFIB63 0.8156 0.5169 0.6338 
TMSTH63 0.7665 0.5996 0.7823 
AFT63 0.6702 0.3422 0.5107 
NEA63 0.4139 0.1847 0.4463 
AFLCI03X 0.9713 0.6250 0.6434 
AFSCM63X 0.7108 0.3980 0-5599 
COCUS63X 0.9061 0.6636 .0.7324 
CHA63X 0.9562 0.6112 0.6392 
GNCON63X 0. 8154 0.4268 0.5235 
IFCW63X 0-9307 0.. 5286 0.5680 
S0CHK63I 0.9010 0.4373 0.4853 
UAW63X 0.9720 0.6331 0-6513 
UMH63X 0.7 369 0.4 144 0.5623 
ACTHV63X 0.8303 0.5980 0.7202 
CARP 6 3 0.8346 0.4551 0.5453 
NF063X 0.8346 0-5349 0.6409 
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The difference in explained variation is much 
smaller in the Senate than it was in the House, .7808 
2 
for ratings and .6091 for contributions. The R values 
for the contribution clusters are higher in the Senate 
2 
in comparison to the House. The R ratio of the 
contribution clusters indicate very clear separation 
between the two clusters. The same cannot be said of 
the cluster separation when ratings are the clustering 
criterion. 
Discussion. There seems to be a weak link between 
a legislator's performance, as evidenced by the ratings, 
and the rewards or sanctions for that behavior as 
evidenced by contributions. It is not possible to 
demonstrate this conclusively. Legislative ratings are 
based on end results - that is, votes that have come to 
the floor. This is but one demonstration of 
legislative behavior. As, or often more, important 
than floor votes are agenda setting and other committee 
behavior. Access to Congress at the beginning of the 
legislative process to make presentations, to apprise 
members of perceived outcomes if particular legislation 
is passed, and to develop compromises are valuable 
commodities. It is possible that much PAC money is 
directed toward insuring access at these earlier stages 
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of the legislative process. It is not possible to 
determine what a committee's agenda might have been 
without, or with a different pattern of, contributions. 
Not withstanding the above arguments, the 
dissimilarity between ratings and contributions needs 
further investigation. It would be hard to imagine a 
legislative issue holding the promise of great reward 
for a particular special interest that does not 
concomitantly hold the potential for significant harm 
for some other group of interests. If. this is true, 
then one would expect many of the apparent outcomes of 
general congressional behavior to pertain at the 
committee level. The potential for contribution 
neutralization, the possibility of supporting the 
lesser of two evils, and the probability of not funding 
a stalwart supporter may be prevalent within the 
committee structure. The probability that these 
activities occur at committee level and the actuality 
that some interest groups are contributing money in 
patterns that greatly differ from their legislative 
rating patterns suggest the need for more investigation 
and explanation of the links between ratings and 
contributions. 
With few exceptions, the journalists and scholars 
who have investigated the behavior of PACs over the 
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last ten years have implied or concluded that PACs 
receive good value for their money. The dissimi¬ 
larities in ratings and contribution patterns that this 
study has found suggest the possibility that PACs are 
in fact, receiving poor value for their contribution 
efforts. 
The following paragraphs are ruminations about how 
PACs may play a part in future electoral campaigns if, 
indeed, they are receiving bad value and if they become 
aware of that fact. 
It could be that PAC mechanism has been so 
successful that the congressional election setting has 
become a seller's market characterized by high 
inflation - too few political goods are being chased by 
too many contribution dollars. If this is true, one 
may expect the market to try to correct itself. One 
change might be product substitution. The proportion 
of PAC receipts used for independent expenditures for 
positive or negative campaigns could increase, or an 
increasing proportion of PAC receipts could be used for 
voter education. If successful, the latter strategy 
would use the influence of propagandized voters to 
"pull" legislators' behavior into the "correct" pattern 
to serve an interest group's best interest. 
A second possibility is that as present and 
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potential PACs recognize the poor value that they are 
receiving from contribution recipients, the growth 
rate, or even actual numbers of PACs, may decline. In 
marketing terms, consumer interest in this new product 
provided by the FECA may decline. In political history 
PACs may be remembered as a short lived fad. 
Political solutions to factional problems will 
still be sought, but the mechanism may be something 
different. Two obvious mechanisms would be increased 
use of resources in direct lobbying and, more 
interestingly, increased funding to the parties, 
particularly the Democrats. If the parties began to 
regain their historical role as prominent electoral 
bankers and if PAC party contribution limits are 
raised, a closer correlation between electoral behavior 
and campaign support might be expected in the future. 
To a certain extent the influencing power of money is 
indirectly related to the number of sources of funds. 
The greater the proportion of electoral funds channeled 
through the party apparatus, the greater the potential 
for legislative discipline. 
If PAC party contributions were to remain 
unchanged, a second means of exacting discipline would 
be for those interest groups most similar in their 
needs to develop coordinating mechanisms for their 
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contribution behavior. With the specifics of their 
ratings used as the similarity measure, organizations 
could look for suitable coalition partners. The 
process might resemble that of the personals columns in 
many newspapers, or more accurately, a computer dating 
service. "Young, black, high tech firm seeks ...." 
Summary 
The results from a series of five hypotheses 
developed to investigate the political cohesiveness of 
a sample of interests groups indicate that neither FEC 
PAC categories, nor traditional denominations such as 
business/labor, discriminate well when rating patterns 
of members of Congress are used as the similarity 
measure. The legislative approval patterns of generic 
business groups tend to more closely resemble those of 
labor unions than other business associations. The 
sample of labor unions display a much greater degree of 
ratings cohesion than the business community. When the 
similarity measure is switched from ratings to 
financial contributions, a sample of PACs divides along 
the business/labor dimension. 
The lack of ratings cohesion within the business 
community and the discrepancy in cluster membership 
between rating and contribution cluster solutions 
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indicates that straightforward comparisons of business 
and labor congressional contributions are 
inappropriate. The financial support provided by the 
business community, on a dollar for dollar basis, 
appears to be less potent than that of labor. 
A review of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
present study and discussion of future research 
directions is presented in the last chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The results of this study may be controversial. 
Many children are warned by parents to avoid "bad 
companions." They are told that "we are known by the 
company that we keep." The sight of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the AFL-CIO, or the ACLU and the National 
Christian Action Coalition, being cluster co-members is 
apt to be perceived by some as examples of 
organizations keeping bad companions. However, drawing 
such a conclusion from this study is too simplistic. 
Almost all research in the social sciences is 
vulnerable to methodological criticisms. Often, what we 
wish to investigate is so ephemeral that operational¬ 
ization of the ephemera may be done in myriad ways. 
While some of those many ways may be better than 
others, none will be without its weaknesses. Social 
science dealing with emotional or controversial topics, 
such as race, intelligence, or politics is especially 
open to criticism. This study falls in the latter 
category. 
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Strength of Findings 
The degree of controversiality of this study's 
findings are closely related to the believability of 
the research setting. 
The use of legislative ratings as the operational 
definition of group self-interest offers an instrument 
of great verisimilitude. The group's self-interest is 
as the group itself defines it. 
The sample of ratings used in the study includes 
almost two-thirds of the population of organizations 
that rate members of Congress. The sample represents 
great diversity of factional interests. It includes 
the largest business and labor organizations in the 
country. Professional, craft, industrial, and 
government employee unions are represented. Small 
business and big business, manufacturing and service, 
agricultural and engineering associations are elements 
within the business sub-sample. Consumer, civil 
rights, Christian, conservation, and women's interests 
are represented. Free market enthusiasts, civil 
liberty activists, and groups professing traditional 
liberal or conservative orientations are contained 
within the sample of raters. 
This study is concerned, primarily, with 
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similarity. Categories and cohesiveness are types of 
similarity. Prior to this study almost all studies of 
PAC similarity have used PAC origin as the similarity 
variable. This study uses a greatly expanded notion of 
similarity. Rather than relying upon a single 
variable, origin, it uses measurements on the 
legislative behavior of 96 Senators and 421 House 
members as its indicator of similarity. 
To discern similarity, cluster analysis, with its 
great taxonomic capabilities, is used to reduce and 
aimensionalize several million similarity comparison 
points. 
This study, of course, is not without its 
weakenesses. The sample is neither a random sample of 
the population of rating organizations nor a random 
sample from the PAC population. The interests of such 
specific factional economic groups as steel, computers, 
and automobiles are represented, if at all, only in 
diluted form through the Chamber of Commerce and other 
generic business organizations. The method of 
discerning similarity, cluster analysis, is one of the 
least formulaic of analytical techniques. Cluster 
interpretation is still more art than science. 
There are serious questions as to the practical 
applicability of using cluster analysis with ratings 
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to comprehend the world of American politics. That the 
Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO are co-members in a 
cluster at the level where ten clusters are formed may 
be interpreted as meaning that these two organizations 
are very similar in their ratings. This need not be. 
Misinterpretation can derive from the difference in 
what similarity means in 47 dimension space as opposed 
to what it means in two dimensions. A two object 
comparison in multiple dimensions must be made in 
relation to ail other members of the set occupying the 
space, not just between the two objects being compared. 
An orange and an apple, though very different, are 
highly similar if the rest of the set of objects is 
composed of a cow, hammer, candle, and crane. 
The reader must judge whether the approach used in 
this study represents an improvement over what has gone 
before. Linnaeus' warning of the confusion resulting 
from misclassifying phenomena and Madison's fear of 
unchecked factions offer strong argument for accepting 
imperfect samples and esoteric techniques in the 
pursuit of greater depth to our knowledge of PACs. 
Interpreting Results 
Contingent upon the caveats discussed above, the 
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results of this project cast doubt upon the validity 
of using FEC or business/labor origin categories to 
study or draw conclusions of the behavior of PACs in 
federal electoral politics. 
In the sample set, the membership within 
categories based on origin does not closely map to the 
membership with groupings derived from ratings 
similarity. Relative to the sample or subsample used 
in a particular hypothesis, many organizations whose 
origins are in the business sector are found to have 
ratings very similar to many labor organizations. 
Origin and purpose (when operationalized as 
ratings) are not the same thing, nor do they denote the 
same information. Knowledge of what an organization 
wants is not derivable, necessarily, from knowledge of 
that organization's origin. This study indicates that 
the above statement holds for a business/labor 
categorical scheme as well as for the FEC scheme. 
The results from the first four hypotheses 
indicate that there is no great correspondence between 
where an organization originates and how that 
organization rates the members of Congress. The 
results obtained under the fifth hypothesis support the 
argument made in Chapter II that there will not be a 
strong linkage between how organizations rate and how 
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they make contributions. But, the H5 results do show 
that the cluster membership derived from contribution 
patterns is almost exactly the same as the membership 
would be if the same set of organizations were 
categorized by origin. In other words origin denotes 
little about ratings, ratings denote little about 
contribution patterns, but origin denotes much about 
contribution patterns. 
In relationship to the actual and potential 
theoretical guidelines discussed earlier in this paper, 
the results indicate that the actual may be being 
overused and the potential of great use. 
The neo Marxian perspective, particularly of 
journalists, is not lent credit. The ratings cluster 
membership indicate that neither labor nor, especially, 
2 
business are cohesive in their sought goals. The R 
2 
values within clusters and the R ratios and 
correlations coefficients across clusters indicate that 
the diametricality of business and labor interests is 
more perceived than actual. 
The fuzziness of the clusters and the intermixing 
of members from different origins lends credence to 
proliferation theorists. The United States of the 
1980s is too complex to expect much explanatory power 
to come from paradigms based on two or three broad 
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interest groups. It appears that too much explanation 
has been sacrified to achieve simplicity. The rubric 
to be followed is parsimony, not simplicity. 
Political action committees are an important 
public policy issue because of their potential for 
exerting political influence. As the degree to which 
any faction can influence political events is related 
to the behavioral cohesiveness of its members 
measurement of cohesiveness must be a central issue in 
future PAC research. This study has attempted to show 
that cohesion is a theoretically and empirically 
complex construct. Investigation of this complexity 
will draw this and, it is hoped, other researchers' 
efforts. As the data base of ratings and contributions 
e 
grows both in number of organizations and number, of 
• • • 
electoral cycles, an investigative field of increasing 
fertility will result. 
The following section discusses ideas for future 
research that links ratings to PACs. 
Future Research 
Theoretical 
An obvious and necessary place to begin a stream 
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of PAC cohesion research is with a replication of this 
study using data from the 95th and 97th Congress. If 
findings from these two Congresses resemble those of 
the 96th, credence will be added to the theory, 
methodology and interpretations found within the 
present study. Dissimilar results may be explicable 
within the dynamics of American political life or may 
flag a need for a revised approach. 
It was noted earlier that much of the 
investigation of PACs has been either from an 
atheoretical or an unexpressed Marxian perspective. 
There is great potential to link formally PAC 
rating and contribution behavior to interest group 
theory. From the homoeostatic perspective, research 
can be conducted that would attempt to investigate the 
relationship between dislocations and political 
behavior. If an interest suffers a negative 
dislocation as evidenced either by such relative 
financial measures as rate of return or CPI adjusted 
wages, or by lower ratings, does it increase its 
participation in the political process through 
increased contributions? More generally, do those 
organizations who drop most precipitously in their 
ratings from one Congress to the next rise most 
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precipitously in their contributions? From another 
perspective, if lower ratings are indicative of unmet 
needs of a special interest, homeostatic theory would 
suggest that one could expect to find differences in 
the content of the legislation used to evaluate 
legislators. Lower rating groups would have more group 
specific legislation in their indices; higher rating 
groups would have more general legislation. 
The distinctions between access and influence and 
between committee and floor behavior are amenable to 
investigation by linking ratings and contributions. 
Longitudinal studies can be done that trace committee 
assignments, reassignments, ratings assessment, and 
contributions. Is there a linear relationship between 
length of committee service (indirectly, agenda power) 
and size of contributions irrespective of ratings? Or, 
does the capture theory hold? Do committee members 
receive higher ratings the longer they remain on a 
committee? 
Applied 
To begin to understand the disparateness of the 
business community, the standardized rating scores of 
legislators can be plotted on two axes. For example, 
the Chamber of Commerce and the NFIB ratings for the 
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House could be plotted. The mass of scores that fall 
into quandrants II and IV can be compared to the mass 
residing in the first and third quadrants. The greater 
the mass in the off diagonal quadrants, the greater the 
discrepancy in the instrumental goals of the two 
organizations. Comparisons can be made between the 
off-diagonal/diagonal proportion of the Chamber and 
NFIB, the AFL-CIO, the Teamsters etc. Refinements can 
be done using the scores of only the members of one 
party and one body. The latter, of course, offers 
insight into the cohesiveness of the parties' 
representatives. 
In contrast to the present study, the focal point 
can become the legislators rather than the rating 
organization. The members of House or Senate can be 
clustered using sets of variables of close alignment to 
determine which legislators are most similar from the 
viewpoint of a particular organization or interest 
group. For example, the legislators could be clustered 
by their scores from the seven or eight labor 
organizations that tend to form the tighest cluster. 
For an organization to expend the resources 
necessary to construct ratings and (from another 
perspective) the strong opposition to ratings shown by 
a number of Congressional members suggests that ratings 
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are perceived as having some significant effect on 
either legislative behavior or electoral outcomes. 
That premise has the potential to be tested by running 
regressions to determine whether and, if so, which 
ratings can be used to predict success in the campaign 
succeeding a rating period. 
Much work remains to be done on investigating what 
connections, if any, there are between ratings and 
contributions. A very simple study would be to compare 
off diagonal/diagonal proportions, where the axes are 
ratings and contributions, using the standard 
deviations of the standardized ratings scores as the 
scale. Various organizations can be compared on the 
discrepancy proportion between their ratings and their 
contributions. The smaller the direct relationship 
between ratings and contributions, the weaker the 
argument that contributions purchase influence. 
Organizational similarity as determined by 
ratings, similarity by contribution pattern, legislator 
similarity as determined by ratings, party affiliation, 
body membership, campaign success, and other empirical 
variables can be combined in numerous ways to study the 
political, and particularly electoral, environment. 
Cluster, discriminant, factor, and causal, analysis and 
dynamic programming techniques offer great promise to 
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better reduce, link, and understand the dynamics of 
politics in the age of PACs and ratings. 
Future research can help to move our perceptions 
from fascination or fear of the size of PAC dollars, to 
an awareness of the extent to which those dollars are 
linked to influence. 
Summary 
The growth in the numbers and contributions of 
political action committees during the last decade has 
been a worrisome effect of the FECA and its amendments. 
Worry as to the potential for undue influence by 
special interests and long term imbalance among 
interests, particularly business and labor, has led to 
research attempts to measure PAC political effect. 
Many of these efforts are founded upon making 
comparisons across aggregated FEC PAC categorical data. 
Other studies have relied upon business versus labor 
comparisons. 
The present project has been a preliminary 
attempt to investigate the appropriateness of using FEC 
categories or business/labor categories in PAC 
analysis. The results of the study indicate that 
neither the FEC nor business/labor categories of 
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memberships hold up when similarity in legislative 
ratings is used to group organizations. The discrepant 
results between the two classification systems, 
described here as systems of origin and purpose, 
indicates that more sophisticated research is necessary 
before final judgment as to the effect of PACs upon the 
American political system may be rendered. It is hoped 
that this study is a first step toward making this 
important public policy judgment. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following descriptions of organizations 
contained in the sample are excerpted from the 
Encyclopedia of Associations, 19th Edition, 1985. 
1. AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS 
UNION (ACTWU) 
Founded: 1976. Members: 380,000. Locals: 
1515. AFL-CIO; CLC. Sponsors Sidney Hillman 
Foundation. Bestows awards; maintains library. 
Divisions: Headwear; Shoe; Textile. 
Publications: Labor Unity, monthly. Absorbed: 
(1978) United Shoe Workers of America; (1982) Hat, 
Cap, and Milinery Workers. Formed by merger of 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (founded 
1914) and absorbed International Glove Workers 
Union of America) and Textile Workers Union of 
America (founded 1929 and absorbed American 
Federation of Hosiery Workers). 
Convention/Meetings: triennial - next 1987. 
2. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU) 
Founded: 1920. Members: 250,000. Staff: 125. 
State Groups: 50. Local Independence and the 
Constitution: Freedom of inquiry and expression 
(speech, press, assembly and religion); due 
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process of law and fair trial for everybody; 
equality before the law for everybody regardless of 
race, color, national origin, political opinion on 
religious belief. Activities include test court 
cases, opposition to repressive legislation, public 
protests on every 
inroad of rights. Maintains library of more than 
3,000 volumes. Sponsors projects on topics such as; 
women's right, juvenile rights, death penalty and 
national security. Committees: Academic Freedom; 
Church State; Communications Media; Due Process; 
Equality; Free Speech-Association; Indian Rights; 
Privacy. Divisions: American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation (see separate entry). Publications: (1) 
First Principles, monthly; (2) Civil Liberties 
bi-monthly; also publishes policy statements, 
reprints and pamphlets. Convention/Meeting: 
biennial - next 1985. 
3. AMERICAN CONSERVATION UNION (ACU) 
Founded: 1964. Members: 400,000. State Groups: 
42. Persons seeking "to mobilize resources of 
responsible conservative thought across the country 
and further the general cause of conservatism." 
Plans to provide education in such subject areas as 
political activity, "prejudice in the press," 
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foreign and military policy, domestic economic 
policy, the arts, professions and services. 
Maintains speakers bureau and information service on 
conservative publications; conducts research 
programs; rates members of Congress on important 
legislation. Bestows awards. Committees: 
Political Action. Publications: Batteline, 
monthly; also publishes Issues Analysis Series. 
Absorbed: (1966) Political Action Committee of 
Young Americans for Freedom. Convention/Meeting: 
annual Conservative Political Action Conference - 
1984 February/March, Washington, DC. 
4. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO) 
Founded: 1955. Members: 13,800,000. Staff: 
500. Federation of national unions (95), state 
federations (51) and city central bodies (742) and 
directly affiliated local unions. Presents annual 
Murray-Green-Meany Award (a plaque and $5000) for 
distinguished service to America, and annual George 
Meany Human Rights Award (a plaque and $5000) for 
service to worldwide human rights and dignity. 
Maintains library. Committees: Civil Rights; 
Community Services; Economic Policy; Education; 
Ethical Practices; Housing; International Affairs; 
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Legislation; Maritime; Organization; Political 
Education; Public Relations; Research; Safety; and 
Occupational Health; Social Security; Veterans 
Affairs. Departments: Building and Construction 
Trades; Food and Allied Service; Industrial Union; 
Maritime Trades; Metal Trades; Professional 
Employees; Public Employee; Railway and Employees'; 
Union Label and Service Trades (see separate 
entries). Publications: (1) News, weekly; (2) 
American Federationist, monthly; (3) Free Trade 
Union News monthly. Formed by merger of: American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations. Convention/Meetings: biennial - 
1985, October 28, Anaheim, CA. 
5. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (Government) (AFSCME) 
Founded: 1936. Members: 1,200,000. Locals: 
3000. AFL-CIO. Maintains library of 5000 volumes. 
Committees: National Public Employees Organized to 
Promote Legislative Equality (PEOPLE). Publications: 
(1) Leadership Newsletter, monthly; (2) Public Employee 
Newspaper, monthly; (3) Women's Newsletter, monthly; 
also publishes President's Lettter. 
Convention/Meeting: biennial - next 1984. 
6. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFT) 
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Founded: 1916. Members: 580,000. Locals: 2100. 
AFL-CIO. Promotes collective bargaining for 
teachers and other educational employees. Conducts 
research on teacher stress, educating the 
handicapped, and other educational issues. Lobbies 
for passage of legislation of importance to 
education and the labor movement. Presents annual 
Human Rights Award; bestows grants in Professionals 
(see separate entry). Publications: (1) American 
Teacher (September-May), monthly; (2) American 
Educator, quarterly. Convention/Meetings: biennial 
- always July or August. 
7. AMERICANS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION (Political 
Action) (ACA) 
Founded: 1958. Political action organization 
supported by financial contributions of individuals. 
Maintains off-election year staff of five along with 
two professional consultants; for 1982 elections 
retained 22 individuals, firms and agencies in 
support of candidates. Undertakes "to help elect 
to the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States individuals, who by their actions, 
have proved their allegiance to the original spirit 
and principles of the Constitution." Presents 
biennial distinguished service award to selected 
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members of Congress. Publications: (1) Index 
(analysis and statistical evaluation of the voting 
records of members of Congress), annual (2) 
Congressional Record Digest and Tally, irregular. 
8. AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION (Liberal) 
(ADA) 
Founded: 1947. Members: 81,000 Staff: 20. 
State Groups: 20. Local Groups: 50. 
Professionals and businesspersons, labor leaders, 
educators, political leaders, and other individuals 
interested in liberal political ideas. To formulate 
liberal domestic and foreign policies based on the 
changing needs of American democracy, enlist public 
understanding and support of these policies, and put 
them into effect through the actions of major 
political parties. Sponsors Progressive Victory 
Fund. Committees: Consumer Affairs; Economics; 
Energy and the Environment; Foreign Policy; 
Political Policy. Divisions: Development; 
Legislative; Organization; Political; Public 
Relations. Publications: (1) The Courier, 
semimonthly (when Congress is in session); (2) For 
Your Information, monthly; (3) ADA World, quarterly; 
(4) Program for Americans, annual. 
Convention/Meetings: annual. 
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9. AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL (ASC) 
Founded: 1955. Members: 325,000. Staff: 39. 
Individuals (325,000), companies (700), colleges, 
labor unions, and others supporting national 
research and information center on national 
security. Maintains Washington bureau and 
broadcasts Radio Free Americas, a daily Spanish 
language program service, on over 38 stations 
throughout the Americas. Organizes and serves as 
program secretariat for Coalition for Peace 
Through Strength (see separate entry). Conducts 
annual National Security Issues Polls. Uses polls 
to rate members of Congress on key national votes. 
Holds regular national security luncheons for 
members of Washington press corps. Committees: 
Political Action. Publications: (1) Coalition 
Insider, monthly; (2) Washington Report, monthly; 
also publishes studies on key issues. Formerly: 
(1956) Mid-American Research Library. 
10. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(U.S.Chamber) 
Founded: 1912. Staff: 1400. National federation 
of business organizations and companies. Membership 
includes 4000 chambers of commerce and associations; 
over 200,000 business firms. U.S. chamber determines 
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and makes known to the government the recommendations 
of the business community on national issues and 
problems affecting the economy and the future of 
the country. Works to advance human progress 
through an economic, political, and social system 
based on individual freedom and initiative. 
Informs, trains, equips, and encourages members to 
participate in policymaking at federal, state, and 
local levels and in legislative and political action 
at the national level. Produces weekly national 
televised programs, Biznet News Today, It's Your 
Business, and Ask Washington, and ratio program. 
What's the Issue?, and operates the American 
Business Network (BizNet). Conducts continuing 
education for business executives, including 
business interacts with the federal government; and 
Institutes for Organization Management: courses to 
improve management skills of chamber of commerce 
and association executives. Major organizational 
units include: Association Department; 
Business-Government Affairs; Center for Leadership 
Development; Communications; Corporate Relations; 
Economic Policy; Human and Community Resources; 
International; Legislative Action and Political 
Affairs; Office of Chamber of Commerce Relations; 
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Resources and Environmental Quality; Small Business 
Center. Sponsors National Chamber Alliance for 
Politics. Maintains 28 committees, numerous task 
forces, and library of 10,000 volumes. 
Publications: (1) The Business Advocate 
(newspaper), biweekly; (2) Business Action Network: 
Washington Watch, monthly; (3) International 
Business Review, monthly; (4) Nation's Business 
(magazine), monthly; (5) Analysis of Workers' 
Compensation Laws, annual; (6) Employee Benefits, 
annual; also publishes special reports, studies, and 
research papers; distributes films and slide 
presentations. Affiliated with: Citizen's Choice; 
National Chamber Foundation; National Chamber 
Litigation Center, Inc.; National Chamber Alliance 
for Politics. Convention/Meeting: annual - always 
Washington, DC. 1985 April 28-30; 1986 April 27-29. 
11. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA (CWLA) 
Founded: 1920. Affiliates: 400. Privately 
supported membership organization devoted to 
improvements of care and services for deprived, 
dependent, or neglected children, youth, and their 
families. Provides consultation; conducts research; 
maintains 3000 volume reference library and 
information service; conducts agency and community 
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surveys; develops standards for services; and 
administers special projects. Maintains placement 
service. Divisions: American Parents Committee 
(see separate entry); Center for Governmental 
Affairs; Florence Crittenton; Hecht Institute; 
Office of Regional Provincial and State Child Care 
Associations. Publications: (1) Child Welfare, 
bimonthly; (2) Directory, annual; also publishes 
books, monographs and newsletters on various topics. 
Absorbed: (1976) Florence Crittenton Association of 
America. Convention/Meeting: regional education 
conference. 
12. CHRISTIAN VOICE (Conservative) (CV) 
Founded: 1978. Members: 325,000. A major lobby 
organization representing the Christian community, 
including 41,000 ministers representing over 45 
different denominations. Seeks to restore 
traditional Christian values throughout the country. 
Areas of interest include bringing back prayer in 
public schools, banning pornography from television 
and movies, and fighting against gay rights laws in 
Congress. Committees: Christian Voice Moral 
Government Fund. Publications: (1) Legislative 
Alert, monthly; (2) Congressional Report Card (a 
report on Senators' and Congressmen's voting records 
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on key moral issues, ERA and Federal spending 
control, annual. 
13. COALITION FOR A NEW FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY 
Founded: 1976. Members: 8000. Coalition of over 
47 national religious civil peace, and public 
interest organizations. Purpose is to mobilize and 
focus nationwide grassroots pressure on Congress and 
the administration to develop a demilitarized, 
humanitarian, non-interventionist foreign policy for 
the U.S. Recent areas of activity include: 
building nationwide support for congressional 
amendments to transfer funds from nuclear weapons 
programs to programs addressing pressing human 
needs, and to establish effective arms control and 
disarmament measures; promoting majority rule in 
South Africa and legislation cutting economic and 
military aid to repressive governments; 
"normalizing" relations with Indochina. Provides 
information on budget priorities and foreign policy 
legislation in relations to ending U.S. intervention 
abroad; provides information about bills ana 
amendments and sponsors and evaluation of "swing" 
members of Congress; organizes suggestions about 
Task Forces: Disarament Working Groups; Human 
Rights Working Group. Publications: Coalition 
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Close Up (newsletter), quarterly; also publishes 
Action Alerts and Action Guides. Affiliated with: 
United States Student Association. Formed by merger 
of: Coalition on National Priorities and Military 
Policy (founded 1969) and Coalition for a New 
Foreign Policy (founded 1973 and formerly Coalition 
to Stop Funding the War). 
14. COMMITTEE FOR THE SURVIVAL OF A FREE CONGRESS 
(conservative) (CSFC) 
Founded: 1974. Staff: 6. Regional Groups: 10. 
Bipartisan political action committee dedicated to 
the election of "conservative, responsible, and 
realistic leaders" to the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate. Activities include: 
identifying and recruiting conservative candidates; 
training candidates and personnel in the skills of 
campaigning; providing services in primary and 
general elections; providing financial support to 
campaigns; training newly elected members of 
Congress; and working with members on key 
legislative proposals. Publishes The Weyrich Report 
and pamphlets. 
15. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA (CWA) 
Founded: 193. Members: 650,000. Locals: 910. 
AFL-CIO. Committees: Political Contributions. 
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Publications: (1) Newsletter, weekly; (2) News, 
monthly. Convention/Meeting: annual. 
16. CONSERVATIVES AGAINST LIBERAL LEGISLATION (CALL) 
Founded: 1977. Members: 42,000. Staff: 5. 
Individuals and corporations interested in strong 
national defense, private enterprise, and less 
governmental affairs affecting national defense, 
economy and family life. Activities include 
lobbying, radio talk shows, speakers bureau, and 
informational service. Compiles statistics on 
congressional voting records and patterns. 
Committees: Congressional Advisory Board. 
Projects: Committee Opposing Legalized 
Discrimination. Publications: (1) Call for Action 
(newsletter), monthly; (2) Congressional Directory, 
annual; (3) Congressional Scorecard, annual; 
also publishes Fact Sheets on Specific Issues. 
Formerly: National Conservative Public Affairs 
Council. 
17. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA (CFA) 
Founded: 1967. Members: 200. Staff: 10. Largest 
national consumer advocacy organization. National, 
regional, state, and local consumer groups; 
supporting groups; and state and local protection 
agencies. Objectives are: to promote the rights of 
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all consumers, in harmony with the general welfare; 
to stimulate and coordinate consumer programs and 
activities in such areas as product pricing, 
quality, servicing and guarantees, regulatory 
agencies, credit and insurance, cost of food, drugs, 
and medical care, safety, energy and natural 
resources development, and in other areas as 
determined by the board of directors; to act as 
clearinghouse for the exchange of information, 
ideas, and experiences; to engage in fact-finding 
and analysis of consumer issues, publish the results 
of such studies, provide a responsible and 
articulate voice for consumers, and conduct public 
information activities. Presents three annual 
awards: Distinguished Public Service Award; 
Distinguished Media Achievement Award; Distinguished 
Consumer Service Award. Committees: Antitrust; 
Communications; Credit; Education; Energy and 
Natural Resources; Environment; Food Health; 
Housing; Insurance; Needs of Low Income Consumers; 
Political Action; Taxation; Transportation. 
Divisions: Consumer Product Safety Network; State 
and Local Consumer Resource Center. Publications: 
(1) Consumer Lobby Reports, bi-weekly; (2) News, 
monthly; (3) Newsletter (for state and local 
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organizations), monthly; (4) Annual Voting Record on 
U.S. Congress; also prepares legislative fact sheets 
and testimony on consumer issues. Absorbed: 
Electric Consumers Information Committee. 
Convention/Meeting: annual consumer assembly. 
18. COUNCIL FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (Free 
Enterprise) (CCE) 
Founded: 1977. Members: 1500. Staff: 6. 
Business and individuals in the business community 
who expouse the concept of a free, competitive 
economy. Opposes government regulations, taxes, 
subsidies, protection, and barriers to competition 
of all types. Lobbies on behalf of the free market 
system to reduce existing regulations and prohibit 
new regulations, tariffs and subsidies. Also 
opposes government aid to ailing corporations, price 
supports, cartels, cargo preference legislation, 
subsidized credit and other economic intervention. 
Conducts research, sponsors conferences, 
and maintains speakers bureau. Publication: (1) 
Executive Commentary, semimonthly; (2) Competition 
(magazine), bimonthly; (3) News, bimonthly; (4) 
Congressional Watchdog Bulletin, irregular; also 
publishes Issue Analysis papers. Formerly: (1978) 
162 
Business Leaders Against Subsidies and Tariffs. 
Convention/Meeting: annual. 
19. FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
(FCNL) 
Founded: 1943. Members: 8000. Staff: 15. An 
appointed committee of members of the Religious 
Society of Friends (Quakers) who feel a special 
concern for the political area of religious life; 
functions autonomously, but seeks to "keep 
responsive to concerns of Quakers generally." 
Informs Friends on issues and events in Washington, 
DC; encourages expression of individual views 
through letters and calls to legislators and public 
officials. Compiles statistics. Interviews members 
of Congress and other government officials; arranges 
for testimony before congressional committees. 
Areas of concern include American Indians, human 
rights, basic human needs, health care, refugees, 
militarism and disarmament, U.S. foreign policy, and 
U.N. affairs. Maintains collection of current 
materials and documents on war and peace and human 
rights. Publications: (1) Washington Newsletter, 
ll/year; (2) Indian Report, 3-4/year; (3) Action 
Bulletins, irregular; also publishes papers on 
topics of concern to Friends and booklets on working 
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in politics and writing letters to the editor. 
Convention/Meeting: annual. 
20. GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, ASSOCIATED 
(Construction) (AC) 
Founded: 1918. Members: 8500. Staff: 95. Local 
Groups: 112. General contractors engaged in 
construction (factories, office buildings, 
warehouses, highways, bridges, dams, railroads, and 
municipal utilities). Conducts J.D. Marshall 
Training Program and special conferences and 
seminars designed specifically for construction 
firms. Makes quarterly compilation of statistics on 
job accidents reported 
by member firms. Bestows annual awards for safety 
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and "BujLld/.America" awards for innovative and 
outstanding achievements by general contractors. 
Maintains J.L. Allhands Library, a collection of 
books, booklets, and brochures on the construction 
industry and construction firms. Maintains 65 
committees, including joint cooperative committees 
with other associations and liaison committees with 
federal agencies. Divisions: Building; Education; 
Equal Employment; Heavy-Industrial; Highway; 
Information; International Construction; Labor; 
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Legislative; Manpower and Training; Municipal 
Utilities; Open Shop; Research; Safety. 
21. INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 
(IPPA) 
Founded: 1921. Members: 7400. Staff: 37. 
Independent of oil and gas operators, land and 
royalty owners, and others (suppliers, drilling 
contractors, bankers, oil attorneys, trucking 
contractors, rig building contractors) interested in 
the production of crude oil and natural gas. To 
represent small oil and natural gas producers in 
legislative and regulatory areas at the federal 
level. Maintains speakers bureau. Committees: 
Cost Study; Crude Oil; Economic Policy; 
Environmental and Safety; Natural Gas; Oil Recovery; 
Public Lands; Supply and Demand; Tax. Publications: 
(1) Petroleum Independent, bimonthly; (2) The Oil 
Producing Industry in Your State, annual. 
Convention/Meeting: annual - always October. 1984 
Oct. 21-23, San Diego, CA; 1985. Oct. 27-29, San 
Antonio, TX. 
22. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA 
(IBT) 
Founded: 1903. Members: 2,000,000. Locals: 704. 
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Independent Publications: International Teamster, 
quarterly. Convention/Meeting: quinquennial - next 
1986 . 
23. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE 
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF 
AMERICA (UAW) 
Founded: 1935. Members: 1,100,000. Locals: 1540. 
AFL-CIO. Publications: (1) Ammo (magazine), monthly; 
(2) Solidarity (newspaper) monthly; (3) skill, 
quarterly. Formerly: (1962) International Union, 
United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America. Convention/Meeting: 
triennial - next 1986. 
24. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF 
AMERICA (UMWA) 
Founded: 1890. Members: 280,000. Independent. 
Publications: Journal, semimonthly. 
Convention/Meeting: quadrennial. 
25. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (LCCR) 
Founded: 1950. Members: 165. Coalition of 
national organizations (civil rights, labor, Asian 
and Hispanic Americans, religious, civic, fraternal, 
women, the aged, and handicapped) working to promote 
passage of civil rights, social and economic 
legislation, and enforcement of lav/s already on the 
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books. Publishes LCCR Memo; has recently released 
studies by six scholars who examined President 
Reagan's tax and budget recommendations in areas 
including housing, elementary and secondary 
education, social welfare, Indian programs, and tax 
cuts. Bestows Hubert H. Humphrey Award. 
Committees: Compliance and Enforcement; Education; 
Employment; Federal Regulatory Agencies; Health and 
Welfare; Housing; Legislative; Veteran's Affairs; 
Women's Rights. Formerly: Civil Rights 
Mobilization. Convention/Meeting: annual board 
meeting - always winter, Washington, DC. 
26. LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS (Environment) 
(LCV) 
Founded: 1970. A national nonpartisan campaign 
committee that supports environmentalists running in 
House, Senate and gubernatorial elections. League 
contributes to campaigns with high environmental 
stakes. Selects outstanding candidates facing close 
races and raises money and manpower for their 
campaigns. Publications: How Congress Voted on 
Energy and the Environment, annual; also publishes 
Presidential Profiles and a report and support slate 
every congressional election year. 
167 
27. LIBERTY LOBBY (Conservative) (LL) 
Founded: 1955. Members: 30,000. Staff: 50. 
"Nationalists and populists interested in political 
action in behalf of 99 issues which are 
pro-individual liberty and pro-patriotic." Supports 
free gold market, lower taxes, fewer farm controls, 
less government spending, protective immigration 
laws, repeal of the Seventeenth and Twenty-Fifth 
Amendments, separation of church and state, the 
right to keep and bear arms, states' rights, an end 
to forced busing and withdrawal from the United 
Nations. Opposes federal aid to education, foreign 
aid, "unfair" foreign competition, the E.R.A., 
revenue sharing, government in busness, monopoly in 
business or labor, recognition of Red China, civil 
rights laws, socialized medicine, peacetime drafts, 
tax-supported housing and world government. Airs 
daily radio broadcast, "This is Liberty Lobby." 
Publications: The Spotlight, weekly; also publishes 
Congressional Handbook and Liberty Ledger. 
Absorbed: Americans for National Security. 
Convention/Meeting: irregular. 
28. NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SENIOR CITIZENS (Aging) 
(NASC) 
Founded: 1974. Members: 770,000. Staff: 9. 
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Regional Groups: 2. State Groups: 5. Persons 
advocating the advancement of senior Americans 
through sound fiscal policy and through belief in 
the American system of individuality and personal 
freedom. Purpose is to inform the membership and 
the American public of the needs of senior citizens 
and of the programs and policies being carried out 
by the government and other specified groups. 
Represents the views of senior Americans before 
Congress and state legislatures. Maintains library 
for political and general research and Golden Age 
Hall of Fame honoring individuals for outstanding 
service to the senior community. Compiles 
statistics. Advisory Council Chairs: Adult 
Education; Budgeting; Consumerism; Protection; 
Family Life; Farm and Rural Life; Gerontology; 
Health Care; Housing; Nursing Homes; Nutrition; 
Organized Labor; Pension and Retirement Benefits; 
Planning and Zoning; Political Action; Productivity; 
Psychologist on Aging; Retirement Centers; Rural 
Transportation; Veterans Affairs; Volunteerism; 
Welfare Publications: (1) Senior Guardian, monthly; 
(2) Our Age, bimonthly. Convention/Meeting: 
biennial - next 1986. 
29. NATIONAL ASSOCIATED BUSINESSMEN (dissolved) 
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30. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS 
(Insurance) (NALU) 
Founded: 1890. Members: 1027. Staff: 105. 
Federation of state (50) and local (1977) 
associations representing 128,000 life insurance 
agents, general agents, and managers. Associate 
members are home office insurance agents, general 
agents, and managers. Associate members are home 
officials of life companies, life insurance 
teachers, journalists, and others. Objectives are: 
to support and maintain the principles of legal 
reserve life insurance and health insurance; to 
promote high ethical standards; to inform the 
public, render community service, and promote public 
goodwill. Sponsors educational and public service 
programs. Presents annual awards. Committees: 
Associations; Company Field Relations; Education; 
Federal Law and Legislation; Field Practice; Group 
Insurance; Health Insurance; Home Service; Liaison 
with Trade and Professional Organizations; Life 
Underwriters Political Action; Multiline; Planning 
and Development; Public Relations; Public Service; 
Recognition of Quality and Achievement; 
State/Company Field Communications; State Law and 
Legislation. Departments: Association Services; 
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Law and Government Affairs; Public Relations; Public 
Service; Communications; State Law and Legislation. 
Departments: Association Services; Law and 
Government Affairs; Public Relations. Publications: 
(1) Life Association News, monthly; (2) Wheelhorse 
Newsletter, monthly; (3) Directory, annual. 
Affiliated with: Association for Advanced Life 
Underwriting; General Agents and Managers Conference 
of NALU; Women Life Underwriters Conference. 
Convention/Meeting: annual - always September. 
1984 Sept. 9-13, Kansas City, MO; 1985 Sept. 8-12, 
Anaheim, CA; 1986 Sept. 7-11, New Orleans, LA; 1987 
Sept. 13-17, Orlando, FL. 
31. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS (NASW) 
9 
Founded: 1955. Members: 95,000. Staff: 125. 
State Groups: 55. Regular members are persons who 
hold a minimum of a baccalaureate degree in social 
work. Associate members are persons engaged in 
social work who have a baccalaureate degree in 
another field. Student members are persons enrolled 
in accredited (by the Council on Social Work 
Education) graduate or undergraduate social work 
programs. Purpose is to create professional 
standards for social work practice, advocate sound 
public social policies through political and 
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legislative action, and provide a wide range of 
membership services including continuing education 
opportunities and an extensive professional 
publications program. Maintains a library of 4000 
volumes. Presents National Public Citizen of the 
Year and National Social Worker of the Year Awards. 
Administrative Units: Academy of Certified Social 
Workers; Publications Editorial Office. Committees: 
Political Action for Candidate Election for Human 
Services. Publications: (1) News, monthly (except 
August and December); (2) Social Work, bimonthly; 
(3) Health and Social Work, quarterly; (4) Practice 
Digest, quarterly, (4) Social Work in Education, 
quarterly; (6) Social Work Research and Abstracts, 
quarterly; (7) Register of Clinical Social Workers, 
annual; also publishes Encyclopedia of Social Work, 
Director of Professional Social Workers and various 
books and pamphlets. Formed by merger of: American 
Association of Group Workers; American Association 
of Medical Social Workers; Association for the Study 
of Community Organization; National Association of 
School Social Workers; Social Work Research Group. 
Convention/Meeting: triennial delegate assembly - 
1984 Sept. 7-10, Washington, DC. Also holds 
biennial symposium - 1985 November, New Orleans, LA. 
32. NATIONAL CHRISTIAN ACTION COALITION 
(Conservative) (NCAA) 
Founaed: 1977. Members: 62,000. Staff. 6. 
Churches and Christian school administrators; local 
and state "good government" groups; interested 
individuals. Works for or against legislation in 
accordance with its stances of social issues, 
defense, and economic policy. Supports capital 
punishment, world peace, a balanced federal budget, 
a tuition tax credit for parents .enrolling their 
children in private schools, and passage of a Human 
Life Amendment. Opposes abortion, gun control, and 
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. Sponsors 
Christian Education and Research Foundation 
(research arm), Christian Voters' Victory Fund 
(political action committee), and New Century 
Foundation (research arm), which works to elect and 
support "pro-family" congressional candidates. 
Publications: (1) Focus on Freedom, semimonthly; 
(2) Alert (newsletter), monthly; (3) Family Issues 
Voting Index, annual; also publishes The Christian' 
Political Action Manual and various political 
training materials. Formerly: (1979) Christian 
School Action. 
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33. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SENIOR CITIZENS (Aging) 
(NCSC) 
Founded: 1961. Members: 4,000,000. Staff: 120. 
Organization of 4000 autonomous senior citizens 
clubs, associations, councils and other groups with 
a combined membership of over 4,000,000 persons. 
Educational and action group which supports 
Medicare, increased social security, improved 
recreational, educational and health programs, 
increased voluntary service programs, reduced costs 
on drugs, better housing, and other programs to aid 
senior citizens. Sponsors mass rallies, educational 
workshops and leadership training institutes; 
provides speakers on Medicare and other issues 
concerning senior citizens; helps organize and 
develop programs for local and state groups. 
Encourages participation in social and political 
action activities; does not endorse candidates for 
political office but works on behalf of issues. 
Distributes films, news mats, special reports and 
other materials. Maintains library of books and 
collection of materials on Medicare and other 
programs. Sponsors National Senior Citizens 
Education and Research Center. Committees: Nursing 
Home Standards. Publications: Senior Citizens 
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News, monthly. Formerly: National Council of 
Senior Citizens for Health Care Through Social 
Security. Convention/Meeting: annual - always June 
or July. 
34. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (Teachers) (NEA) 
Founded: 1957. Members: 1,600,800. Staff: 600. 
State Groups: 53. Local Groups: 10,000. 
Professional organization and union of elementary 
and secondary school teachers, college and 
university professors, administrators, principals, 
counselors and others concerned with education. 
Committees: Affiliate Relationships; Higher 
Education; Human Relations; Instruction and 
Professional Development; Political Affairs; 
Research. Publications: (1) NEA Today, 8/year; (2) 
Handbook, annual; (3) Today's Education, annual. 
Absorbed (1966) American Teachers Association; 
(1981) NEA Higher Education Council (founded 1974 
and superceded the combined activities of National 
Association of College and University 
Administrators, founded 1969; National Society of 
Professors, founded 1967); (1982) Student National 
Education Association (formerly, 1957), National 
Association of Future Teachers of America-Ccllege 
Section). Formerly: (1870) National Teachers 
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Association. Convention/Meeting: annual - 1984 
Washington, DC. 
35. NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION (NFO) 
Founded: 1955. Staff: 700. Producers of farm 
commodities. Non-partisan organization of farmers 
who seek to obtain the cost of production plus 
reasonable profits under long-term contracts for the 
sale of farm commodities through collective 
bargaining. Members currently marketing farm 
products under negotiated contracts with buyers, 
processors and exporters. Seeks continued 
improvement in contracts. Maintains speakers 
bureau. Divisions: Cattle (Slaughter and Feeder); 
Dairy; Grain; Hog; Sheep; Specialty Crop. 
Publications: Reporter monthly. Convention/ 
Meetings: annual - 1984 - Dec. 4-6, Las Vegas, NV; 
1985 Nashville, TN; 1986 Des Moines, IA. 
36. FARMERS' EDUCATIONAL AND COOPERATIVE UNION OF 
AMERICA (FECUA) 
Founded: 1902. Members: 300,000. Staff: 30. 
Local Groups: 3000. Farm families in 44 states 
interested in general agricultural welfare. Carries 
on educational, cooperative, and legislative 
activities. To represent farm families' interests 
and gain for them a more equitable share of the 
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national income; to help farm families develop 
self-help institutions such as cooperatives. 
Publications: Washington Newsletter, monthly. 
Convention/Meeting: annual - 1985 Mar. 3-6, 
Phoenix, AZ; 1986 Mar. 2-5, Spokane, WA; 1987 Mar. 
1-4, Ft. Worth, TX; 1988 Mar. 6-9, Albuquerque, NM. 
37. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS 
(NFIB) 
Founded: 1943. Members: 560,000. Staff: 197. 
Field Staff: 571. Independent business and 
professional people. Presents opinions of small 
business to state and national legislative bodies. 
Members vote by ballot on issues; ballots are 
tabulated and results forwarded to Congress. 
... Conducts surveys at the state level with area 
*% • • • 
directors and government affairs representatives 
working with state legislatures. Maintains 
legislative, research, and public affairs office in 
Washington, DC. Publications: The Mandate (with 
ballots for membership voting), 8/year; also 
prepares and disseminates weekly press releases to 
daily papers, trade associations, and chambers of 
commerce nationwide, and monthly materials to all 
high schools, colleges, and universities throughout 
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the country. Convention/Meeting: quadrennial - 
1987 Washington, DC. 
38. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES (Municipal) (NLC) 
Founded: 1924. Members: 1175. Staff 53. 
Federation of 49 state leagues of 1126 cities. 
Develops and pursues a national municipal policy, 
which can meet the future needs of cities and help 
cities solve critical problems they have in common. 
Represents municipalities with Congress and federal 
agencies. Offers training, technical assistance, 
and information to municipal officials to help 
them improve the quality of local government. 
Sponsors the National League of Cities Institute. 
Maintains 20,000 volume library. Committees: 
Community and Economic Development; Energy, 
Environmental and Natural Resources; Administrative 
and Intergovernmental Relations; Human Development; 
Transportation and Communications. Publications: 
(1) Nation's Cities Weekly; (2) Urban Affairs 
Abstracts, weekly (with semiannual and annual 
cumulations); (3) Director of Local Officials, 
semiannual; (4) National Municipal Policy, annual. 
Formerly: American Municipal Association. 
Convention/Meeting: annual - 1984 Nov. 24-28, 
Indianapolis, IN; 1985 Dec. 7-11, Seattle, WA; 1986 
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Nov. 29-Dec. 3, San Antonio, TX; 1987 Dec. 5-9, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
39. NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS 
(Engineering) (NSPE) 
Founded: 1934. Members: 80,000. Staff: 75. 
State Groups: 54. Local Groups: 525. 
Professional engineers and engineers in training in 
all fields registered in accordance with the laws of 
state or territories of the United States, or 
provinces of Canada; qualified graduate engineers, 
student members and registered land surveyors. 
Concerned with social, professional, ethical, and 
economic considerations of engineering as a 
profession; encompasses programs in public 
relations, employment practices, ethical 
considerations, education and career guidance. 
Monitors legislative and regulatory actions of 
interest to the engineering profession. Committees: 
Political Action. Departments: Education and 
Preparation; Intersociety and Interprofessional 
Relations; Legal and Government; Professional 
Engineers in Industry; Professional Engineers in 
Private Practice; Professional Practice; 
Professional Qualification and Ethics; Public 
Relations; Society Development. Publications: (1) 
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Engineering Times, monthly; (2) Professional 
Engineer, quarterly; also publishes reports and 
pamphlets. Absorbed: (1966) American Association 
of Engineers. Convention/Meeting: semiannual - 
always January and July. 1985 Jan. 28-Feb. 2, 
Albuquerque, NM and July 15-20, Buffalo, NY; 1986 
Jan. 13-18, Ft. Worth, TX and July 14-19, 
Indianapolis, IN; 1987 Jan. 19-24, Orlando, FL and 
July 13-18, Denver, CO. 
40. NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION (NTU) 
Founded: 1969. Members: 120,000. Seeks to: 
reduce government spending; cut taxes; protect the 
rights of taxpayers. Claims to have helped generate 
federal budget cuts of over 120 billion dollars. 
Activities include research programs and an intense 
lobbying campaign in Washington, DC. Has been a 
leader in the fights against government ventures 
such as: the SST; guaranteed income; congressional 
and bureaucratic pay raises; federal subsidies of 
all kinds; foreign aid; the Space Shuttle; the B-l 
bomber; plutonium reactors; national health 
insurance. Is working for a balanced Federal 
Budget Amendment; federal pension reform; reduction 
of capital gains and personal income tax; social 
security reform. Has worked for airline 
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deregulation; indexing of federal income tax; 
California's Proposition 13; Massachusetts 
Proposition 2h; and other state tax cutting 
initiatives. Conducts annual voting study of 
congressmen and senators, rating their votes on 
spending and tax issues and presenting awards for 
best and worst records. Is organizing state NTU 
councils to monitor state legislatures and work for 
tax and spending reductions on the state and local 
levels. Maintains library of books periodicals, 
hearings and information on federal, state, and 
local tax and spending issues. Committees: Balance 
the Budget. Publications: (1) Dollars and Sense, 
monthly; (2) Tax Savings Report, monthly; also 
publishes Cut Local Taxes, Congressional Spending 
Analysis, and Taxpayer's Action Guide. 
41. NATIONAL WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAUCUS (Women's 
Rights) (NWPC) 
Founded: 1971. Members: 75,000. Staff: 15. 
Local Groups: 300. "Anyone with a sincere interest 
in getting women more political clout." In seeking 
to gain an equal voice and place for women in the 
political process, the multipartisan caucus is 
organized at local, state, and national levels to 
support women candidates for elective and appointive 
181 
political offices. Raises women's issues in every 
election and is pressing to see that women hold 
policymaking positions in the political parties. 
Has lobbied in state legislatures to pass the Equal 
Rights Amendment, to protect women's rights to 
reproductive freedom, and to secure comparable worth 
on the job. Works for affirmative action within the 
major political parties. Compiles statistics. 
Committees: Campaign Support; Leadership 
Development Education and Research Fund. 
Publications: Women's Political Times, bimonthly. 
Convention/Meeting: biennial - 1985 Atlanta, GA. 
42. PUBLIC CITIZEN (Consumer) (PC) 
Founded: 1971. Supporters: 200,000. Formed by 
Ralph Nader to support the work of citizen 
advocates. Areas of focus include: repealing 
government subsidies; alleviating secrecy between 
the public and Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 
opposing waste disposal; promoting conservation and 
renewable energy. Acquires contributions through 
direct mail, paid subscriptions, and purchases of 
publications and reports. Contributions have been 
used to support projects relating to citizen and 
community action. Projects supported by Public 
Citizen include: Tax Reform Research Group; Public 
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Citizen Litigation Group; Health Research Group; 
Critical Mass Energy Project; and Congress Watch 
(see separate entries). Works to provide effective 
citizen advocacy on the most pressing problems at 
the least cost by using the services of volunteers, 
keeping expenses as low as possible, and hiring 
dedicated professionals who are willing to work long 
hours for modest salaries. Publications: (1) 
Public Citizen (magazine), 4/year; (2) Report, 
annual; also publishes Critical Mass Bulletins, 
People and Taxes, The Congress Watcher, and books 
and reports. 
43. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF 
AMERICA (UBC) 
Founded: 1881. Members: 800,000. Locals: 2047. 
AFL-CIO. Committees: Carpenters' Legislative 
Improvement. Publications: The Carpenter, monthly, 
/absorbed: (1979) Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' 
International Union. Convention/Meeting: 
quinquennial - next 1986. 
44. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL UNION (UFCWIU) 
Founded: 1979. Members: 1,300,000. Locals: 900. 
AFL-CIO. Publications: Action, 8/year. Absorbed: 
(1981) Barbers, Beauticians and Allied Industries 
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International Association (1983) Insurance Workers 
International Union. Formed by merger of: Retail 
Clerks International Union (founded 1888 and 
formerly Retail Clerks International Association; 
absorbed Boot and Shoe Workers Union in 1979) and 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of 
North America (founded 1897; absorbed United 
Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers, formerly 
United Packinghouse Workers of America, in 1968). 
Convention/Meeting: quadrennial - next 1987. 
45. THE WOMAN ACTIVIST (Women) (TWA) 
Founded: 1975. Nonprofit consulting firm 
specializing in services on issues of political 
concern to women. Activities include research, 
o 
program development, issue analysis, .repor„t Writing, 
and statistics compiliation. Rates members of 
Congress on women's issues and compares voting 
patterns of congressmen and congresswomen on civil 
and social rights issues. Maintains library of 
feminist books and information. Publications: The 
Woman Activist, 10/year; also publishes Guide to 
Precinct Politics, Guide to Lobbying, and Guide for 
Women Candidates. 
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APPENDIX B 
RATING REQUEST LETTER 
This is a copy of the letter sent to various 
PACs in order to solicit their ratings. 
May 1983 
Dear 
Numerous organizations, including _ , have 
chosen to assist their members in making voting 
decisions by issuing ratings of the legislative 
performance of the members of Congress. 
Legislative ratings and the growth of poli¬ 
tical action committees represent two of the more 
interesting trends in electoral politics of the 
last ten years. While the PACs have received 
much attention from the popular and academic 
journals, to date very little attention has been 
given to developing information about ratings. 
It is my intention, as a researcher at the 
School of Management of the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts, to begin a preliminary analysis of this 
newly popular political tool. 
You could be of great assistance to this pro¬ 
ject by sending me copies of the ratings issued by 
_ since 1977. 
Although the strength of my academic research 
is increased when materials can be attributed to 
their source, the desire of some organizations to 
keep their contributions anonymous is understood 
and will be respected. Should you desire to have 
the ratings remain anonymous, please mark the lower 
left hand corner of your return envelope with "ANON." 
Appendix B (continued) 
Upon completion of this study, I shall be 
happy to send you a condensed version of the re¬ 
sults. Should you wish a copy of the results, 
please mark the lower left hand corner of your 
return envelope with "COPY." 
It is my hope that your recognition of the 
intrinsic interest of ratings as a political tool 
as well as a piquing of your personal interest in 
the results of this research will encourage you to 
forward _ ratings from 1977 forward. 
Thank you for your time and efforts. 
Sincerely, 
C.N Hetzner III 
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DELETION OF OBSERVATIONS 
The following cases were deleted from the merged 
file because of the missing values that resulted from 
out of the ordinary circumstances. 
FEC CODE NAME REASON 
H8IL10016 John Edward Porter Replaced Mikva 
H6IL10028 Abner J. Mikva Resigned to 
become U.S. 
Court of 
Appeals judge 
9/28/79. 
H6IL16026 John B. Anderson Votes missed 
due to presi¬ 
dential 
campaign. 
H0LA03018 V7.J. Tauzin Replaced Treen 
5/22/80. 
H6MA08042 Thomas O'Neill Speaker of the 
House only 
votes to break 
ties. 
H6MD06022 Goodloe E. Byron Unknown. 
H6MI130 23 Charles C. Diggs, 
Jr. 
Resigned 
6/3/80. 
H6NM02028 Harold Runnels Died 8/5/80. 
H6PA11016 Daniel Flood Resigned 
1/31/80. 
H0PA110 35 Raphael Musto Replaced Flood 
4/15/80. 
H0WV030 29 John Hutchinson Replaced Slack 
6/10/80. 
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APPENDIX C (continued) 
H6WV030 34 John M. Slack Died 3/7/80 
S6ME00019 Edmund Muskie Resigned 
to become 
Secretary 
of State 
5/12/80. 
S2ME000 26 George Mitchell Replaced 
Sen.Muskie 
5/19/80 
S4VT0017 Patrick Leahy Key punch 
errors. 
Sen. William Proxmire 
(Wisconsin) 
Not 
contained 
on The PAC 
Directory 
tape 
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APPENDIX D 
MISSING VALUE SUBSTITUTIONS 
A final check for missing data revealed 9 
occurrences of missing values. For these, the 
arithmetic mean of the ratings of the particular 
organization was inserted. Those nine cases are: 
FEC CODE NAME VARIABLE VALUE 
H6MI04048 David Stockman NAB 6 3 49 
H6MI03073 Howard Wolpe CUVF63 51 
H6MT02028 Pat Williams NAB 6 3 49 
H60H11020 William J. Stanton NASC61 52 
H8PA01039 Michael Myers CFA6 2 43 
H8PA01039 Michael Myers PAR62 46 
S4AR000 20 Dale Bumpers NASC61 52 
S8AR00047 David H. Pryor NASC61 52 
S6MA00015 Edward M. Kennedy NASC62 48 
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APPENDIX E 
The following are the summary statistics of the 
complete set of raters. 
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APPENDIX F 
The following list contains the acronyms, FEC 
categories and names of the organizations that con¬ 
stitute the sample for the first hypothesis. 
FEC 
Symbol Categories Name 
ACA Uncon Americans for Constitutional Action 
ACTWV Labor Amal. Clothing & Textile Workers 
ACUX T/M/H American Conservative Union 
ADAX Uncon Americans for Democratic Action 
AFLCIX Labor Amer. Federation of Labor 
AFSCMX Labor Amer. Fed. State, Cnty., Munic. Wrkrs 
AFT Labor Amer. Fed. of Teachers 
CARP Labor United Bro. of Carpenters 
CFAX T/M/H Consumer Fed. of America 
CHVC Uncon Christian.Voice 
COCUSX T/M/H Chamber of Commerce 
CSFCX Uncon Comm. Survival of a Free Cong. 
CWAX Labor Communication Workers of Amer. 
GNCONX Trade Assoc. General Contractors 
IFCWX Labor Int'l. Food and Commercial Workers 
LCVX Trade League of Conservation Voters 
NALU Trade Nat'l. Assoc, of Life Underwriters 
NCAC Uncon Nat'l. Christian Action Coalition 
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Appendix F (continued) 
Symbol Categories Name 
NEA Labor National Education Assoc. 
NFIB Uncon Nat'l Fed. Independent Business 
NFOX Trade Nat'l. Farmers Org. 
NSPE Trade Nat'l Soc. Prof. Engineers 
SOCWKX Trade Nat'l. Assoc, of Social Workers 
TMSTR Labor Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters 
UAWX Labor United Autoworkers 
UMW Labor United Mineworkers 
WPC Uncon Women's Political Caucus 
APPENDIX G 
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APPENDIX G 
This appendix contains cluster solutions iterated 
beyond those dictated by the hypotheses. 
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TABLE 16 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING 
GENERATED SOLUTIONS FOB FEC-CATEGORIZED 
PAC SUBSAHPLE 
GBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 4 i CLUSTERS 
CLUSIEB VARIATION PROPORTION SECOND 
CLUSTER MEMBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 3 3.C00000 2.588271 0.8628 0.288124 
2 14 14.000000 12-237808 0.8741 0.456322 
3 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
4 9 9.000000 8. 117227 0.9019 0.239142 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 23.94331 PROPORTION = 0.886789 
B-SQUABED WITH 
OWN NEXT B**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST BATIO 
ri I19TFR 1 ------ - 
NSPE T 0.8623 0.6482 0.7516 
LCVX”T 0.9144 0.6877 0.7520 
GNCO'SX T 0.81 15 0.4028 0.4963 
CLUSTER 2-=- 
NALU T 0.6943 0.6483 0.9338 
NFIB“U 0.8886 0.7835 0.8818 
TMSTT L 0.7733 0.6645 0.8594 
AFT L~ 0.8990 0.7902 0.8790 
CART l 0. 776 1 0.6741 0. 8686 
aflctx l 0.9702 0.8711 0.8978 
AFSCHX-L 0.8308 0.6517 0.7844 
CFAX T” 0.9070 0-8291 0.9141 
COCIT5X T 0-9 27 3 0.8447 0-9109 
C HA X L“ 0.9611 0.8776 0.9131 
IFCHI L 0. 9505 0.8869 0.9332 
UAWX I 0.9703 0.9146 0.9427 
UHHX“L 0.9084 0-7983 0.8788 
acthtx l 0.7810 0..6778 0.8678 
CLUSTER 3--- 
NFOX T 1.0000 Q.,3270 0.3270 
CH VC U 0.9204 0.71130 0.7747 
NCACTU 0.8625 0.6790 0.7872 
HPC TJ 0.8702 0.7026 0.8073 
N EA~L 0.8203 0. 7701 0.9368 
ACA7 U 0.9288 0.8757 0.9428 
ACUX“T 0.9452 0. 8829 0.9341 
ADAX“U 0.9075 0.8648 0.9529 
CSFCT U 0.9505 0.8769 0.9226 
S0CHK7 T 0.9118 0.8824 0.9678 
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TABLE 17 
HODSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BAILNG 
GENERATED SGLUTICNS BOB FEC-CAIEGCRI2ED 
PAC SOBSAMPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 2 
14 
1 
9 
1 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
2.000000 
14.000000 
1.000000 
9.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
1.863239 
12.237808 
1.000000 
8.117227 
1.000000 
0.9316 
0.8741 
1.0000 
0.9019 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
C. 136761 
0.456322 
0.239142 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 24.21827 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PROPORTION = 0.896973 
WITH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
NSPE T 0.9316 0.6482 €.6958 
lcvxit 0.9316 0.6877 0.7382 
NALU T 0.6943 0.6483 0.9338 
NFIB”U 0. 8886 0.7835 0.8818 
1MST1 L 0.7733 0.6645 0.8594 
AFT I" 0.8990 0.7902 0.8790 
CARP L 0.7761 0.6741 0.8686 
aflctx l 0.9702 0..8711 0.8978 
AFSCMX”L 0.8308 0-6517 0.7844 
CFAX T” 0- 9 070 0.8291 0.9141 
C0CU3X T 0.9273 0.8447 0.9109 
CW AX L"~ 0.9611 0.8776 0.9 131 
IFCNT L 0.9505 0.8869 0.9332 
UANX I 0.9703 0.9146 0.9427 
umwjtl 0.9084 0.7983 0.8788 
ACTH7X L 0.7810 0.6778 0.8678 
NFOX T 1.0000 0.3270 0.3270 
CHVC U 0.9204 0.7130 0.7747 
NCAC”U 0.8625 0.6790 0.7872 
B PC 1J 0.8702 0.7026 C.8C73 
NEA"L 0.8203 0.7701 0.9388 
AC AT U 0.9208 0.8757 0.9428 
ACUX”T 0.9452 0.8829 0.9341 
ADAX~U 0..9075 0.8648 0-9529 
CSFCT U 0.9505 0.8769 0.9226 
socwKljr 0.9118 0.8824 0.9678 
GNCONX T 1.0000 0.6176 0.6176 
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TABLE 18 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENEBAIED CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOB FEC-CATEGOBIZED PAC SUBSAflPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 4 CLUSTEBS 
CLOSTEB MEMBERS 
1 4 
2 19 
3 2 
4 2 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
4.000000 
19.000000 
2.000000 
2.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
3.430869 
16.073972 
1.622428 
1.669275 
0.8577 
0.8460 
0.91 12 
0.8346 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.375447 
0.504531 
0. 177572 
G.33C725 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 22.99654 PBOPGBIION = 0.851724 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
B-SQUABED HITE 
ONI NEXT B**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC U 0.9404 0.8263 0.8786 
NCAC“U 0.8979 0.7849 0.8741 
H PC U 0.8881 0.7138 0.8038 
NEA”L 0.7045 0.3923 0.5569 
£ 
NALU T 0.6046 0.3968 0.6563 
NFIE~U 0.8194 0..6013 0.7338 
thstb l 0.7813 0.5996 0.7675 
AFT L" 0.649e 0. 4582 0.7051 
AC AX U 0.9095 0.7720 0.8488 
ACUX“T 0.9115 0.8515 0.9341 
A D A X*~ U 0.8910 0.7821 0.8778 
AUCflX L 0.9765 0.7447 0.7625 
AFSCMX"L 0.7056 0.5363 0.7601 
CFAX T" 0.8512 0.6613 0.7770 
C0CU3X T C.9209 0.7232 0.7852 
CSFCX ”0 0. 9 39 4 0.8537 C.9088 
C HA I X 0.9616 0.7232 0.7521 
GNCOUX T 0.8070 0.6262 0.7760 
IFCBX I 0.9270 0.7463 0.8051 
SOCHKT T 0.8902 0. 8220 0.9234 
UANX L" 0.9805 0.7843 0.7999 
UHHX~L 0.7147 0.4523 0.6329 
*> , ACTHTX L 0.8323 0.5980 0.7185 
J 
NSPE T 0.9112 0.4665 0.5120 
f| 
LCVX”T 0.9112 0-4138 0.4541 
CA8P L 0.8346 0.4802 0.5754 
NFOXIT 0.8346 0.5713 0.6845 
U
lf
rU
lM
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TABLE 19 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER 
SCLOTICNS FOR EEC-CATEGORIZED PAC SUBSAflPlE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL CGHPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUHMARl FOR 5 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEHBERS 
1 4 
18 
2 
1 
2 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
4.000000 
18.000000 
2.000000 
1.C00000 
2.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EIPLAINED EXPLAINED 
3-430869 
15.484894 
1.822428 
f.000000 
1.669275 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED > 23.40747 
0.8577 
0.8603 
0. 9112 
1.0000 
0.8346 
PROPORTION 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.375447 
0.480277 
0.177572 
0.330725 
0.866943 
fi-SQUARED MITH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
1. VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 1 
CBVC U 0.9404 0.8305 0.8831 
NCAC“U 0.8979 0.7899 0.8798 
RPC TJ 0.8881 0.7150 0.8051 
0 NEA~L 0.7045 0.3975 0.5643 
A. 
NFIB U 0.8209 0.6013 0.7325 
TBST'E l 0.7884 0.5996 0.7605 
AFT L" 0.6529 0.4582 0.7017 
AC AT U 0.9127 0.7720 0.8459 
ACUX”T 0.9133 0.8515 0.9323 
A DAX”U 0.8901 0. 7821 0.8787 
AFLCTX L 0.9749 0.7447 0.7638 
AFSCHJTL 0.7098 0-5363 0.7556 
CFAX T~ 0.8501 0.6613 0.7779 
COCUSX T 0.9204 0.7232 0.7858 
CSFCX TJ 0.9406 0.8537 0.9077 
CW AX X 0.9583 0.7232 0.7546 
GNCOTX T 0.8075 0.6262 0.7756 
IFCWX X 0.9263 0.7463 0.8056 
SOCMKT t 0.8880 0., 8220 0.9257 
UAWX L“ 0. 9795 0.7843 0.8006 
UMBX“L 0.7146 0.4523 0.6330 
ACTWTX L 0.8366 0.5980 0.7148 
J 
NS PE T 0-9112 0.4645 0.5097 
It _ 
LCVXIT 0.9112 0.4177 0.4584 
4 1 n
 
I I => 
i ^
 
1 1 *
 1.0000 0.5734 0.5734 
5- ——- ■ - - 
CARP L 
NF0X"T 
0.8346 
0.8346 
0.4783 
0.5705 
0.5731 
0.6836 
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TABLE 20 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLOSTEfi 
Sui, JTION S FOB THE BDSIliESS/LABOfi SOBS AH PIE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COHPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUHHARY FOB 3 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTION SECOND 
:lusteb HEHBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 18 18.COOOOO 15.089137 0.8383 0-696901 
2 3 3.000000 2.687477 0.8958 0.2CC828 
3 2 2.000000 1.760757 0.8804 0.239243 
TOTAL VARIATION EXFLAINED = 19-53737 PROPORXION = 0.849451 
fi-SQUARED NITB 
OH N NEXT R**2 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0.8146 0.6415 0.7874 
NAB63 0.8838 0. 7390 0.8361 
NALU63 0.6992 0.4975 0.7116 
NSPE63 0.7133 0. 3696 0.5182 
HFIB63 0.8845 0.6952 0.7860 
AFT63 0.9017 0.. 6 5 17 0.7228 
NEA63 0.7844 0.6813 0.8685 
AFLCI03X 0.9495 0.8510 0.8962 
AFSCH63X 0.8086 0.6897 0.8529 
COCUS63I 0.9439 0.7016 0.7433 
CUA63X 0.9559 0.7918 0.8283 
GNCON63X 0.4642 0.2043 0.4402 
IFCH63X 0-9412 0.8051 0.8554 
BUSORG63 0.7829 0.5777 0.7380 
SOC MK63X 0.8998 0.7015 0.7796 
UAW63X 0.9702 0.7880 0.8122 
UMH63X 0.9111 0.6868 0-7538 
CLUSTER 
ACTWV63X n 0.7803 0.5893 0.7551 
THSTR63 0.9070 0.7071 0-7796 
CARP63 0.9163 0.7072 0.7718 
CLUSTER 
CCE63X 0.8642 0.6655 C-7700 
NF063X 0-6804 0.3346 0.3801 
NFU63X 0.3804 0.5985 0.6798 
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TABLE 21 
HOUSE 
SOLUTIONS FGfi THE EUSlNESS/LABOfi BUBSANpLE 
LEGISLATIVE BATING GENEBA1ED CLOSTEfi 
J MP J 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COHPONEN1 CLOSTEfi ANALYSIS 
CLOSTEfi SOHHAfiY FOB 4 CLOSTEfiS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 16 
2 3 
3 2 
4 2 
CLOSTEfi 
VARIATION 
16.000000 
3.000000 
2.000000 
2.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
13-956475 
2.687477 
1.760757 
1.720921 
EXPLAINED 
0.8723 
0.8958 
0.8804 
0.8605 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.36S404 
0.200828 
0.23S243 
0.279a79 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.12563 PROPOBTION * 0.875027 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
fi-SQUARED UITH 
OHM NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0.8089 0.6415 0.7931 
NAB63 0.8922 0.7390 0-8283 
NAL063 0.6975 0.4975 0.7133 
NFIB63 0.8900 0.6952 0.7811 
AFT63 C.9002 0.6517 0.7240 
NEA63 0.7917 0.6813 0.8605 
AFLCI03X 0.9592 0.8510 0.8872 
AFSCH63X 0.8162 0.6897 0.8450 
C0CUS63X 0.937 3 0.7016 0.7485 
CWA63X 0.9623 0.7918 0.8228 
IFCW6JX 0.9483 0.8051 0.8490 
BUSORG6 3 0.7843 0.5777 0.7367 
SOCBK63X 0.9049 0.7015 0.7753 
UA863X 0.9738 0. 7880 0.8093 
UHW63X 0.9023 0.6868 0.7611 
ACTWV6 3X 0.7875 0.5893 0. 7482 
THSTB63 0.9070 0.7268 C-8013 
CARP63 0.9163 0.7316 0.7984 
..CCE63I 0.8642 0-6748 0.7808 
NFC63X 0.8804 0.3346 0.3801 
NFU63X 0.8804 0.5985 0.6798 
NSPE63 0.8605 0.6701 0.7788 
GNCON63X 0.8605 0.4161 0.4836 
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TABLE 22 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE SATING GENEBAIED CLUSTER 
SCifiTlCNS FOB THE EUSINESS/LAfiOB SUBSAHPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COBPCNEEl CLUSTER ANA1ISIS 
CLUSTER SUBBARY FCB 5 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTEfi BERBERS 
1 15 
2 3 
3 2 
4 2 
5 I 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
15.000000 
3.000000 
2.000000 
2.COCOOO 
1.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
13.274916 
2.687477 
1.760757 
1.720921 
1.000000 
20.44407 
B-SQUAHED 
C.8850 
0.8958 
0.8804 
0.8605 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.314627 
0.200828 
0-23S243 
0.279079 
PBOPCBTION = 0.888873 
ON 8°' BIT H NEXT H**2 
1 , V ABIABLE CLUSTEfi HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0.8140 0.6415 0.7880 
NAB63 0.8928 0.7390 0.8277 
NFIB63 0.8910 0.6952 0.7802 
AFT63 0.9019 0.6517 0.7226 
NEA63 C.79 15 0.6813 0-86C7 
AFLCI03X 0.9614 0.8510 0.8852 
AFSCB63X 0.8181 0.6897 0.8430 
COCUS63X 0.9358 0.7016 0.7497 
CUA63X 0.9649 0.7918 C.8206 
IFCN63X 0.9490 0.8051 0.8483 
EUSCBG63 0.7822 0.5777 0.7386 
SOCHK63X 0.9053 0.7015 0.7749 
UAU63X 0.9747 0.7880 0-8085 
UBU63X 0.9002 0.6868 0.7629 
ACTV V631 0.7920 0.5893 0.7440 
£ 
THSTB63 0.9070 0.7279 0.8026 
CARP63 0.9163 0.7354 0.8026 
1 . 
CCE63X 0.8642 0.6790 0.7857 
J 
NF063X 0.8804 0.33416 C.3801 
fa _ 
NFU63X 0.8804 0.5985 0.6798 
NSPE63 C.8605 0.6690 0.7775 
C 
GNCON63X 0.8605 0.4118 C-4786 
N ALU 63 1.0000 0.. 66 52 0.6652 
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TABLE 23 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENEBATED CLUSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE BUSINESS/LABOB SUESAflPIE 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMHARY FCB 6 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTEB NEHBEBS 
1 15 
2 3 
3 2 
4 1 
5 I 
6 1 
CLUSTEB 
V AflIATION 
15.000000 
3.000000 
2.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
13.274916 
2.687477 
1.760757 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8850 
0.8958 
0.8804 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.314627 
C.20C828 
0.239243 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.72315 PROPORTION = 0.901007 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 6- 
B-SQUABED 8ITH 
088 NEXT B**2 
VARIABLE 1 . - CLUSTEB HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0.8140 0.6415 0.7880 
NAB63 0.8928 0.7390 0.8277 
NFIB63 0.8910 0-6952 C.7802 
AFT63 0.9019 0.6517 0.7226 
NEA63 0.7915 0.6813 0.8607 
AFLCI03X 0.9614 0.8510 0.8852 
AFSCH63X 0.8181 0.6897 0.8430 
COCUS63X 0.9358 0.7078 0.7563 
CMA63X 0-9649 0-7918 0. 8206 
IFCN63X 0.9490 0.8051 0.8483 
BUSORG63 0.7822 0.5777 0.7386 
SOCWK63X 0.9053 0.7015 0.7749 
UAI63X 0.9747 0.7880 0-8085 
UM863X 0.9002 0.7108 0.7896 
ACTHV63X 0.7920 0.5893 0.7440 
TMSTB63 0.9070 0.7279 0.8026 
CARP6 3 0.9163 0.7354 0.8026 
CCE63X | 0. 8642 0.6790 0.7857 
NF063X 0.8804 0.3346 0.3801 
NFU63X 0.8804 0.5985 0.6798 
GNCON63X 1.0000 0.5197 0.5197 
NALU63 1.0000 0.6652 0.6652 
NSPE63 1.C000 0.6690 0.6690 
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TABLE 24 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENERATED CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE BUSINESS/LABCB S UBS AMPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL CCNPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 7 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTICN SECOND 
CLUSTER MEMBERS VABIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 15 15.000000 13.274916 0.8850 0.314627 
2 2 2-000000 1.887592 0.9438 0-112408 
3 2 2.000000 1.842313 0.9212 0- 157687 
4 1 1.000000 1.000000 1. 0000 
5 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
6 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
7 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
TOTAL VABIATION EXPLAINED = 21.00482 PBOPOBXION = 0.913253 
R-SQUABED BIIH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CLUSTER 1— ..... 1 
IPAA63 0.814G 0.6099 0.7493 
NAB63 0.8928 0.7001 0.7841 
NFIB63 0.8910 0-6947 0-7796 
A FT 63 0.9019 0.6462 0.7165 
NEA63 0.7915 0.6735 0.8509 
AFLCI03X 0.9614 0.8280 0.8612 
AFSCM63X 0.8181 0.6958 0.8505 
CCCUS63X 0- 9358 0-7078 0.7563 
CWA63X 0.9649 0.7619 0.7896 
IFCW63X 0-9490 0.7846 0.8268 
BUSORG63 0.7822 0.5612 0.7175 
SOC7K63X 0.9053 0.6739 0.7443 
UAW63X 0.9747 0.7642 0.7841 
UNW63X 0.9002 0.7108 0.7896 
CLUSTER 
ACIMV63X 0.7920 0.5650 0.7134 
TMSTR 63 0.9438 0.7279 0.7713 
CLUSTER 
CAHP63 0.9438 0.7354 0.7792 
j 
CCE63X 0.9212 0.7151 0.7763 
CLUSTER 
NFU63X 0.9212 0.5788 0.6283 
GNCON63X 
5 
1.0000 0.5197 0.5197 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
NALU63 
Q . , - 1.0000 0.6652 0.6652 
NSPE63 1.0000 0.6690 0.6690 
CLUSTER 
NF063X 1.0000 0.5701 0.5701 
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TABLE 25 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENEBATED CLUSTEfi 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE BDSINESS/LABOB SUESAHPLE 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL CCHPONENT CLUSTEfi ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 8 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTION SECOND 
CLUSTEE 1 MEMBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 13 13.000000 11.698171 0.8999 0.262863 
2 2 2.000000 1.887592 0.9438 0.112408 
3 2 2.000000 1.842313 0.9212 0. 157687 
4 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
5 1 1.000000 3.000000 1.0000 
6 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
7 1 1.CC0000 1.000000 1.0000 
8 2 2.000000 1.818037 0.9090 0. 181963 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.24611 PBOPCBTION - 0.923744 
B-SQUARED WITH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST BATIO 
CLUSTER 1- 
NAB63 0.9002 0.7281 0.8088 
NFIB63 0.8940 0.7542 0.8437 
A FT 6 3 0.9053 0.7602 0.8396 
NEA63 0.8035 0.6735 0.8382 
AFLCI03X 0.9551 0.8739 0.9150 
AFSCM63X 0.8222 0-6958 0.8463 
COCUS63X 0.9313 0.8401 0.9021 
CWA63X 0.9597 0.8703 0.9068 
IFCM63X 0.9508 0.8117 0-8537 
BUSORG63 0.7842 0.6656 0.8487 
SOCWK63X 0.9115 0.7473 0.8198 
UAW63X 0.9766 0.8335 0.8535 
UMB63X 0.9038 0.7578 0.8385 
CLUSTER 2- 
THSTB63 0.9438 0.7348 0.7786 
rtnsTFR 
CARP63 
1- 
0.9438 0.7388 0.7828 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEfi 
CCE63X 
NFU63X 
0.9212 
0.9212 
0.7151 
0.5788 
0.7763 
0.6283 
GNCON63X 1. 0000 0.5197 0.5197 
NALU63 
6 - — ™ - 
1. 0000 0.6724 0-6724 
* NSPE63 1.0000 0.6638 0.6638 
NF063X 1.0000 0-5701 C.5701 
8 
IPAA63 
ACTWV63X 
0.9090 
0.9090 
0.7841 
0.7600 
0.8626 
0.8361 
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TABLE 25 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENERATED CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE BUSlNESS/LABOB SOBSAfiPIE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COHPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUHHARY FCB 9 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTION SECONE 
HEHBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 12 12.000000 10.929488 0.9108 0. 239263 
2 2 2.000000 1.887592 0. 9438 0.112408 
3 2 2.000000 1.842313 0.9212 0. 157687 
4 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
5 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
6 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
7 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
8 2 2.000000 1.818037 0.9090 0.181963 
9 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED -= 21.47743 PROPORTION = 0.933601 
R-SQUARED HITH 
OUN NEXT B 2 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE 
1 -r -r 
CLUSTER HIGHEST BATIC 
1 
0.9013 NAB63 0.7281 0.8079 
NFIB63 0.891 1 0.7542 0.8464 
AFT63 0.9095 0.7602 0.8358 
NEA63 0.8045 0.6735 0.8371 
AFLCI03X 0.9587 0.8739 0.9115 
AFSCH63X 0. 8254 0-6958 0. 8431 
COCUS63X 0-9263 0.8401 0.9069 
CWA63X 0.9620 0.8703 0.9046 
IFCW63X 0. 9533 0.8117 0.8515 
SOCWK63X 0.9112 0.7473 0.8201 
UAN63X 0.9794 0.8335 0.8510 
CLUSTER 
UWBb3X 
7 - -- ■ 0.9068 0.7578 0.8358 
THSTB63 0.9438 0.7406 0.7847 
CLUSTER 
CARP 63 
1 - 
0.9438 0.7437 0.7879 
CCE63X 0.9212 0.7151 0-7763 
CLUSTER 
NFU63X 0.9212 0.5788 0.6283 
4 
GNCON6JX j-- 1-C000 0.5197 0.5197 CLUSTER 
NALU63 A —— • 
1.0000 0.6683 0.66e3 
CLUSTER D 
CLUSTER 
NSPE63 
J-— — 1.0000 0.66 16 0-6616 
NF063X 1.0000 0-5701 0.57C1 
CLUSTER g„ ...... 
IPAA63 0.9090 0.7825 0.6608 
CLUSTER 
ACTNV63X n _ _ _ 0.9090 0.7595 0.8355 7 
BUSORG63 1.0000 0.7524 0.7524 
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TABLE 27 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE BATING GENERATED CLUSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE BUSINESS/LABOB SOBSAHPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL CG11PONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUflHAfiY FOB 10 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTEB HEHBEBS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
12.000000 
2.000000 
2.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.C00000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
10.929488 
1.887592 
1.842313 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
PBOPORTIGN 
EXPLAINED 
0-9108 
0.9438 
0.9212 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.239263 
0. 112408 
0.157687 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
EXPLAINED = 21. 65939 PROPORTION = 
B-SQUARED NITH 
CUN NEXT fi**2 
1- 
VARIABLE CLUSTEB HIGHEST RATIO 
NAB63 0.9013 0.7001 0.7768 
NFIB63 0.8911 0.7181 0.8059 
AFT63 0.9095 0.7023 0.7722 
NEA63 0. 8045 0.6735 0.8371 
APLCI03X 0-9587 0.8280 0.8636 
AFSCH63X 0.8254 0.6958 0.8431 
COCUS63X 0.9263 0.8126 0.8772 
CWA63X 0.962 0 0.8212 0.8537 
IFCW63X 0.9533 0.7846 0-8230 
SOCWK63X 0.91 12 0. 7233 0.7938 
UAH63X 0.9794 0.7661 0.7822 
UNH63X 0-9068 0.7390 0.8150 
z 
TMSTR63 0.9438 0.7406 0.7e47 
CABP63 0.9438 0-7437 0.7879 
CCE63X 
NFU63X 
GNCON63X 
0.9212 
0.9212 
1.0000 
0. 71 51 
0-5788 
0.7763 
0.6283 
0.5197 0.5197 
KALU63 1.0000 0.6683 0.6683 
NSPE63 1.0000 0.6616 0.6616 
NF063X 
8- 
1.0000 0.5701 0.5701 
IPAA63 1.0000 0.7825 0.7825 
10- 
BUS0BG63 
ACTVV 63X 
1.C00C 0.75240.7524 
1.0000 0.7595 0.7595 
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TABLE 28 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER 
1 
2 
3 
MEMBERS 
7 
15 
5 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
7.000000 
15.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
5.766864 
12.175489 
3.000000 
0.8238 
0.8117 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.409421 
0.607218 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18-94235 PROPORTION * 0.823581 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
R-SQUARED 
CNN 
NITH 
NEXT 
CLUSTER 
NEA63 1.0000 
R**2 
T VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 1 
IPAA63 0.7958 0.6690 0.8406 
TMSTR63 0.8239 0.7430 0.9018 
CARP 63 0.6776 0.4505 0.6648 
CCE63X 0-9303 0.6106 0.8713 
BUSORG63 0-9144 0.8075 0.8831 
NF063X 0.7509 0. 5-404 0.7198 
NFU63X 0.8738 0.7174 0.8209 
NAB63 0.8337 0.7368 0.8837 
N ALU b 3 0-6228 0.4689 0.7529 
NSPE63 0.5049 0.2914 0.5772 
NFIB63 0. 815 1 0-7285 C.8938 
AFT63 0.6616 0.4842 0.7319 
AFLCI03X 0. 9711 0.8263 0.8509 
AFSCM63X 0.7147 0.5833 0.8163 
COCUS63X 0. 9059 0.8759 0.9669 
CUA63X 0.9548 0.8362 0.8758 
GNCON63X 0.8138 0.6312 0.7756 
IFCN63X 0.9296 0.7411 0.7973 
SOCWK63X 0.9047 0.6544 0.7233 
UAH63X 0.9707 0.8532 0.8789 
UMW63X 0.7482 0„ 5 522 C. 7380 
3- 
ACTHV63X 0.8239 0.7464 0.9059 
0.3839 0.3839 
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TABLE 29 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SCIUTICNS 
FCR THE BO SI N ESJS/L A EOR SUESAHPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL CCHPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SDHflARY EOR 4 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTION SECOND 
CLUSTER HEHBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 7 7.000000 5.766864 0.6238 0.409421 
2 14 14.000000 11.692101 0.8352 0.461713 
3 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
4 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 19.45897 PROPORTION - 0.646042 
B-SQUARED BIIH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
CLUSTER 1- 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST BATIC 
IPAA63 0.7956 0.6660 0.8369 
THSTR63 0-8239 0.7550 0.9163 
CARP63 C.6776 0.4752 0.7013 
CCE63X 0.9303 0.8201 0.8615 
BUSORG63 0.9144 0.8130 0.889 1 
NF063X 0.7509 0.5468 0.7283 
NFU63X 0.8738 0.7182 0.8219 
CLUSTER 2- 
NAB63 .0.8394 0.7368 0.8778 
NALU 6 3 0.. 6223 0.4689 0.7535 
NFIB 63 0.8228 0.7285 0.8854 
AFT63 0.6616 0., 4 84 2 0-7316 
AFLCI03X 0.9742 0.82b3 0.8482 
AFSCH63X 0.7169 0.5833 0.8137 
COCUS63X 0.9065 0., 8759 0.9662 
CWA63X 0.9 59 2 0. 8 3 62 C- 87 18 
GNCON63X 0.8038 0.6312 0.7852 
IECH63X 0.9295 0.74 11 0.7973 
SOCHK63X 0.8975 0.6544 0-7291 
UAH63X 0.9722 0.8532 0.8776 
UH ii 63 X 0.7528 0.5522 0.7335 
ACTWV63X 0.8333 0.7464 0- 8957 
CLUSTER o 
It 
NEA63 1.0000 0. 3607 C.3607 
CLUSTER 4— 
NS PE63 1.0000 0.4619 0.4619 
rg
ro
^
in
 
TABLE 30 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE SATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE BUSINES-S/LAEOB SUBSAMPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 7 
13 
1 
1 
1 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
7.000000 
13.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
6.035538 
10.793485 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
0.8628 
0.8303 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
C.364890 
0.457844 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 19.83302 PROPORTION = 0.862305 
B-SQ0ABED 
GUN 
WITH 
NEXT B**2 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
1- 
VARIABLE CLUSTEfi HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0.8193 0.6533 0.7974 
TMSTR63 0.8112 0.7516 0.9265 
CCE63X 0.9367 0.80S3 0.8639 
C0CUS63X 0.9214 0.8901 0.9660 
EUSORG63 0.9211 0.8001 0.8687 
NF063X 0.7464 0.5350 0.7168 
NFU63X 0.8835 0.7081 0.8015 
z 
NAB63 0.8386 0.7584 0.9043 
NALU63 0.6230 0.4860 0.7802 
NFIB63 0.8219 0.7493 0.9118 
AFT63 0.6691 0.4982 0.7445 
AFLCI03X 0. 9733 0.8539 0.8774 
AFSCH63X 0.7210 0.6141 0.8518 
CMA63X 0. 9557 0-86 72 0.9074 
GNCON63X C.7990 0.6757 0.8456 
IFCN63X 0. 9289 0.7838 0.8438 
SOCWK63X 0.9008 0.7051 Q.,7828 
UAW63X 0.9673 0.8896 0.9 197 
UMU63X 0.7623 0.5615 0.7366 
1 ACTWV63X 0.8327 0.7501 
0.9008 
J 
II 
NEA63 1. 0000 0.3603 0.3803 
c NSPE63 1.0000 
0.4604 0.4604 
J" 
CARP63 1. 0000 0.5809 0.5809 
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TABLE 31 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE BUSINESS/LABOB SUBSAMPLE 
OBLIQUE PBXNCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUNMABX FOB 6 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTEB MEHBEBS 
1 7 
2 12 
3 1 / 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
CLUSTEB 
VARIATION 
7.000000 
12.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
6.039538 
10. 193642 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
SECCNL 
EIGENVALUE 
0.364890 
0.437729 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.23318 
PEOPOBTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8628 
0.8495 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
PROPORTION = 0.879703 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
B-S 
OB 
U ABED HUB 
NEXT B**2 
1 , VARIABLE CLUSTEB HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0.8193 0.6575 0.8025 
TMSTB63 0.8112 0.7614 0.9386 
CCE63X 0.9367 0.8512 0.8660 
C0CUS63X 0.9214 0.8883 0.9641 
BUSORG63 0.92 U 0.8019 0.8707 
NF063X 0.7464 0.5322 0. 7131 
o . 
NFU63X 0.8835 0.7100 0.8036 
L 
NAB63 0. 0399 0.7584 0.9029 
NFIB63 0.825 1 0.7493 0-9082 
AFT63 0.6760 0.4982 0.7369 
AFLCI03X 0.9717 0.8539 0.8788 
AFSCM63X 0.7293 0.6141 0.8421 
CWA63X 0.9513 0.8672 0.9116 
GNCON63X 0.8001 0.6757 0.8444 
IFCB63X 0.9290 0.7838 0.8437 
SOCWK63X 0.8989 0.7051 0.7844 
UAW63X 0. 9661 0.8896 0.9209 
UMW63X 0.7660 0.5615 0.7330 
ACTBV63X 0. 8402 0.7501 0.8927 
NEA63 1.0000 0.3879 0.3879 
q .. 
c NSPE63 1.0000 0.4575 0.4575 J 
e- 
CABP63 1.0000 0.5809 0.5809 
NALU 63 1.C000 0.5762 0.5762 
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TABLE 32 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSABPLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUBMABY FOB 7 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 5 
2 12 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 2 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
5.000000 
12.000000 
1.000000 
9.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
2.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
4.352528 
10.495469 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1. 74402J 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
C.8705 
0.8746 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6720 
SECOND 
EIGENV HUE 
0.299805 
0-348752 
0.255977 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 20.59202 PROPORTION = 0.895305 
B-SQUABED HUH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE CLUSTER BIGHLST RATIO 
IPAA63 0.8189 0.6923 0.8454 
CCE63X 0.9366 0.8495 0.9070 
EUSCRG63 0. 9059 0.8375 C.9245 
NF063X 0.7978 0.5632 0.7059 
NFU63X 
2. r - 
0.8933 0.7405 0.8289 
NAB63 0.8474 0.7268 0.8577 
NFIB63 0.8333 0.7014 0.8417 
TMSTB63 0.7976 0.7399 0.9277 
AFLCI03X 0.9714 0.8090 0-8328 
AFSCH63X 0.7270 0.5879 0.8088 
C0CUS63X 0- 9213 0.8855 0.9612 
CHA63X 0. 9607 0.8253 0.8591 
GNCON63X 0.8015 0.6351 0.7925 
IFCW63X C.9284 0.7426 0.7999 
SOCHK63X 0.8852 0.6996 0.7903 
UAN63X 0.9770 0.8499 0.8700 
ACTHY63X 0.8449 0.7099 0.8402 
NEA63 9. COO0 0.J900 C.3900 
l NSPE63 1.0Q0C 0.4468 C.4 468 
CABP63 
6 
1-0000 0.5658 G.5656 
~ NALU6J 1.0000 0.5736 0.5736 
AFT63 0.8720 0.6148 C.7 05 0 
UMN63X 0.8720 0.7125 0.8170 
iT“
<
N
n
^
m
v
o
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TABLE 33 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SOESAABLE 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY POR 8 CLUSTERS 
CLUS ER MEMBERS 
3 
1 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
3.000000 
11.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
2.000000 
3.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
2.681713 
9.714609 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.744023 
2.719241 
PROPORTICN 
EXPLAINED 
0.8939 
0.8831 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.8720 
0.9064 
SECGkl 
EIGENVALUE 
0..20 1946 
0.345728 
0.255977 
0. 16 6 456 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20-85959 PROPORTION - 0.906938 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
fi-SQUARED 
OWN 
RUB 
NEXT R**2 
8 
VARIABLE CLUSTEB HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 
TMSTR63 
BUSORG63 
NAB63 
NFIB63 
AFLCI03X 
AFSCM63X 
C0CUS63X 
CHA6JX 
GNC0N63X 
IFCH63X 
SOCHK63X 
UAH63X 
ACTHV63X 
0.8802 
0.8778 
0.9237 
0.6836 
0.7632 
0.8287 
0.7766 
0.8694 
0.8972 
0.8480 
0. 8253 
0.9718 
0.7290 
0.9217 
0.96 11 
0.8055 
0.9350 
0.8969 
0.9785 
0.8419 
0.7187 
0.7460 
0.8117 
0.5805 
0.8691 
0.8441 
0.6756 
0.7464 
0.6996 
0. 8 5 4 1 
Q„7405 
0.8476 
0.9040 
0.8353 
0.7963 
0.9429 
0.8783 
0.8387 
0-7983 
0.7800 
0.8728 
0.8795 
NEA63 1.00 00 0..3961 0.3961 
NSPE63 1.0000 0.4598 0.4598 
CARP63 1.0000 0.5750 0.5750 
NALU63 1.0000 0..5835 0.5835 
APT63 
UMH63X 
0.8720 
0.8720 
0.6149 
0.. 7096 
0.7051 
0.8138 | 
CCE63X 
NF063X 
NPU63X 
0.9283 
0.8725 
0.9184 
0.8471 
0.5836 
0..7782 
0.9126 
0.6689 
0.8473 
i*’" psi«"n z
t in
v
o
r*
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TABLE 34 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE BUSINESS/LABOB SUBSAHPIE 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL CCHPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUMHABY FOB 9 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTEB MEMBERS 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
3.000000 
8.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
4.000000 
3.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
2.681713 
7.378738 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
3.390641 
2.719241 
1.000000 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 21- 17033 
PBOPOBTIO N 
EXPLAINED 
0.8939 
0.9223 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.8477 
0.9064 
1.0000 
PROPORTION 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.201946 
0-2C2607 
0.276970 
0-186456 
0.920449 
fi—SQUARED BITS 
OWN NEXT R**2 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
A 
' CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
9 VAEIABLE CLUSTEB BIG BEST RATIO 1 
IPAA63 G.8802 0.6836 0.7766 
TMSTB63 0.8778 0.7433 0.8468 
*) BUSORG63 0. 9237 0.8252 0.8933 
AFLCI03X 0.9732 0.8789 0.9031 
COCUS63X 0.9274 0. 8691 0.9370 
CUA63X 0.9582 0-8583 0.8957 
GNCON63X 0.8406 0.6756 0-8037 
IFCH63X 0.9447 0.8184 0.8662 
SOCHK63X 0.8924 0-817 3 0.9159 
UAH63X 0.9820 0.8569 0.8726 
ACTWV63X 0.8602 0.7405 C.6608 
J 
ll . 
NEA63 1.0000 0.3949 G.3949 
*• 
C NSPE63 1.0000 0.4738 0.4738 
J 
CARP63 1. 0000 0.5750 0.5750 
O 
7 NALU 6 3 1.0000 0.5916 0.5916 /" 
NAB63 0.8731 0.8015 C.9179 
NFIB 63 0.8811 0.7781 0.8831 
AFSCM63X 0.7967 0.6713 0.8426 
n UMW63X 0.8398 0.6800 
0.. 8097 
0“ 
CCE63X 0.9283 0.8471 0.9126 
NFC63X 0.8725 0.5836 0.6689 
O i 
NFU63X 0.9184 0.7782 0.8473 
J 
AFT63 1.0000 0.6323 0.6323 
O
'-
O
C
B
'-
JC
T
'U
U
r 
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TAB1E 35 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE BOSINESS/LAEOB SUBSAHP1E 
OBLIQUE PHINCIPAL COHPONENT CLUSTEfi ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUflHABY FOB 10 CLOSTEfiS 
CLUSTEfi MEMBERS 
3 
9 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
CLUSTEB 
VABIATION 
3-000000 
9.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
2.000000 
3.000000 
1.000000 
1.C0C000 
V ABIATION 
EXPLAINED 
2.681713 
8.200175 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1. 8369JO 
2.719241 
1.000000 
1.000000 
PBOPOfiTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8939 
0.9111 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9185 
0.9064 
1.0000 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.201946 
0.265153 
0.163070 
0. 188456 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.43806 PBOPOBTION = G.932C9 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEfi 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 10 
VABIABLE 
OWN 
CLUSTEB 
NEXT 
HIGHEST 
B**2 
RATIO 
IPAA63 
TMSTR63 
BUSOBG63 
0.8802 
0.8778 
0.9237 
0.6840 
0.7488 
0-8278 
0.7771 
0.8530 
0.8962 
NAB6J 
AFLCIC3X 
COCUS63X 
CWA63X 
GNCON63X 
IFCB63X 
SOCUK63X 
UAW63X 
ACTW V63X 
0.8398 
0.9730 
0.9275 
0.9587 
0.8282 
0.9404 
0.9004 
0.9830 
0.8490 
0.7388 
0.. 8290 
0.8691 
0.8441 
0.6756 
0.7651 
0.7337 
0.8541 
0.7405 
0-8797 
0-8519 
0.9370 
G.8e05 
0.8158 
0.8135 
0.8148 
0.8688 
0.8722 
NEA63 1.00GC 0.4038 0.4038 
NSPE63 1.0000 0.4679 0.4679 
CABP63 1.000C 0.5750 0.5750 
NALU63 1.0000 0.5921 0.5921 
NFIB63 
UMW6JX 
0.9185 
0.9185 
0.7884 
0.6891 
0.8584 
0.7503 
CCE63X 
NF063X 
NFU63X 
0. 9.283 
0.8725 
0.9184 
0.8471 
0.5836 
0.7782 
0.9126 
0.6689 
0.8473 
AFT63 1.0000 0.6245 0.6245 
AFSCH63X 1.C000 0.6801 0.6801 
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APPENDIX H 
CLUSTERING ALL VARIABLES 
Only 27 of the 47 variables in the data set were 
contained and classified on the FEC's 1978-1980 Final 
Report, Reports on Financial Activity for U.S. Senate 
and House Campaigns tape. Without campaign financial 
activity at the federal level, an organization will 
not be classified. 
In this section of analysis, however, FEC 
classification is not really an issue. This section 
deals with cluster membership of the full set of 
variables as a series of clusters are formed. 
The purpose of clustering the full set of 
variables is to determine if a limited number of 
clusters will separate the organizations into 
2 
relatively unfuzzy clusters (low R ratio) with 
memberships that can be described parsimoniously. 
House of Representatives 
Tables 36 to 44 portray cluster membership as the 
cluster algorithm proceeds from two to ten clusters. 
With two cluster [Table 36], the variable set splits in 
half. Each cluster contains a disparate collection of 
business and labor, and conservative and liberal 
TABLE 36 
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HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 2 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER 
1 
2 
MEMBERS 
25 
21 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
25-000000 
21.C00000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
21.263913 
17.275055 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
C-8506 
0-8226 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
1-039955 
0-820703 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 3e.53897 
CLUSTER 
B-SCUARED 
PROPORTION = 0-8378C4 
KITH 
VARIABLE 
OWN 
CLUSTER 
NEXT 
HIGHEST 
R**2 
RATIO 
NAB 63 C-9104 0-8417 0.9246 
CHVC63 0-8476 0-7574 C-8935 
NCAC63 0.7837 0.7369 0.9403 
LCCB63 0- 8759 0.8127 0- 9279 
CONS63 C-8 97 0 0.78-44 0.8745 
WPC63 0. 8067 0-7311 0.9063 
TMSTE63 0-7503 0-6220 0.8290 
CARP63 0.7675 0.6083 0-7927 
NEA63 0-8 163 0.7328 0-8978 
ACA63X 0-9602 0.8212 0-8553 
ACU63X 0.9574 0.8625 0-9008 
AFLCI03X 0-9 28 0 0.8904 0-9586 
CCE63X 0.7873 0.5634 0.7156 
CSFC63X 0- 9683 0- 8467 0-8744 
CUA63X C-9236 0.8999 0.9743 
IFCW63X 0-9289 0.8898 0-9578 
N A SC63 X 0.9454 0-9084 0.9608 
NFC63X 0-3686 0-2362 0.6408 
NFU63X C.62 02 0.4127 0.6655 
NTV63X 0- 8834 0- 66 53 0- 7531 
PAR 6 3X 0- 9056 0.8567 0.9459 
SCIT63X 0.9270 0-9 168 €-9889 
SOCNK63X 0-9018 0-8767 0.9722 
UAH63X 0-9450 0.5368 C-991 3 
LIBLB63X 0. 8571 0.7294 0.8511 
TABLE 36 - Continued. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIBE SAMPLE OF EATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB 2- 
IPAA63 0.7755 0.7344 0.9470 
A SC 63 0.8259 0.7894 0.9559 
N ALU 63 0.7092 0.6442 0.9083 
NSPE63 0.7671 0.5667 0.7387 
NFIB63 0. 8431 0.8056 0.9555 
ACLU6J 0.7608 0.6697 0.8802 
A FT 6 3 0.8876 0.8153 0.9185 
LCV63X C.8400 0.6292 0.7491 
AUA63X 0.9575 0.8603 0.8985 
AFSCH63Y 0.7578 0.7141 0.9423 
CfA63X 0.9328 0.8352 0.8954 
CNFMP63X 0.8261 0.6941 0.8403 
C0CUS63X 0.9244 0.8596 0.9299 
FCNL63X 0.9053 0.8290 0.9157 
GNCON63X 0. 5478 0.3659 0.6679 
BUSOBG63 0.7658 0.7253 0.9471 
PCCH63X 0.9354 0.7746 0.8281 
LCTY63X 0.8449 0.7353 0.8703 
UHI63X 0.9072 0.8203 0.9043 
HOHAC63X 0.8277 0.8005 0-967 1 
ACTWV63X 0.7335 0.7077 0.9648 
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members. The two farm organizations in Cl, the NFO and 
NFU and the General Contractors in C2 have the lowest 
2 
R with their own clusters. 
The nine organizations that form C3 in the third 
iteration [Table 37] seem to have little in common, 
other than a loose cohesion to their former co-members 
in Cl and C2. In the next iteration [Table 38] the two 
farm organizations form a triad, C4, with the Council 
for a Competitive Economy. In the fifth through eighth 
iterations [Tables 39 to 42] the farm groups form a 
2 
dyad, C5, that is, as evidenced by the R ratio, 
relatively well separated from the rest of the set of 
organizations. This is the only cluster that has both 
2 
a low average R ratio and apparent political 
consistency. 
In contrast to the farmers is the cluster, C4, 
which forms at the fifth iteration and remains together 
through the tenth [Table 44]. It is composed of the 
free market espousing Council for a Competitive 
Economy, the Teamsters and Carpenters unions, and the 
National Taxpayers Union, a group dedicated to reducing 
government spending. While a labor historian familiar 
with the teamsters' close ties to the Republican party 
might not be surprised by the membership of C4; those 
who analyze PAC and political behavior might be 
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TABLE 37 
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OP RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALISIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 
2 
3 
16 
21 
S 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
16.GC 0000 
21.000000 
9.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
13.115126 
18.554602 
7.724552 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 39.39428 
PBOfOBTIGN 
EXPLAINED 
0.8197 
0.8836 
0.8583 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.913078 
0.373616 
0.473984 
PROPORTION = 0.856397 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
R-SQUABED RITH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC63 0.8652 0.7642 0.8833 
NCAC63 0.7940 0.7412 0-9336 
LCCR63 0.8567 0.8386 0.9789 
CCNS63 0. 9065 0.8007 0-8833 
WPC63 0.8110 0.7355 0.9069 
TMSTB63 0.7416 0.7129 0.9613 
CARP 63 0.7574 0.7199 0.9505 
NEA63 0.8093 0.7711 0-9528 
AC A 6 3 X 0- 9592 0.8808 0.9183 
ACU63X 0.9513 0.8935 0.9392 
CCE63X 0.8157 0.6714 0.8231 
CSFC63X 0. 9667 0. 8923 <0. 923 1 
NF063X 0.4230 0-2563 0.6058 
NFU63X 0-674 1 0.4755 0-7055 
NTV63X 0.9060 0.7617 0.8407 
LIBLE63X 0.8774 0.7556 0.8612 
IPAA63 0.8047 0-6860 0.852,5 
NAB63 0-8941 0.8722 0.9756 
NALU63 0.6962 0.6454 0.9270 
NFIB63 0.8820 0.7452 0. 844ft . 
AFT63 0.9045 0.7998 0-8 842 * 
AFLCI03X G.9565 0.8782 0.9 181 
AFSCM63X 0.8126 0.6516 0.8019 
CFA63X 0.9201 0.8666 0.9418 
CCCUS63X 0.9353 0.8281 0-8854 
CUA63X 0.9603 0.8660 0.9018 
IFCW63I 0.9459 0.8794 0.9297 
BUSORG63 C.7 809 0.6868 0.8795 
NASC63X 0.9539 0.9008 0.9444 
PAR63X 0.9042 0.8632 0.9547 
SCIT63X 0.9677 0.8701 0-8992 
SOCHK63X 0.5104 0.8580 0-9425 
UAV63X 0.9750 0-8924 0.9153 
LCTY63X 0.8311 0.7675 0.9234 
UMW63X 0.9028 0.8269 0-9160 
ROMAC6 3X 0.8306 0.7644 0.9204 
ACT3V63X 0.7859 0.6449 0.8207 
TABLE 37 - Continued 
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIBE SAflPLE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL CCflPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEfi 3- 
ASC63 0-865J 0.7698 0.8897 
NSPE63 0.78&4 0.6766 0.8582 
ACLU63 0-8282 0.6738 0.8136 
LCV63X 0-8899 0-7267 0.8166 
A0A63X 0.9625 0.8994 0.9345 
CNFMP63X 0.8885 0.7350 0.8273 
FCNX63X 0-9346 0.8386 0.8973 
GNCON63X 0.6464 0-4274 0.6612 
FCCW63X 0-9209 0- 8743 0-9493 
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TABLE 38 
HOUSE OF BEPB ES ENTATX? ES LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE EBTIBE SAMPLE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUMMARY FOB 4 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTEB 
1 
2 
3 
4 
NEMBEBS 
12 
22 
9 
3 
CLUSTEB 
VARIATION 
12.COOOOO 
22.000000 
9.000000 
3.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
10.758553 
19. 131 139 
7.724552 
2.529473 
P EOPOBTICN 
EXPLAINED 
0.8965 
0.8696 
0.8583 
0.8432 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.335542 
0.503789 
0.473984 
0.323577 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 40.14372 PBOPCBTION * 0.872689 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
B—SQUIBED BITS 
OH N NEXT R **2 
VARIABLE CLUSTEB HIGHEST BATIC 
NAB63 0.9020 0.8846 0.9807 
CHVC63 0.9095 0.7642 0.8402 
NCAC63 0.8379 0.7412 0.8847 
LCCB63 0.8909 0.8326 0-9346 
CONS63 0.9282 0.7984 0.8601 
WPC63 0.8439 0.7299 0.8649 
NEA63 0.8092 0.7764 0.9595 
ACA63X 0.9508 0.8851 0.9309 
ACU63X 0.9609 0.8939 0.9303 
CSFC63X 0.9674 0.8919 0.9219 
NTV63X C.862 0 0„7801 0.9050 
LIBLB63X 0.8959 0.7558 0.8436 
IPAA63 0. 8049 0.6768 0.8409 
NALU63 0.6923 0.6454 0.9323 
NFIB63 0. 8838 0.. 7584 0.8581 
TMSTR6J 0.7461 0.6810 0.9127 
A FT 6 3 0.8987 0.7998 0.8900 
CABP63 • 0.7523 0.7000 0.9304 
AFLCI03X 0. 9650 0.8707 0.9023 
AFSCM63X 0.8205 0.6417 0.7822 
CFA63X 0. 9 122 0.8666 0-9499 
COCUS63X 0.9332 0.8281 0.8874 
CWA63X 0.9617 0-8692 0.9C38 
IFCU63X 0.9499 0.0830 0.9296 
BUSCBG63 0.7748 0.7011 0.9048 
NASC63X 0.950-4 0.9179 0.9658 
PAB63X 0.9015 0.6696 0.9647 
SCIT63X 0.9654 0.8798 0.9 113 
SOCHK63X 0.9051 0.8834 0.9760 
UAU63X 0.9742 0.9067 0.9307 
LCTY63X 0.8262 0.7675 0.9289 
UM H 63 X 0.9039 0.8269 0.9149 
W0HAC63X 0.8263 0.7889 0-9548 
ACT*V63X 0.7829 0.6550 0.8365 
TABLE 38 - Continued 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FCE THE ENTIRE SAfiPLE OF BATEES 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
RINCIPAL COHPCNENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
A SC 63 0.8653 0-8205 0-9482 
NSPE63 0-7884 0.66 n 0.8386 
ACLU63 0-8282 0-7 169 0.8656 
LCV6JX 0.8899 0.7098 0-7977 
AEA63X 0-9625 0-8855 C.9 200 
CNFMP63X 0-8085 0.7213 0.8118 
FCNL63X 0.9346 0.8495 0.9090 
GNCON63X 0.6464 0.4153 0.6425 
PCCW63X 0- 9209 0-8585 0.9322 
CCE63X 0.8473 0-7331 0-8652 
NF063X 0.7844 0.3461 0.4413 
NFU63X 0- 8977 0.5860 0.6527 
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TABLE 39 
HOUSE OF BEPRESENIATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATI KG CIOSTBB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIBE SAMPLE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL COflPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEfi SUMMARY FOB 5 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTEB MEMBERS 
10 
2 21 
3 9 
4 4 
5 2 
CLUSTEB 
VARIATION 
10.000000 
2 f.OCOOOO 
9.000000 
4.000000 
2.000000 
VARIATION P BOPOBTION 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
9.021856 
18.554602 
7.724552 
3.579633 
1-760757 
0.9022 
0.8836 
0.8583 
0.8949 
0.8804 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
C.251379 
0.373616 
0-473984 
0.254778 
0.239243 
TOTAL VABIATION EXPLAINED - 40.6414 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
PBOPCBTION * 0.883509 
HUB 
OUN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTEB .HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC63 0.9252 0.7642 0.8260 
NCAC63 0.8553 0.7412 0.8666 
LCCB63 0. 8934 0.8386 0.9387 
CONS63 0.9336 0.8007 0.8577 
WPC6 3 0.8564 0.7355 0- 8588 
NEA63 0.81 12 0..7711 0.9506 
ACA63X 0.9405 0.8808 0. 9366 
ACU63X 0.9540 0.8935 0.9366 
CSFC63X 0.9563 0.8923 0.9331 
LIBLB63X 0.8960 0.7556 0.8433 
IPAA63 C.8047 0.6686 0.8309 
NAB63 0.8941 0.8756 0.9794 
NALU63 0.6962 0.6454 0.9270 
NFIB63 0. 8820 0.7494 0.8497 
AFT63 0.9045 0.7998 0.8842 
AFLCI03X 0.9565 0.8588 0.8979 
AFSCM63X 0.8126 0.6878 0.8464 
CFA63X 0.9201 0.8666 0.941e 
COCUS63X 0.9353 0.8281 0.8854 
CWA63X 0.9603 0.8580 0.8934 
IFCW63X C.945S 0.8729 0.9228 
BUSCBG63 0.7809 0.6933 0.8879 
NASC63X C. 953 9 0.9095 0.9535 
PAB63X 0.9042 0.8577 0.9486 
SCIT63X C-9677 0.8673 0.8963 
SOCHK63I 0.9104 0.8781 0.9646 
UAW63X 0.9750 0.8964 0.9194 
LCTY63X 0.83 11 0.7675 0.9234 
UMU63X 0.9028 0.8269 0.9160 
U 0MAC6 3X 0.8306 0-7893 0.9503 
ACTWV63X 0.7859 0.6457 0.8216 
TABLE 39 - Continued 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIRE SAHPLE OF RATERS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
A SC 6 3 0.8653 0.8316 0.961 1 
NSPE63 0.7084 0.6766 0.8502 
ACLU63 0.8282 0.7368 0.8896 
LCV63X 0. 8899 0.7267 0.8166 
ADA63X 0.9625 0.8994 0.9345 
CNFMF63X 0. 0885 0.7350 0.8273 
FCNL63X 0.9346 0.8574 0.9174 
GNCON63X 0. 6464 0.4274 0.6612 
PCCW63X 0.9209 0.8743 0.9493 
TNSTR63 0.8703 0.7129 0.8192 
CARP63 0-8089 0-7199 0.8099 
CCE63X C. 900 0 0.704 0 0.7822 
NTV63X 0.9205 0.8290 0.9006 
NF063X 0.8804 0. 3706 0-4209 
NFU63X 0.8804 0.6416 0.7288 
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TABLE 40 
HCUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FCE 6 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTER 
1 
MEMBERS 
10 
20 
6 
4 
2 
4 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
10,000000 
2C.CCOOOO 
6.000000 
4.000000 
2.000000 
4.C00000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
9.021856 
J7.870208 
5.329389 
3.579633 
1.760757 
3.468675 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.9022 
0.8935 
0.8882 
0.8949 
0. 8 8 0-4 
0.8672 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.251379 
0.318590 
0.317842 
0.254778 
0.239243 
0.317725 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED - 41.03052 PROPORTION * 0.891968 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
1- 
2- 
R-SCUARED UITH 
GUN NEXT 8**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC63 0.9252 0.8275 0.8943 
NCAC63 0- 8553 0.7788 •C.9106 
LCCR63 0.8934 0.8368 0.9 366 
CO NS 63 0.9336 0.8261 0.8849 
UPC 63 0.8564 0.7515 0.8775 
NEA63 0.81 12 0.7703 0.9496 
ACA63X 0.9405 0.8809 0.9367 
ACU63X 0.9540 0.8925 0.9355 
CSFC63X 0.9563 0.8915 0.9323 
LIBLB63X 0.8960 0.7533 0.8407 
IPAA63 0.8085 0. 6709 0.8298 
NAB63 0.8948 0.8756 0.9786 
NFIB63 0.8826 0.7494 0.8491 
AFT63 0.9061 0.8009 0.8839 
AF1CIOJX 0.9582 0. 8588 0.6963 
APSCM63X 0.8141 0.6878 0.8449 
CFA63X 0.9196 0.8384 0.9 115 
COCUS63X 0.9342 0.8 175 0.6751 
CUA63X 0.9624 0.8580 0.8915 
IFCW63X 0.9464 0.8729 0.9223 
EUSGRG63 0.7794 0-6933 0.8896 
NASC63X 0.9540 Oo 909 5 0.9534 
PAB63X 0.9044 0.8577 0.9483 
SCIT63X 0.9681 0.. 867 3 0.6959 
S0CWK63X 0.9110 0..878 1 0-9639 
UAU63X 0.9759 0.8964 0.9185 
LCTY6JX 0.8317 0.7389 0.8883 
UMH63X 0.9014 0.7987 0.8861 
UCMIC63X 0.8280 0.7693 0.9533 
ACTUV63X 0.7892 0.. 5457 0-8 18 1 
TABLE 40 - Continued. 
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIBE SAMPLE OP RATERS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSIER ANALYSIS 
ASC63 
NALU 63 
ACLU63 
ADA63X 
CNFHP63X 
FCNL63X 
0.9141 
0.7329 
C. 853 9 
0.9571 
0.9107 
0. 960 7 
0.8316 
0.6723 
0.7368 
0.. 8973 
0.. 7434 
0.8574 
0.9098 
0.9173 
0.8628 
0.9375 
0.8163 
0.8924 
THSTB63 
CARP 63 
CCE63X 
NTV63X 
0. 8703 
0.8889 
0.9000 
0.9205 
0.713 3 
0.7224 
0.7040 
0.8290 
0.8197 
0.8127 
0.7822 
0.9006 
NF063X 
NFU63X 
C.8804 
0. 8804 
0.3706 
0.6416 
0.4209 
0.7288 
NSPE63 
LCV63X 
GNCON6JX 
PCCW63X 
0.8666 
0.9308 
0. 758 7 
0.9124 
0..6761 
0.7902 
0. 5205 
0..8723 
0.7802 
0.8490 
0.6860 
0.9560 
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TABLE 41 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUS1EB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIRE SAHPLE OF BATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 7 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 10 
20 
6 
4 
2 
3 
1 
CLUSTER 
V ABIATION 
1C.000000 
20.000000 
6.000000 
4.000000 
2.000000 
3.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
9.021856 
17.870208 
5.329369 
3. 579633 
1.760757 
2.771624 
1.000000 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.9022 
0.8935 
0.8882 
0.8949 
0.8804 
0.9259 
1.0000 
SECOKC 
EIGENVALUE 
0.251379 
C.318590 
0.317842 
0.254778 
0.239243 
0. 145347 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 41.33947 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PROPOBTION 0.898684 
NITH 
OH N NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC63 0.9252 0.8275 0.8943 
NCAC63 0. 8553 0.7788 C-9106 
LCCR63 0.8934 0.8368 0.9366 
CCNS63 0.9336 0.8261 0.8849 
UPC 6 3 0-8564 0.7515 0.8775 
NEA63 0.8 1 12 0.7703 0.9496 
ACA63X C.9405 0.8809 0.9367 
ACU63X 0.9540 0.8925 0.9355 
CSFC63X 0.9563 0.8915 0.9323 
LIBLB63X 0.8960 0.7533 0.8407 
IPAA63 0.8085 0.7006 0.8665 
NAB63 C.8 948 0.8756 0.9786 
NFIB63 0.8826 0.7494 0.. 849 1 
AFT63 0.9061 0.8009 0.8839 
AFLCI03X 0.9582 0.8588 0.8963 
AFSCM63X 0.8141 0.6878 0.8449 
CFA63X 0. 9198 0.8619 0.9371 
COCUS63X 0.9342 0.8 175 0.8751 
CHA63X 0- 9624 0. 8580 0.8915 
IFCW63X 0.9464 0.8729 0.9223 
BUS0BG63 0.7794 0.6933 C.8696 
NASC63X 0.9540 0.9095 0.9534 
PAB63X 0.9044 0.8577 0.9463 
SCIT63X 0.9681 0.8673 0.8959 
S0CHK63X 0.9110 0.8781 0. 9639 
UAH63X 0.9759 0.8964 0.9 185 
LCTY63X 0.8317 0- 7587 0-9122 
UMH63X 0.9014 0., 8434 0.9356 
UOMAC63X 0. 8280 0.7893 0.9533 
ACTHV63X 0.7892 0.6457 0.8181 
TABLE 41 Continued. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE BATING CXUSTEB 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE : PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
3 
A SC 6 3 
NALU63 
ACLU63 
A0A63X 
CNFMP63X 
FCNL63X 
(J— 
0.9141 
0.7329 
0.8539 
0. 957 1 
0.9107 
0.9607 
0.8316 
0.6723 
0.7368 
0.8973 
0.7569 
0.8574 
0.9098 
0.9173 
0.8628 
0.9375 
0.8312 
0.8924 
T MSTS63 
CARP63 
CCE63X 
NTV63X 
0.8703 
0.8889 
0.9000 
0.9205 
0.7133 
0.7224 
0.7040 
0.8290 
0.8197 
0.8127 
0.7822 
0.9006 
NF063X 
NFU63X 
0.6804 
0.8804 
0.3706 
0.6416 
0.4209 
0.7288 
NSPE63 
LCV63X 
^ PCCW63X 
0.8996 
0.9345 
0.9436 
0..6761 
0..7902 
0.8723 
0.7516 
0.8457 
0.9245 
GNCON63X 1. 0000 0.6140 0.6140 
i *—
 cm
 m
 ^
 in
 vo r^- co 
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TABLE 42 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OP RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY ECB 8 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
10 
20 
6 
4 
1 
3 
1 
1 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
10,000000 
2C.000000 
6.000000 
4.000000 
1.000000 
3.CO 0000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
9.021856 
17.870208 
5.329389 
3.579633 
1.000000 
2.777624 
1.000000 
1.000000 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.9022 
0.8935 
0.8882 
0.8949 
1.0000 
0.9259 
1.0000 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.251379 
0. 318590 
0.317842 
0.254778 
0.149347 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 41.57871 PROPORTION = 0-903865 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
% \ *..• B-SGUARED UITH 
variable 
OWN NEXT B ** 2 
CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC 63 0.9252 0.8275 0.8943 
NCAC63 0.8553 0.7788 0.9106 
LCCR63 0.8934 0.8368 0.9366 
C0NS63 0. 9336 0.8261 o.ee49 
UPC 63 0-8564 0.7515 0.8775 
NEA63 0.8112 0.7703 0.9496 
ACA63X 0.9405 0.8809 0.9367 
ACU63X 0.9540 0.8925 0.9355 
CSPC63X 0.9563 0.3915 0.9323 
LIBLB63X 0.8960 0.7533 0.8407 
IPAA63 0.8085 0.7006 0.8665 
NAB63 0.8948 0.8756 0.9786 
NFIB63 0..8826 0.7494 0.8491 
AFT63 C.906 1 0.8009 0.8839 
AFLCI03X 0.9582 0. 8588 0-8963 
AFSCM63X 0.8141 0.6878 0.8449 
CFA63X 0.9198 0.8619 0. 937 1 
COCUS63X 0.9342 0.8175 0.8751 
CWA63X 0.9624 0.. 8580 0-8915 
IFCW63X 0.9464 0.8729 0.9223 
BUSCBG63 0.7794 0.6933 0.8896 
NASC63X 0.9540 0.9095 0.9534 
PAR63X 0.9044 0.8577 0.9463 
SCIT63X 0.9681 0.. 8673 0.8959 
SOCUK63X 0.9 110 0..8781 0.9639 
UAU6JX 0.9759 0.8964 0.9 185 
LCTY63X 0., 8317 0. 7587 0.9122 
UMU63X 0.9014 .0. 8434 0.9356 
VOHAC63X 0.8280 0. 7893 0.9533 
ACTUV63X 0.7892 0.6457 0-8 18 1 
TABLE 42 - Continued 
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAflPLE OP RATERS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PRINCIPAL COflPC NENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
A SC 63 
NALU63 
ACLU63 
ACA63X 
CNFMP63X 
FCNL63X 
0.9141 
0„7329 
0.8539 
0.9 571 
0.9107 
0.9607 
0.8316 
0.6723 
0.7368 
0.. 8973 
0.7569 
0.8574 
0.9098 
0.9173 
0.8628 
0.9375 
0.8312 
0.8924 
7NSTE63 
CARP63 
CCE63X 
NIV63X 
0.8703 
0.8889 
0.9000 
0.9205 
0.7133 
0.7224 
0.. 7095 
0.8290 
0.8197 
0.8127 
0.7883 
0.9006 
NFU63X 1.CQ00 0.6416 0.6416 
NSPE63 
LCV63X 
PCCW63X 
C.8996 
0.9345 
0.9436 
0.6761 
0.7902 
0.8723 
0.7516 
0.8457 
0.9245 
GNCON63X I.OQOO 0.6140 0.6140 
NF063X 1.0000 0.5788 0.5788 
v£
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TABLE 43 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOB THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUHMARI FOB 9 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 10 
20 
5 
4 
1 
3 
I 
1 
1 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
10.000000 
20.000000 
5.000000 
4.000000 
1..000000 
3.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
9.021856 
17.870208 
4.639102 
3.579633 
1.000000 
2.777624 
1.000000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.9022 
0.8935 
0.9278 
0.8948 
1.0000 
0.9259 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.251379 
0.318590 
0. 176202 
0.254778 
0.149347 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 41.88842 PROPORTION = 0.910618 
R-SQOARED 
OHS 
MITH 
NEXT B**2 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC63 0.9252 0.8341 0.9014 
NCAC63 0. 8553 0.7764 0.9078 
LCCR63 0.3934 0.8368 0.9366 
CONS 63 0. 9 33 6 0.8190 0-8773 
WPC63 0-8564 0.7525 0.8786 
NEA63 0. 81 12 0.7703 0-9496 
AC A 6 3 X 0.9405 0.8809 0.9367 
ACU63X 0.9540 0-8925 0.9355 
CSFC63X 0.9563 0.8915 0.9323 
LIBLE63X 0.8960 0.7533 0-8407 
IPAA63 0.8085 0. 7006 0-8665 
NAB63 0.8948 0.875b 0.9786 
NFIB63 0. 8826 0.7494 0. 8491 
AFT63 0.9061 0.7925 0-8746 
AFLCI03X 0.9582 0.8588 0- 8963 
AFSCM63X 0.8141 0.6878 0.8449 
CFA6JX 0. 9 198 0.8619 0. 9371 
COCUS63X 0.9342 0.8175 0.8751 
CUA63X 0.9624 0- 8580 0-8915 
IFCH63X 0.8464 0.8729 0.9223 
BUSCBG63 0.7794 0.6933 0.8896 
NASC63X C.954 0 0.9095 0.9534 
PAR63X 0.8044 0. 8577 0-9 48 3 
SCII63X 0.9681 0.8673 0.8959 
SOCWK63X 0. 9 110 0. 878 1 0.9639 
UAH63X 0.9759 0.8964 0.9 185 
LCTY63X 0.8317 a. 7587 0.9122 
UNW63X 0.9014 0« 84 34 0.9356 
UOMAC63X 0.8280 0.. 789 3 0. 9533 
ACTS V63X 0.7892 0.6457 0.8181 
TABLE 43 - Continued. 
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATIBG CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE Of RATEHS 
OBLIQUE 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
3 A SC 63 
ACLU63 
ADA63X 
CNFHP63X 
FCNL63X 
0.9256 
0.8682 
0.9587 
0. 9256 
0.9609 
0.8316 
0.7368 
0.8973 
0.7569 
0.8574 
0.8985 
0.8486 
0-9359 
0.8177 
0.8922 
TMSTR63 
CARP63 
CCE63X 
NTV63X 
C 
0.8703 
0.8889 
0.9000 
0.9205 
0.7133 
0.7224 
0.7095 
0.8290 
0.8197 
0.8127 
0.7883 
0.9006 
NFU63X 
6 
1. 0000 0.. 64 16 0.6416 
NSPE63 
LCV63I 
PCCM63X 
*j 
0.8996 
0.9345 
0.9436 
0.6761 
0.7882 
0.8723 
0.7516 
0.8435 
0.9245 
GNCON63X 1.0000 0.6140 0.6 140 
g 
NF063X 
g 
1. 0000 0.5788 0.5788 
NALU 6 3 1. 0000 0.6723 0.6723 
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TABLE 44 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE R ATING CLUSTER 
SCLUT10NS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 10 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTION SECOND 
CLUSTER MEMBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 10 10.000000 9. 02 1856 0.9022 C.251379 
2 18 18.C0C000 16.294207 0.9052 0.285468 
3 5 5.000000 4.639102 0.9278 0. 176202 
4 4 4.COOOOO 3.579633 0.8949 0.254778 
5 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
6 3 3.000000 2.777624 0.9259 0. 149347 
7 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
8 1 1.000000 I.COOOOO 1.0000 
9 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
10 2 2.GO 0000 1.818037 0.9090 0. 181963 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 42.13C46 PROPORTION = 0.91568 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
NAB63 
N FIBS 3 
AFT63 
APLCI03X 
AFSCH6JX 
CFA63X 
COCUS6JX 
CBA63X 
IFCH63X 
BUSQRG63 
NASC63X 
PAB63X 
SCIT63X 
SOCBK63X 
UAU63X 
LCTY63X 
UMH63X 
UOHAC63X 
B-SQUARED WITH 
OWN NEXT R**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
CHVC63 0.9252 0.8341 C.9014 
NCAC63. 0.8553 0.7764 0.9078 
LCCR63 0.8934 0.8431 0.9437 
CONS63 0.9336 0.8190 0.8773 
«i PC6 3 0.8564 0.7525 0.8786 
NEA63 0.8112 0.7766 0.9573 
ACA63X 0.9405 0.8825 0.9383 
ACU63X 0.9540 0.8944 0.9375 
CSFC63X 0.9563 0.8943 0.9351 
LIBLB63X 0.8960 0«. 7584 0.8465 
0.9002 0.8756 0.9727 
0- 8 83 8 0.7542 0.8534 
0.909C 0.7925 0.8719 
0.9534 0.8 7 39 0.9167 
0.8165 0.6878 0.8424 
0.9178 0.8619 0.9391 
0.9308 0.8401 0.9026 
0.9583 0.8703 C.9C81 
0.9474 0.8729 0.9213 
0.7805 C.6933 0.0083 
0.9553 0.. 9095 0.9521 
0.9058 0.8577 0.9469 
0.9684 0.8673 0.8956 
0.9160 0. 8 78 1 0- 9587 
0.9773 0.. 3964 0.9172 
0.8362 0. 7587 0.9072 
0.9040 0.8434 0.9329 
0.8334 0.7893 0.9471 
TABLE 44 - Continued 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE HATING CLUSTER 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF EATERS 
GBLIQOE PRINCIPAL CCHPCNENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
rrhctvd wLU Lu 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
ASC63 
ACLU63 
ACA63X 
CNFMP63X 
FCNL63X 
0.9256 
0.8682 
0.9587 
0.9256 
0.9609 
0.8316 
0.7368 
0.9021 
0.7569 
0.. 8574 
0-8985 
0.8486 
0.9409 
0.8177 
0.8922 
THSTB63 
CARP63 
CCE6JX 
NTV63X 
c 
0.8703 
0.8889 
0.9000 
0.9205 
0.7167 
0.7235 
0.7095 
0.8290 
0.8236 
0.8 139 
0.7883 
0.9006 
MPU63X 1.0000 0.6416 0.6416 
NSPE63 
LCV6JX 
PCCH63X 
0.8996 
0.9345 
0.9436 
0.6731 
0..788 2 
0.8708 
0.7482 
0.8435 
0.9229 
GNCON63X 1.0000 0.6140 0.6140 
NF063X 1.0000 0.5788 0.5788 
tJ 
NALU6J 1.C000 0.6781 0.6781 
^ Q — -r - ... 
IPAA63 
ACT IIV6 3X 
0.9090 
0.9090 
0.7866 
0.7660 
0.8653 
0.8427 
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disconcerted by C4's membership. 
When the algorithm is truncated at ten clusters 
[Table 44], the following points may be noted. With 
the exception of the Woman's Political Caucus and the 
National Education Association, the remainder of Cl 
appears to be composed members of a conservative 
orientation. If Cl is "conservative," then C3 is 
liberal. The fourth cluster, C4, appears to be of a 
conservative nature; however that conservativism may 
have more of an economic orientation than Cl. It is 
the largest cluster, C2, that is the most interesting. 
It contains most of the generic business organizations, 
such as the Chamber and the National Federation of 
Independent Business as well as a broad range of labor 
unions. This mixture, after ten iterations, indicates 
a large degree of overlap in the instrumental goals of 
business and labor organizations relative to the set of 
raters. 
In Table 45 the intercluster correlation coef¬ 
ficients are given for the ten cluster House solution. 
The two conservative clusters, Cl and C4, have a high 
positive correlation of .895. They both have large 
negative correlations with C3, the liberal cluster. 
They have larger negative correlations to the 
business/labor cluster, C2, than to the liberal cluster. 
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TABLE 45 
HOUSE OF EEPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATI 
SCLOTIOHS FOE THE ENT IRE SAflPLE OF R 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL CCflPONENT CLUSTER A 
NG CLUSTER 
ATERS 
NALYSIS 
INTER-CLUSTEE CORRELATIONS 
CLUSTER 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1.000000 -.944851 -.930485 0.895928 -..754637 
2 -.944351 1.000000 0.920405 -.896525 0.691525 
3 -.930485 0.920405 1. 000000 -.759759 C.6 17367 
4 0.895928 -.896525 -.759759 1.000000 -.80 1004 
5 -.754637 0.691525 0.617367 -.801004 1.QCCOCO 
6 -.835595 0.902947 0.911050 -.693268 0.551224 
7 0.6 16517 -.651537 -. 724022 0.462508 -.362365 
3 -.581433 0.505742 0.478546 -.608743 0.760757 
9 0.799661 -.823479 -« 80 2583 0.713829 -.545762 
10 -.850218 0.924084 0.813919 -.827 176 0.635502 
CLUSTER 6 7 8 9 10 
1 -.835995 0.616517 -.581433 0.799661 -.850218 
2 0.902947 -.651537 0.505742 -.823479 0.924084 
3 0.91 1050 -.724022 0.478546 -.802583 0.813919 
4 -.693268 0.462508 -.608743 0.7 13829 -.827176 
5 0.551224 -. 362365 0.760757 -.545762 0.635502 
6 1.000000 -.783594 0.422135 -.771895 0.845683 
7 -.783594 1.000000 -.402675 0.585824 —.6C7460 
a 0.422135 -.402675 1.000000 -.406693 0.48 1797 
9 -.771895 0.585824 -.406693 1.000000 -.729616 
10 0.845683 -.6C746 0 0.481797 -.729616 1.000000 
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The results from cluster analyzing forty-seven 
diverse organizations on their ratings of members of 
the House of Representatives indicate that dichotomous 
representations of politics, such as liberal/ 
conservative or business/labor, offer little insight 
into the instrumental goals of interest groups. 
Senate 
As in the House, when Senate member ratings are 
used the formation of clusters having an apparent 
internal political consistency does not take place 
early in the clustering process. For example, at the 
three and four cluster level, [Table 46 and 47] C3 
contains the National Society of Professional 
Engineers, the General Contractors, and the League of 
Conservation Voters. However, by the fifth iteration 
[Table 48], Cl and C5 begin to resemble somewhat 
traditional representations of business and labor. 
Although four of Cl's 16 members are business 
organizations, only the NFIB is a generic business 
group. Eight of the cluster's 16 members are labor 
unions. C5 is primarily a mixture of large business 
associations and conservatively oriented groups. 
As the algorithm progresses, further splitting 
does not seem to add much refinement to the gross 
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TABLE 46 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIBE SAHPLE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL CGHPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEfi SUBflARY FOB 2 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTER BEHBERS 
1 26 
2 20 
CLUSTEfi 
VABIATION 
26.CCOOOO 
20.000000 
VABIATION 
EXPLAINED 
21.401237 
15. 191778 
TOTAL VABIATION EXPLAINED = 36.59302 
PBOPOBTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8231 
0.7596 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.903373 
0-8S S635 
PBOPOBTION - 0.7955 
CLUSTEfi 
V ABIABLE 
B-SQUABED MITH 
OWN NEXT 
CLUSTEfi HIGHEST 
B**2 
RATIO 
IPAA63 0.7379 0-6015 0-8151 
NAB63 0.8485 0.7586 0.8941 
NALU63 0.5745 0.5100 0. 8878 
NFIB63 0.8151 0.6683 0.8199 
C0NS63 0.8742 0.7914 0.9053 
TBSTB63 0. 8043 0.5990 0.7447 
C AJBP63 0.5596 0.2565 0-4584 
ACA63X 0.9483 0.7922 0.8353 
ACU63X 0.9352 0-8541 0.9 133 
AFLCI03X 0.9479 0.8617 0.9091 
AFSCH63X 0.6992 0.6169 0-8823 
CCE63X 0.9184 0.7047 0.7673 
CCCUS63X 0.9313 0.8035 0.8627 
CSFC63X 0.9632 0.8851 0.9189 
CBA63X 0.9444 0.8206 0.8690 
IFCH63X 0.8859 0.8530 0.9629 
BUSOBG63 0.8848 0.6976 0.7884 
NASC63X 0.9369 0.8372 0.8936 
NF063X 0.6776 0.496 1 0-7322 
NFU63X 0.8164 0.6604 0.8089 
NTV63X 0- 8563 0.7012 0.8189 
SCIT63X 0.8766 0.8288 0.9456 
UAH63X 0.9628 0.8812 0-9153 
LIBLB63X 0.5121 0.3788 0.7398 
UBH63X 0.6674 0. 5675 C.8 503 
ACTM V63X 0.8225 0.6615 0-8042 
TABLE 46 - Continued. 
SEMITE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIBE SAMPLE OF fiATEHS 
OBLIQUE PBIMCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER 2- 
ASC63 0.7937 0.7629 0.9612 
CHVC63 0.0796 0.8363 0.9508 
NCAC63 0.3469 0.7864 0.9285 
NSPE63 0.6316 0.4035 0.6308 
LCCB63 0.6930 0.6205 0-8944 
ACLU63 0.7664 0.4798 0.6261 
WPC63 0-7022 0.7141 0.9129 
AFT6J 0.6079 0.5684 0.9350 
NEA63 0. 4333 0.3800 0.7783 
LCV63X 0.6211 0.3456 0.5565 
ACA63X 0.9442 0.8311 0.8802 
CFA63X 0.0500 0.8002 0.9405 
CNFMF63X 0.7709 0.5811 0.7461 
FCNL63X 0.8440 0.6820 0.8080 
GNCON63X 0. 7935 0.7352 0.9266 
PAR63X 0.7374 0.6812 0.9238 
PCC863X 0.300 1 0. 6242 0.7801 
SOCHK63X 0.9121 0.8J26 0.9129 
LCTI63X 0.7616 0.7304 0.9590 
UOHAC63X 0.6577 0.47 07 0.7157 
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TABLE 47 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIBE SAMPLE OF RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLQSlEfi ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 3 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTEB MEMBERS 
1 28 
2 13 
3 5 
CLUSTEB 
VARIATION 
23.000000 
13.COOOOO 
5.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
22- 725286 
10.319004 
4. 136841 
P BOPOBTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8116 
0.7938 
0.8274 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
1.06S782 
0.598988 
0.42SS34 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 37.18113 
CLUSTEB 1- 
PBOPCBTION = 0.808285 
WITH 
VARIABLE 
OWN 
CLUSTEB 
NEXT 
HIGHEST 
H**2 
RATIO 
IPAA63 0.7347 0.5928 0.8069 
NAB 6 3 0.8499 0.7731 0.9096 
NALU63 0.5772 0.4925 0.8532 
NEIB63 0.8151 0.6660 0.8171 
C0NS63 0-8694 0.8265 0-9506 
TMSTB63 0.8042 0.5876 0.7306 
AET63 0.5955 0-5539 0.9301 
CARP63 0-5493 0.2632 0.4791 
ACA63X 0.9418 0.7987 0.8481 
ACU63X 0.9329 0.8806 0.9439 
AFLCI03X 0.9540 0.8394 0-8799 
AESCH63X 0.7076 0.5921 0.8368 
CCE63X 0.9087 0.7162 0-7881 
COCUS63X 0.9288 0.7826 0.8427 
CSFC63X 0.9615 0-8916 0-9274 
CUA63X 0.9497 0.7985 0.8408 
IECH63I 0.893 1 0.8315 0.9310 
BUSORG63 0.8784 0.6829 0.7774 
NASC63A 0. 9358 0.8262 0.8829 
NF063X 0.6646 0.5092 0.7662 
NFU63X 0. 8098 0.6586 0.8 132 
NTV63X 0.8513 0.7302 0.8578 
SCIT63X 0.8830 0.8073 0.9143 
UAH63X 0.9672 0.8625 0.89 17 
LCTY63X 0.7528 0.7093 0.9423 
LIBLB63X 0.5023 0.4051 0.8065 
UMU63X 0-6799 0.5328 0.7836 
ACTHV63X 0.8267 0.6278 0.7594 
TABLE 47 - Continued 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SCLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF BATEBS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
NSPE63 
LCV63X 
CFA63Z 
GNCON63X 
PCCW63X 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
ASC63 0.801 1 0.7679 0-9586 
CHVC63 0.9081 0.8350 0.9 195 
NCAC63 0-8671 0.7885 0.9094 
LCCR63 0.7151 0.6208 0.8681 
ACLU63 0.7704 0.6814 0.8845 
HPC63 0.8306 0.7126 0.8579 
NEA63 0.5436 0. 3855 0.7092 
ADA63X 0.9269 0.8413 0.9077 
CNFHP63X 0.7758 0-6573 0.8473 
FCNL63X 0.8283 0.7515 0.9073 
PAR63X 0. 735*1 0.6813 0.9271 
SOCWK63X 0.9112 0.8441 0.9264 
WCHAC63X 
1- 
0.7056 0.5085 0.7208 
0.7611 
0.8055 
0.8573 
0.8127 
0.9002 
0.5595 
0.5321 
0. 8065 
0.7456 
0.7280 
0-7351 
0.6606 
0.9407 
0.9174 
0-8087 
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TABLE 48 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIB £ 5 AMPLE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUNHARY FOB 4 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTEB MEMBERS 
1 28 
2 12 
3 5 
4 1 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
VABIATION 
28.000000 
12.000000 
5.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION PHOPOBTIOM 
EXPLAINED 
22.725286 
9.800979 
4. 136841 
1.000000 
EXPLAINED 
0.8116 
0.8167 
0.8274 
1.0000 
[PLAINED - 37-66311 PROPORTION = 
B-SQUARED WITH 
OWN NEXT B**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
IPAA63 0-7347 0.5928 0.8069 
NAB6J 0.8499 0.7732 0-9098 
NALU63 0.5772- 0.5041 0.8733 
NFIB63 0.8 15 1 • 0-6738 0-8266 
CONS63 0.8694 0-8279 0.9522 
TMSTB6 3 0-8042 0.5935 0.7380 
AFT63 0.5955 0. 553 1 0.9288 
CAHP63 0..5 49 3 0.2666 0.4854 
ACA63X 0.9418 0.8045 0.8542 
ACU63X 0.9329 0.8775 0-9405 
AFLCI03X 0.9540 0.8472 0.888 1 
AFSCM63X 0.7076 0- 5971 0.8437 
CCE63X 0.9087 0.7180 0.7901 
COCUS63X 0-9288 0.7891 0.8497 
CSFC63X 0-9615 • 0-8939 0.9298 
CNA63X 0.9497 0-8029 0.8453 
IFCH63X 0.8931 0.8353 0.9352 
BUSOBG63 0. 8784 0.6916 0.7873 
NASC63X 0.9358 0.8316 0.8886 
NF063X 0.6646 0.5151 0-7751 
NFU6JX 0-8098 0.6654 0.8216 
NTV63X 0.8513 0.7291 0-8564 
SCIT63X 0.8830 0.8140 0.9219 
UAH63X 0.9672 0.8676 0.8970 
LCTI63X 0.7528 0.7124 0.9464 
LIBLB63X 0- 5023 0.. 4029 0-8022 
UNU63X 0-6799 0.5447 0.8012 
ACTWV63X 0.8267 0.. 6327 0.7652 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
1.069782 
0.577260 
0.429534 
0.818763 
TABLE 48 - Continued. 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEfi SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATEBS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PRINCIPAL 
T_ 
COMPONENT CLUSTER ANAXISIS 
A SC 63 0.8042 0.7679 0.9549 
CHVC63 0-9002 0.8350 0-9276 
NCAC63 0.8647 0.7885 0.9119 
LCCB6J 0.7277 0.6208 0-8531 
ACLU63 0.7674 0.6814 0.8880 
BPC63 0.8225 0.7126 0.8664 
ADA63X 0.9342 0.8413 0.9006 
CNFHP63X 0.7805 0.6573 0.8422 
FCNL63X 0.8333 0.7515 0.9019 
PAB63X 0.7492 0.6818 0.9100 
SOCMK63X 0.9110 0.8441 0.9265 
I ROHAC63X 0.7062 0.5085 0.7201 J 
NSPE63 0.7611 0.5670 0.7450 
LCV63X 0.8055 0-5442 0.6756 
CFA63X 0.8573 0.8065 0.9407 
GNCON63X 0-8127 0.7456 0.9174 
4- 
PCCH63X 0.9002 0. 740 3 0-8223 
NEA63 1.0000 0.4924 0.4924 
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TABLE 49 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSIBB SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIRE SAHPIE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUMMABY FOB 5 CLUSIEBS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PROPORTION SECOND 
CLUSTEB MEMBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 16 16.000G0U 13.353031 0. 8346 0.464631 
2 12 12.000000 9.80 0979 0.8167 0.577260 
3 3 3.000000 2.596898 0.86 56 0.246940 
4 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
5 14 14.000000 11.685256 0.8347 0.504681 
TOTAL V ARIATION EXPLAINED = 38.43616 PROPORTION = 0.835569 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
R—SQUARED BITH 
CNN NEXT R**2 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
1 VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST BATIO 1 1 
NAB63 0.8383 0.8040 0.9591 
NALU 63 0.6178 0.5041 0.8160 
NFIB63 0.8173 0.7531 0.9214 
AFT63 0- 6579 0.5531 0.8407 
AFLCI03X 0-9706 0.8833 0.9101 
AFSCM63X 0.7366 0.6297 0.8550 
CFA63X 0.8487 0.. 8018 0.9448 
CUA63X 0.9581 0.8833 0.9219 
GNCON63X 0.8012 0.7336 0.9156 
IFCW63X 0.9249 0.8353 0.9031 
NASC63X 0.9185 0.8990 0.9787 
SCIT63X 0- 8951 0.8 160 0.9116 
UAN63X 0.9704 0.9105 0.9383 
LCTY63X 0-8 27 3 0. 7124 0.8612 
UHN63X 0.7397 0.5721 0.7735 
ACTNV63X 0.8309 0.7740 0.9315 
£ 
ASC63 0.8042 0.7556 0.9395 
CHVC63 0.9002 0-8362 0 . 9 290 
NCAC63 0.8647 0.7752 0.8965 
LCCR63 0.7277 0-6238 0.8572 
ACLU63 0.7674 0.6583 0-8579 
WPC63 0.8225 0.7067 0.8593 
ADA63X 0.9342 0.8735 0.9351 
CNFMP63X 0.7805 0.6453 0.8267 
FCNL63X 0.8333 0.7212 0. 8654 
PAB63X 0.7492 0.6940 0-9263 
SOCUK63X 0.9 110 0.8942 0.9815 
“1 HOMAC63X 0.7062 0.4711 0.6670 J 
NSPE63 C. 8507 0.5670 0.6665 
LCV63X 0.8978 0.5442 0.6061 
PCCH63X 0.8483 0.74 03 0-8726 
4“ 
NEA63 1.0000 0.4924 0.4924 
TABLE 49 - Continued. 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOB TEE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER 5- 
IPAA63 0.7628 0-6756 0.8856 
CO NS6J 0.8783 0-8279 0.9426 
THSTR63 0.8038 0. 7548 0.9390 
CABP63 0.6008 0.4609 
0.8767 
0.7671 
ACA63X 0.9517 0.9212 
ACU6JX 0.9318 0.8779 0.9421 
CCE63X 0.9440 0-8174 0.8658 
C0CUS63X 0-9134 0-8962 0.9812 
CSFC63X 0.9579 0.9110 0.9510 
B0S0BG63 0-8989 0-8103 0-9014 
NF063X 0.7457 0.5497 0.7372 
NFU63X 0.8531 0.7212 0-8454 
NTV63X 0.8563 0.7844 0.9161 
LIBLB63X 0.5867 0.4029 0.6868 
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TABLE 50 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOE THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF HAIEBS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 6 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
16 
6 
4 
1 
14 
5 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
16.000000 
6.000000 
4.000000 
1.000000 
14.000000 
5.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
13.614021 
4.995402 
3.330644 
1.000000 
11.685256 
4.322043 
PBCPORTICN 
EXPLAINED 
0.8509 
0.8326 
0.8327 
1.0000 
0.8347 
0. 8644 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.456858 
0.339398 
0.292830 
0.504681 
0.338 V 30 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 38.94736 PROPORTION = 0.846682 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE 
B-SQUABED RUN 
0 SiN NEXT 
CLUSTER HIGHEST 
R**2 
RATIO 
1- 
NAB63 0-8476 0.8040 0-9466 
NALU63 0.6225 0.5037 0.809 1 
NFIB63 0.8204 0. 753 1 0.9179 
AFLCIOJX 0-9702 0.88J3 0.9105 
AFSCM63X 0.7389 0.6297 0-8522 
CFA63X 0.8508 0.7757 0.9118 
CHA63X 0. 9 561 0.8833 0.9239 
GNCON63X 0.7963 0.7407 0.9302 
IFCH63X 0.9 310 0.8 122 0.8724 
NASC63X 0. 92 1 1 0.8990 0.9760 
SCIT63X 0.8988 0. 816 0 0.9079 
SOCUK63X 0.9077 0.8555 0.9426 
UA063X 0-9689 0. 9105 0-9397 
LCTI63X 0. 8305 0.6979 0.3404 
UMR63X 0. 7323 0.5721 0.7812 
ACTNV63X 0.8208 0.7740 0.9429 
CHVC 63 0.9083 0.8362 0.9206 
NCAC63 0.8951 0..7863 0.8785 
LCCR63 0.7866 0.6346 0.8067 
WPC63 0.8634 0.7067 0.8166 
PAR63X 0.7968 0.7064 0.8866 
ROMAC63X 0.7452 0.5442 0.7303 
NSPE63 0.8 209 0.5447 0.6636 
ACLU63 0.7976 0.6873 0.8617 
LCV63X 0.86 57 0.. 5 0 23 0.5803 
PCCU63X 0.8464 0.6936 0.8 195 
‘T" 
NEA63 9.0000 0..4765 0.4765 
TABLE 50 - Continued. 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE ENTIRE SAflPLE OF RATERS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
PRINCIPAL CCflPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
IPAA63 0-7628 0-6709 0-8796 
C0NS63 0.8783 0-8105 0.9228 
TMSTR63 0.8038 0-7477 0.9303 
CARP63 0-6008 0.4508 0.7503 
ACA63X 0-9517 0.8797 0-9243 
ACU63Z 0-9318 0.8822 0.9467 
CCE63X 0-9440 0.8207 0.8693 
COCUS63X 0.9134 0.8975 0-9826 
CSPC63X 0-9579 0-9145 0.9547 
BUSOHG63 0.3989 0.8059 0- 8965 
NF063X 0.7457 0.5640 0.7563 
NFU63X 0.8 531 0.7218 0.8462 
NTV63X 0.8563 0-7964 0.9301 
LIBL863X 0-5867 0.4308 0.7342 
ASC6 3 0-8889 0.7551 0.8495 
AFT63 0.7242 0-6229 0.860 1 
A0A63X 0-9126 0.8755 0.9593 
CNFHP63X 0-8848 0.6498 0.7344 
FCNL6JX 0.9 115 0.7201 0.7900 
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dimensions present at the fifth iteration. For example 
at the eighth iteration [Table 51] C2 has two Christian 
groups, the ACLU, and two woman's groups. Cl retains 
three business organizations; C5 contains conservative 
organizations, such as Conservatives Against Liberal 
Legislation along with major business organizations. 
2 
At ten iterations [Table 54], a scan down the R 
2 
Ratio column reveals numerous values with R ratio 
above .85. There is not clear separation among the set 
of clusters. If one were to name the four clusters 
having more than three members. Cl is labor, although 
it contains the Chamber, General Contractors, and small 
business (NFIB). C2 is a Christian/Conservative 
collection with the Woman's Political Caucus being the 
most anomalous member. Business might be the name for 
C5, although it contains the Teamsters' and Carpenters' 
unions and both farm organizations. Cluster 6 is a 
liberal cluster. Inspection of the inter-cluster 
correlations [Table 55] shows. Cl, C5, and C6, the 
labor, business, and liberal clusters to be positively 
and strongly correlated. The correlation of C2, the 
conservative cluster, with the above three clusters is 
strongly negative. 
The results of clustering a diverse group of 47 
organizations on their similarities in rating members 
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TABLE 51 
SEMITE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
POM THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF fiATEHS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY POM 7 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER MEMBERS 
1 15 
2 6 
3 4 
4 1 
5 14 
6 5 
7 1 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
15.000000 
6.000000 
4.000000 
1.000000 
14.000000 
5.000000 
1.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
13. 0094>00 
4.995402 
3.330644 
1.000000 
11. 685256 
4.322043 
1.000000 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8673 
0-8326 
0-8327 
1.0000 
0- 83 47 
0.B644 
1.0000 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.409593 
0.339398 
0.292830 
0.504681 
0-338730 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 39.34294 PROPORTION = 0.855281 
B-SQUARED WITH 
OVN NEXT R •♦2 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
1 ' 
NAB63 0.8494 0.8040 0.9466 
NFIB63 0.8232 0.7531 0-9148 
AFLCI03X 0.9691 0.8833 0.9115 
AFSCH63X 0.7467 0.6297 0-8434 
CPA63X 0.8506 0.7757 0.9120 
CM A6 3 X 0.9530 0.8833 0.9269 
GNCON63X 0.7973 0.7407 0.9290 
IFCM63X 0- 9316 0.8 122 0.8719 
NASC63X 0.9211 0.8990 0.9760 
SCIT63X 0.8999 0.8160 0.9068 
SOCMK63X 0-9069 0.8555 0.9434 
U AM 6 31 0.9684 0.9105 0.9402 
LCTY63X 0.8321 0.6979 0.8388 
UHM63X 0.7340 0.5721 0-7795 
ACTHV63X 0.8264 0.7740 0.9 365 
CHVC63 0.9083 0„8362 0.9206 
NCAC6 3 0.8951 0.7935 0-8865 
LCCR63 0.7866 0.6351 0.8073 
MPC63 0.8634 0.7067 0.8186 
PAR63X 0.7968 0.7017 0.8807 
*1 MOHAC63X 0.7452 0.5442 0.7303 
NSPE63 0.8209 0.5447 0.6636 
ACLU63 0.7976 0.6873 0.8617 
LCV63X 0.8657 0-5023 0-5803 
4- 
PCCH63X 0.8464 0.6936 0.8195 
NEA63 1.0000 0.4765 0.4765 
TABLE 51 - Continued. 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB SCLUTiCNS 
FOB THE ENTLBE SAMPLE OF BAIEBS 
CLOSIEB 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
c 
PBJNCIPAL COMPONENT CLOSTEB ANALYSIS 
J 
IPAA63 0-7628 0.6754 0.8854 
CONS 63 0.8783 0-8111 0.9236 
IHSTR63 0-8038 0.7554 0.9399 
CABP63 0.6008 0.4477 0.7451 
ACA63X 0.9517 0.8830 0.9278 
AC063X 0.9318 0.8840 0.9486 
CCE63X 0.9440 0.8230 0.8718 
C0CUS63X 0.9134 0.8967 0.9818 
CSFC63X 0.9579 0.9159 0.9561 
BUSOBG63 0.8989 0.8079 0.8987 
NF063X 0.7457 0.5640 0.7563 
NFU63X 0.8531 0.7242 0.8489 
NTV63X 0.8563 0.7989 0.9330 
C. 
LIBLE63X 0.5867 0.4308 0.7342 
o 
ASC63 0.8889 0.7544 0.8487 
AFT63 0.7242 0.6260 0.8645 
A DA63X 0.9126 0.8747 0.9585 
CNFMP63X 0.8848 0.6498 0.7344 
7. 
FCNL63X 0.9115 0. 7224 0.7925 
/ 
NALU 63 1.0000 0.5860 0.5860 
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TABLE 52 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIBE SAflPLE OF BATBBS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL CONPOHEMT CLUSTEB ANALYSIS 
CLUSTEB SUNHABI FOB 8 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTEB VARIATION PBOPOBTION SECOND 
CLUSTEB HEflBEBS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 15 15.000000 13.009600 0.8673 0.409593 
2 5 5.000000 4.258289 0.8517 0.300978 
3 3 3.000000 2.596898 0.8656 0.246940 
4 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
5 14 14.000000 11.685256 0.8347 0.504681 
6 5 5.000000 4.322043 0.8644 0.338730 
7 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
8 2 2.000000 1.808764 0.9044 0. 191236 
TOTAL 7AHIATIOM EXPLAINED = 39.68085 PROPORTION = 0.862627 
R-SQOABED HITH 
OH 1 NEXT H**2 
VARIABLE CLUSTEB HIGHEST BATIO 
CLUSTEB I- 
NAB63 0.84 94 0.8040 0.9466 
NFIE63 0- 823 2 0. 7531 0.9148 
AFLCI03X 0.9691 0.8833 0.9115 
AFSCH63X 0.7467 0.6297 0.8434 
CFA6JX 0. 8506 0-7757 0.9120 
CHA63I 0-9530 0.8833 0.9269 
GNC0N63X 0.7973 0.7407 0.9290 
IFCH6JX 0.9316 0.8 122 0.8719 
NASC63X 0.9211 0.8990 0.9760 
SCIT63X 0.8999 0.8160 0.9068 
SOCHK63X 0.9069 0.8436 0.9302 
U AH 6 32 0.9684 0.9105 0-9402 
LCTX63X 0.8321 0.6979 0.8388 
UNH63X 0.7340 0. 5721 0.7795 
ACTHV63X 0.8264 0.7740 0.9365 
CLUSTEB 4" 
CH VC 63 0.9210 0.8362 0.9080 
NCAC63 0.9020 0.7935 0.8797 
ACLU63 0.7896 0.6633 0.8400 
HPC63 0. 8697 0.7067 0.8126 
UOHAC63X 0.7760 0.5545 0.7145 
CLUSTEB r. J 
MSPE63 0.8507 0.5447 0.6403 
LCV63X 0.8978 0.5153 0.5740 
CLUSTEB 
PCCH63X 0.8483 0.6891 0.8122 
NEA63 1.0000 0.5423 0.5423 
TABLE 52 - Continued 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE EATING CIUSIEfi SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIBE SAMPLE OF BATEBS 
CLOSTEB 
CLOSTEB 
CLOSTEB 
CLOSTEB 
•EINCIPAL COMPONENT CLOSTEB ANALYSIS 
IPAA63 0.7628 0.6754 0-8854 
C0NS63 0. 8783 0.8 111 0-9 236 
TMSTB63 0.8038 0.7554 0.9399 
CABP63 0.6008 0.4477 0.7451 
ACA63X 0.9517 0.8830 0.9278 
AC063X 0.9318 0.8840 0-9486 
CCE63X 0.9440 0.8230 0.8718 
CCCUS63X 0.9134 0.8967 0-9818 
CSFC63X 0.9579 0.9159 0.9561 
BOSOBG6J 0.8989 0.8079 0.8987 
NF063X 0.7457 0.5511 0.7390 
NFU63X 0.853 1 0-7242 0.8489 
N1V63X 0.8563 0.7989 0.9330 
LIBLB63X 0.5867 0.4084 0.6960 
ASC63 0.8889 0.7544 0.8487 
AFT6J 0.7242 0.6260 0.8645 
AEA63X 0.9126 0-8747 0-9585 
CNFMP63X 0.8848 0.6601 0.7460 
FCNL63X 0.91 15 0.7224 0-7925 
NAL063 1. 0000 0.5860 0.5860 
LCCB63 0.9044 0.6714 0.7424 
PAH 63 X 0.9044 0.7017 0.7759 
TABLE 53 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE CF BATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALISIS 
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOB 9 CLUSTEBS 
CLUSTER VARIATION PfiOPOBTICN SECOND 
CLUSTER MEMBERS VARIATION EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EIGENVALUE 
1 14 14.000000 12.094590 0.8639 0.402291 
2 5 5-000000 4.258289 0.8517 0.3 C 0978 
3 3 3.000000 2.596898 0.8656 0.246940 
4 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
5 14 14.000000 12.036469 0.8597 0.492512 
6 5 5.000000 4.3 22043 C.8644 0.338730 
7 1 1.C0C000 1.000000 1.0000 
8 2 2.000000 1.808764 0.9044 0.191236 
9 1 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED — 40-11705 PROPORTION = 0.87211 
R-SQUARED NITH 
OWN NEXT fi**2 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
1 
NAB63 0.8471 0.8134 0.9602 
NFIB63 0. 8227 0.7686 0.9343 
AFLCI03 X 0. 9678 0.8980 0.9280 
AFSCM63X 0.7499 0. 643 1 0.8577 
CFA63X 0. 8501 0.7757 0.9 125 
CWA63X 0. 9506 0.9013 0.9461 
GNCON63X 0.7963 0.7407 0.9301 
IFCW63X 0.9341 0.6228 C.8808 
SCIT63X 0.3981 0.8329 0-9274 
SGCWK63X 0.9080 0.8436 0.9290 
UAW63X 0.9649 0.9255 0.9592 
LCTY63X 0.3400 0.6979 0.8309 
UHN63X 0.7398 0.. 58 91 0.7963 
CLUSTER 
ACTWV63X "Y_ T1 , . , _ 0.8252 0.78 10 0.9464 
t. 
CHVC63 0-92 10 0.. 8 3 52 C.9068 
NCAC63 0.9020 0-7881 0.8738 
ACLU63 0.7896 0..6633 0.8400 
MPC63 0.8697 0.7040 0.8095 
CLUSTER 
WOMAC63X 0.7760 0.5545 0.7145 
NSPE63 0.8507 0.5447 0. 6403 
LCV63X 0.8978 0.5153 0-5740 
CLUSTER 
PCCW63X 
H 
0.8 483 0.6891 0.8 122 
NFA63 1.0000 0.5423 0.5423 
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TABLE 53 - Continued. 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLOSTEfl SOLUTIONS 
FOB THE ENTIBE SAMPLE GF BAXEBS 
OBLIQUE PBINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTEfi ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
5- 
IPAA63 0. 76 n 0.6720 0-8829 
CONS 63 0.8833 0-8026 0.9087 
T MSTB63 0-8023 0-7548 C-9409 
CABP63 0.5970 0.4409 0.7385 
ACA63X 0-9 530 0.8761 0.9 192 
ACU63X 0.9370 0.8778 0.9368 
CCE63X 0- 9438 0-8160 0.8646 
COCUS6 31 0.9264 0.8907 0.9614 
CSFC6 3X 0-9621 0.9099 0-9457 
BUSOBG63 0.9068 0.7997 0.8819 
NASC63X 0.9225 0.9085 0- 9848 
NF063X 0.7365 0.5414 0.7351 
NFU63X 0-8564 0-7158 0.8358 
C 
NTV63X 0.8482 O-7963 0.9388 
A SC 6 3 0.8889 0.7499 0-8437 
AFT63 0-7242 0,6285 0-8679 
ADA63X 0.9126 0-8740 0-9576 
CNFMP63X 0- 8848 0-6601 0-7460 
7 
FCNL63X 0-9115 0.7200 0.7898 
o 
NALU63 1.0000 0.5843 0.5843 
LCCH63 0.9044 0.6714 0.7424 
o 
PAB6JX 0.9044 0.6984 0. 7722 
LIBLE63X 1.0000 0.5345 C-5345 
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TABLE 54 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SCLUTICNS 
FCR THE ENTIRE SAfLPIE OF RATERS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER SUflBARI FOR 10 CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER BERBERS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
30 
15 
S 
3 
1 
7 
c 
•J 
1 
2 
1 
2 
CLUSTER 
VARIATION 
15.000000 
9.000000 
3.000000 
1.000000 
7.000000 
5-CCC000 
1.000000 
2.000000 
1.000000 
2.000000 
VARIATION 
EXPLAINER 
13-073895 
8.188569 
2. 596898 
3.000000 
5.766864 
4.322043 
1.000000 
1-808764 
1-000000 
1-755081 
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 40.51211 
PROPORTION 
EXPLAINED 
0.8716 
0.9098 
0.8656 
1.0000 
0. 8238 
0.8644 
1.0000 
0.9044 
1. 000 0 
0-8775 
* * . ® 
PROPORTION = 
SECOND 
EIGENVALUE 
0.424359 
0.243740 
0.246S40 
0.409421 
0.338730 
0. 191236 
0. 244919 
0.880698 
fi-SQUARED 
OWN 
fcilTH 
NEXT R**2 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTER 2- 
CLUSTER 
VARIABLE CLUSTER HIGHEST RATIO 
NFIB 63 0.8210 0.7408 0.9023 
AFLCI03X 0.9710 0.8871 0.9 136 
AFSCM63X 0.7409 0.6523 0.8805 
CEA63X 0.8528 0.7757 C.9096 
COCUS63X 0.9100 0.8759 0.9626 
CWA63X 0.9566 0.8711 0.9106 
GNCON63X 0.8074 0.7407 0.9 174 
IFCW63X 0-9347 0.8411 0-8998 
NASC63X 0.9234 0.8979 0.9724 
SCIT63X 0.9002 0-8313 0.9235 
SOC4K63X 0.9003 0.8582 0.9532 
UAS63X 0.9723 0.9142 0.9402 
LCTY63X 0-8245 0.6979 0.8465 
UHW63X 0-7258 0.5804 0.7997 
ACTWV63X 0.8330 0.7464 0.8960 
NAB63 0.8723 0.8288 0.9502 
CHVC63 0.9357 0.8046 0-8599 
NCAC63 0.8928 0.7858 0.8802 
CONS63 0.9155 0.8133 0.8884 
UPC 6 3 0.8285 0.6940 0.8377 
ACA63X 0-9325 0..8920 0.9566 
ACU63X 0.9618 0.8835 0.9186 
CSFC63X 0.9740 0.9184 0.9429 
NTV63X 0.8755 0.7876 0.8996 
NSPE63 0.8507 0.54-4 7 0.6403 
LCV63X 0- 8978 0.5477 0.6 101 
PCCB63X 0.8483 0.6891 0.8 122 
NEA63 1.0000 0.4884 0.4884 
CLUSTER 
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TABLE 54 - Continued. 
SEMATE LEGISLATIVE HATING CLUSTEB SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF HATEHS 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEfl 
CLUSTER 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
CLUSTEB 
8 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
IPAA63 Q-7S58 0., 6847 0.8604 
T MSTB63 0-8239 0.7563 0-9178 
CARP63 Q-6776 0.4497 0-6636 
CCE63X 0-9303 0-8710 0-9362 
BUSORG63 0-9144 0.. 8171 0.8935 
NF063X 0- 7509 0., 6 6 8 8 C-8907 
NFU63X 0-8738 0.7618 0-8718 
A SC 6 3 0.8889 0-7800 0-8775 
AFT63 0.7242 0-6280 0-8671 
ADA63X 0-9126 0-8749 0.9586 
CNFMP63X 0.8848 0-6643 0-7507 
FCNL63X 0.9115 0.7250 0-7954 
NALU63 1.Q00Q 0-5879 0.5879 
LCCB63 0-9044 0.6484 0.7169 
PAB63X 0.9044 0.6956 0.7692 
LIBLE63X 1.0000 0.5347 0. 534 7 
ACLU63 0-8775 0-6633 0.7558 
WOMAC 63X 0.8775 0-5899 0.6722 
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TABLE 55 
SENATE LEGISLATIVE BATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF BATEBS 
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL CCMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
CLUSTER 
0 
LUSTER 
10 
INTER-CLUSTER CORRELATIONS 
1 
1-000000 
-.950602 
0-779562 
0.618645 
0.913215 
0-916282 
-.766729 
0.856434 
-.638414 
0.766156 
6 
0-916282 
-.893799 
0.815152 
0.652098 
0.802991 
1.000000 
-.701255 
0.794833 
-.581610 
0.8 28 442 
2 
-.950602 
1.000000 
-.740336 
-.698840 
-.921292 
-.893799 
0.713162 
-.861872 
0.731247 
-.815777 
7 
-.766729 
0.713162 
-.575062 
-.397714 
-.684798 
-.701255 
I.OOOOCO 
-.690478 
0.429430 
-.555548 
3 
0-779562 
-.740336 
1.000000 
0.504448 
0.635020 
0.815152 
-.575062 
0.765281 
-.436490 
0.798843 
8 
0-856434 
-. 86 1872 
0.765281 
0.540086 
0.783823 
0.794833 
-.690478 
1.000000 
-.571948 
0-798091 
4 
0.618645 
-.698840 
0.504448 
1.000000 
0.542004 
0.652098 
-.397714 
0.540086 
-.479177 
0.668583 
9 
-.638414 
0.731247 
-.436490 
-.479177 
-.723136 
-.581610 
0.429430 
-.571948 
1.000000 
-.476351 
5 
0.913215 
-.921292 
0.635020 
C.542CQ4 
1.000000 
C.8C2991 
-.684798 
0.783823 
-.723136 
0.636510 
10 
0.766156 
-.815777 
0.798843 
0.668583 
0.636510 
0.828442 
-.555548 
C.79e091 
-. 476351 
1.QC0000 
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of the Senate throw doubt on the efficacy of using 
traditional definition of business/labor on 
conservative/liberal as dimensions or categories for 
PAC analysis. The memberships of the clusters at ten 
iterations show several clusters where co-members are 
from different origins. As important as the 
discrepancy between origin and instrumental goals are 
the frequent co-membership and the strong positive 
correlations among the business and labor 
organizations. 
•17 

